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ABSTRACT 
 
Curriculum Evolution at Air Command and Staff College 
in the Post-Cold War Era. (December 2010) 
William Robert Donovan II, B.S., Middle Tennessee State University; 
M.S., University of Arkansas 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Lynn M. Burlbaw 
 
 This qualitative study used a historical research method to eliminate the gap in 
the historical knowledge of Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) curriculum 
evolution in the post-Cold War era. This study is the only known analysis of the forces 
that influenced the ACSC curriculum and the rationale behind curricular change at 
ACSC in the post-Cold War era from the publication of the Skelton Report to the 
present. Data for this study were gathered through personal interviews with past and 
present members of the ACSC faculty and leadership, and review of published and 
unpublished historical ACSC curriculum documents. 
Research for this study revealed that the ACSC curriculum was continually in 
flux during this time period. At no time did the ACSC curriculum remain exactly the 
same as the previous academic year. The curriculum was responsive to external and 
internal influences. External influences were the Skelton Report, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, the Air University Commander, and 
world events. Internal influences include the ACSC Commandant and the ACSC faculty.  
 iv 
 The most significant and radical changes to the ACSC curriculum originated with 
those individuals or groups of individuals in positions of authority over military 
education institutions, primarily the Skelton Panel, Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, and 
ACSC Commandants. Many minor changes were made to the ACSC curriculum during 
this time. Significant curricular changes made were not lasting changes. New leadership 
at times eliminated all or large parts of the curriculum they inherited because of personal 
preference. The ACSC curriculum is therefore subject to potential cyclical curricular 
change coinciding with changes in military leadership, which averages every two years.  
This study concludes that the ACSC curriculum changed often, sometimes 
significantly, in the post Cold War era. The frequent curricular change frustrated many 
faculty members and led to periods of turmoil within ACSC. ACSC is not likely to 
realize a period of curriculum stability until the Air Force places limits on the scope of 
curricular change its leaders are allowed to make at ACSC without approval and 
considers assigning professional educators to leadership roles in its Professional Military 
Education institutions. This study recommends that the Air Force consider placing a 
system of checks and balances on the ability of ACSC Commandants to reinvent the 
curriculum and placing professional educators in the positions of Air University 
Commander and ACSC Commandant in order to slow the rate of curricular change and 
bring a level of stability to the ACSC curriculum.  
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 In November 1987, the Panel on Military Education, a congressional panel 
chaired by Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO) to review the Department of Defense 
implementation of the education provisions of the Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was formed. By 
convening this Panel, which became known as the Skelton Panel, the United States 
Congress was recognizing the vital role of Professional Military Education (PME) in 
national security. According to the Report, ―Creation of the Panel signifies recognition 
by the Congress that rigorous, high-quality professional military education (PME) is 
vital to the national security. It is an investment in the future military leadership for war 
and peace.‖1 In April 1989, the Skelton Panel published its report, which was critical of 
the PME system in the United States. The Skelton Report, as this report was called, 
criticized PME institutions for lack of rigor and intellectual content and recommended 
significant changes in the education of military officers, particularly those attending 
mid-level and senior-level schools. The Department of Defense then mandated that PME 
institutions implement the Skelton Report recommendations.  
 
 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of History of Education Quarterly. 
1 House Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth 
Congress, 1989, 11. 
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Seven months after the release of the Skelton Report, in November, 1989, the  
Berlin Wall was knocked down, followed months later by the peaceful reunification of 
Germany, signaling an end to the Cold War and the doctrine of containment that had 
shaped United States military organization and strategy for over forty years. Over the 
next few years, the United States military, facing an unfamiliar international security 
environment with the absence of its former Soviet Union adversary, began reevaluating 
its traditional roles and missions. David Jeremiah observed, 
 
 The security architecture of the Cold War and the doctrine of containment are 
 fading away. But without a formal mechanism to redraw disputed international 
 borders, we seem to be in for a prolonged period of regional conflict. Challenges 
 will proliferate as the world population grows, ethnic and religious antagonisms 
 are unleashed by the end of communism and political and military institutions 
 undergo change. Who will be our adversaries and how can the armed forces 
 prepare for the warfare of the future? Moreover, how can we plan sensibly in the 
 face of declining budgets and technological developments? What should be 
 scrapped, what must be procured, and how can rivers of information be reduced 
 to usable products and directed where they are needed? Looking ahead like the 
 great military visionaries of the past, and with the benefit of sound analysis, we 
 can begin to discern trends that have import for our national interests and the 
 joint capabilities which the services will need to defend them.2  
 
How did the military education system change as a result of the Skelton Report? How 
did PME change to meet the subsequent challenges of the new international security 
environment of the post-Cold War era? An answer to these questions is what underlies 
the research reported in this dissertation. 
 Modern military leaders have great intellectual demands placed upon them. 
Jeffrey McCausland states, ―The modern military leader must have something of the 
                                                 
2 David E. Jeremiah, ―What‘s Ahead for the Armed Forces?,‖ Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993, no. 1: 
25. 
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anthropologist, police officer, and diplomat. The need, therefore, is for the broadly—one 
might even say, the liberally—educated officer, whose hallmark is not the dogged 
clinging to eternal verities of military doctrine, but a versatility and self-awareness that 
are acquired in the schoolhouse no less than in the field.‖3 This intellectual development 
is the goal of PME institutions in the United States. This study will examine one PME 
institution, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). 
ACSC is the United States Air Force‘s intermediate-level PME institution located at 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The annual ACSC student body consists of 
approximately 600 students and is not limited to only Air Force officers. ACSC educates 
mid-career officers from all military services, Department of Defense civilians, and 
international officers in the operational employment of air and space forces.  
ACSC‘s roots date back to 1920 with the establishment of the Air Service School 
at Langley Field, Virginia, for officers assigned to the nascent air arm of the United 
States Army. The Air Service became the Air Corps in 1926, and the school name was 
changed to the Air Corps Tactical School. The Air Corps Tactical School moved to 
Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama in 1931, and served as the 
intellectual center of military aviation for the United States until the school closed with 
the outbreak of World War II. Following World War II, the Air Corps Tactical School 
was reopened as the Air Command and Staff School and was placed under the 
supervision of Air University (AU), an umbrella organization created to manage the 
                                                 
3 Jeffrey D. McCausland, ―Educating Leaders in an Age of Uncertainty—The Future of Military War 
Colleges.‖ Research study for the Smith Richardson Foundation, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, 
December 15, 2005: v.  
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educational needs of the newly-independent United States Air Force. In 1962, the school 
was renamed Air Command and Staff College, as it remains today. ACSC has undergone 
numerous structural and organizational changes in its history and today awards graduate 
degrees accredited through the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.      
The institutional history of ACSC as a PME school has been documented in 
historical time increments. ACSC, as with all Air Force organizations, writes an annual 
history report documenting significant events from the previous year. These annual 
history reports represent a chronological archive of ACSC, and serve as annual 
snapshots of the school and its operation. However, the reports are not written as a 
progressive analysis and synthesis that builds on the previous year of ACSC history or 
its curriculum evolution. 
 Short school histories were written to mark the twentieth and twenty-fifth 
anniversaries of ACSC in 1966 and 1971 respectively for the Air University Office of 
History.4 Brief histories of ACSC with a curricular focus are captured in two papers 
written in 1987 and 1988 that cover the school‘s first 40 years.5 Lastly, two Air Force 
Lieutenant Colonels, Richard Davis and Frank Donnini, briefly traced the development 
of Professional Military Education in the Air Force from its inception after World War II 
                                                 
4 Marvin I. Cohen and Richard H. Jackson, Captain, USAF, ―History of the Air Command and Staff 
College, 1946-1966‖ (working paper, Twentieth Anniversary Command Edition, Office of History, 
Headquarters Air University, 1966). 
5 James A. Harrold, ―A Historical Analysis of Basic Air Force Doctrine Education Within the United 
States Air Force Air Command and Staff College, 1947-1987‖ (master‘s thesis, Air Force Institute of 
Technology, 1987); James D. Tatum, ―Historical Perspective of Air Command and Staff College 
Curriculum, 1946-1987‖ (working paper, Office of History, Headquarters Air University, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama, 1988). 
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through the 1980s, including an overview of the historical development of ACSC and its 
curriculum.6  
 Moreover, some histories of PME institutions concentrate on exploring the 
factors leading to the institution‘s founding and largely focus on the development of 
organizational structure. In histories of the Army War College, curriculum is covered in 
broad terms with little in-depth analysis of curriculum evolution.7 Likewise, histories of 
the Naval War College and the Army Command and General Staff College focus on the 
founding of the institution and evolving organizational structures instead of curriculum.8 
Robert Gest made the same observation in his doctoral dissertation in which he traced 
the curriculum evolution of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), a senior-
level PME institution. Gest stated, ―Most histories of military colleges have sought to 
chronicle the all-inclusive institutional development: programs, procedures, and 
organizational structure. Thus, for the most part, they have failed to deal specifically 
with the variety of agents who acted on the curriculum to give it form and structure.‖9  
                                                 
6 Richard L. Davis and Frank Donnini, Professional Military Education for Air Force Officers: Comments 
and Criticisms (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991). 
7 Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Alumni Association of the U.S. Army War College, 1984); George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The 
U.S. Army War College, 1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the U.S. Army 
War College, 1967). 
8 Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval 
Profession (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977); Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth 
Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 
1881-1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978). 
9 Robert Gest III, ―The evolution of the curriculum of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1924-
1988: A search for rigor‖ (doctoral dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1990), 
4. 
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Statement of the Problem 
 
 There is a significant gap in the historical knowledge of ACSC curriculum 
evolution because the post-Cold War era has not been fully analyzed. None of the 
existing literature on ACSC offers an exploration of how and why ACSC curriculum has 
evolved from the publication of the Skelton Report and the end of the Cold War to the 
present. The problem therefore, is a lack of historical analysis of ACSC curriculum, 
particularly in the post-Cold War era. 
 The purpose of this study is to chronicle the changes that occurred in the ACSC 
curriculum between the years 1990 and 2006. The study begins with the year 1990 and 
concludes in 2006. The year 1990 was chosen as a beginning date for two reasons. First, 
the year 1990 is a significant year in PME history as a result of the publication of the 
Skelton Report. The Skelton Report was published in November 1989 and was critical of 
PME curriculum across all the service schools, particularly the Air Force schools. The 
Skelton Report recommended far-reaching changes to transform the entire PME system.  
 Second, 1990 marks the end of the Cold War with the peaceful reunification of 
Germany. With the end of the Cold War and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, 
United States military forces no longer were facing a single, peer competitor threat that 
had defined the international security environment for the previous forty years. The 
United States military now faced an uncertain international security environment which 
forced a reevaluation of military organization, roles and missions, including the focus of 
Professional Military Education. The year 2006 was chosen as an end date because 
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changes in the top echelons of Air Force leadership took place during the year with a 
new Air Force Chief of Staff, a new Air University Commander, and a new ACSC 
Commandant.  
Research Questions 
 
 This study fills a historical gap in Professional Military Education literature by 
addressing this central question:  
How has the curriculum at ACSC evolved since the publication of the Skelton  
 
Report and the end of the Cold War?  
 
The following supporting questions provide focus to the study and construct a 
framework for understanding the influences that have shaped the ACSC curriculum in 
the post-Cold War era.   
1. What were the external and internal influences on the curriculum? 
2. How were external and internal influences manifested in the curriculum? 
3. What factors facilitate or impede curricular change relative to external and 
internal influences? 
External influences include the recommendations of official Boards and Commissions, 
influential military and civilian personnel not assigned to ACSC, and domestic or global 
social, economic, and political events. The input of students and faculty of ACSC, the 
educational philosophy of ACSC leadership, and technological changes related to 
pedagogy and practice, classified as internal influences, will also be explored to 
determine what, if any, impact they had on the curriculum.  
 8 
Significance of the Study 
 
 Curriculum planners need a solid understanding of the past in order to have a 
clear sense of direction and avoid counterproductive activities.  O.L. Davis states, 
I contend that historical studies of curriculum should help us to understand the 
antecedents of the present course of study and of our professional field. 
Possessing understanding, we may explore contemporary justifications, analyze 
new proposals, and, informed, invent more appropriate, more consistent, more 
valid curriculum.10  
 
Therefore, a historical awareness of how and why curriculum evolved as it did informs 
development of current and future curricula. In planning curriculum, educational 
institutions determine the knowledge they feel is important enough to impart to their 
students based on a sense of what is best for society.  
 As Gest points out, this is especially important for PME institutions because the 
American public has a vested interest in how well its military officers are educated due 
to the far-reaching consequences that could result from a cadre of senior military leaders 
unprepared to successfully cope with today‘s volatile international security 
environment.11 Thus, this study will add to the existing knowledge of curriculum history 
at ACSC, and provide understanding of past curricular decisions that can inform future 
curricular decisions at ACSC.  
 Examining the historical evolution of curriculum at ACSC since the end of the 
Cold War will provide understanding of how the curriculum has changed to meet the 
recommendations of the Skelton Report and meet the challenges presented by the post- 
                                                 
10 O.L. Davis, Jr., ―The Nature and Boundaries of Curriculum History: A Contribution to Dialogue over a 
Yearbook and its Review,‖ Curriculum Inquiry 7, no. 2 (1977): 157. 
11 Robert Gest III, ―The evolution of the curriculum of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1924-
1988: A search for rigor‖ (doctoral dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1990). 
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Cold War international security environment. Because the security of the United States 
depends largely upon the preparedness of its military leadership, it is incumbent upon 
the civilian leadership of the United States to periodically review the effectiveness of 
PME curriculum in preparing its military leaders for current and future security 
challenges. This study will contribute to that review.   
Definition of Terms 
 
 Certain terms used in this study are common in the military vernacular, but are 
not well known to most civilians. These terms are defined as follows to assist the reader 
in placing these terms in their proper context. 
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (ACSC):  Located at Maxwell Air Force 
Base in Montgomery, Alabama, Air Command and Staff College is the Air Force‘s 
intermediate-level PME institution that instructs mid-career officers in the operational 
employment of air and space power. The school academic year currently is 10-months 
long, conducted from August to June each year. ACSC is accredited through the 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools to award graduates a master‘s degree in 
Military Operational Art and Science.     
AIR UNIVERSITY (AU):  Located at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, 
Alabama, Air University was established in 1946 as a umbrella headquarters 
organization to oversee the Air Force‘s PME school system, which today includes the 
Air and Space Basic Course, Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, 
and Air War College (all for commissioned officers), and various PME schools for 
enlisted personnel as well.      
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CHIEF OF STAFF:  The senior military commander of the United States Air Force or 
United States Army. The senior military commander of the United States Navy is called 
the Chief of Naval Operations and the senior military commander of the United States 
Marine Corps is called the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The position of Chief of 
Staff carries four-star general rank.     
COMMANDANT:  The senior military commander of Air Command and Staff College.  
The person occupying the position of Commandant is usually a Brigadier General (one-
star general) or a senior Colonel waiting for promotion to Brigadier General.     
INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL PME:  This PME level is the second level in a four-level 
hierarchical PME system, which is made up of primary, intermediate, senior, and flag 
officer (general officer) levels.      
JOINT:  Two or more military service departments working together in a particular 
activity, operation, or organization.    
MID-LEVEL CAREER OFFICERS:  Commissioned officers with between twelve and 
fourteen years of service who expect to remain in the service for a minimum twenty-year 
career. Generally, these officers carry the rank of major.     
Limitations and Delimitations 
 
 This study contains limitations and delimitations. This study is limited by: 
1. The availability of documents related to ACSC‘s curriculum in the period under study. 
Some documents may be classified and unavailable, or no longer exist. 
2. Data gathered through personal interviews. Individuals with the experiences and 
insight sought may be incapacitated, have passed away, or otherwise not be available for 
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an interview. In addition, some interviewees may be reluctant to share everything they 
know if the knowledge they share could reflect negatively upon ACSC or those 
personnel assigned, past or present, to ACSC.   
 The delimitations of this study include the following: 
1. ACSC is the only PME institution examined in this study. No other PME institution 
within the Air Force or other military service departments is considered outside of 
background context.  
2. This study examines only the resident curriculum of ACSC, and excludes the 
curriculum of ACSC‘s distance learning program.  
3. This study will not analyze ACSC‘s curriculum evaluation process for internal 
validity. ACSC survey‘s its students and faculty during each academic year for feedback 
regarding all facets of the ACSC experience, including its curriculum. In addition, 
ACSC survey‘s the superior officers of its graduates two years after graduation to 
receive feedback on how well ACSC prepared its graduates to perform in their new 
positions. This study will consider ACSC‘s curriculum evaluation process only in the 
context of how feedback impacted curricular decisions.  
 12 
CHAPTER II 
 
 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 Three areas of literature were reviewed for this study. The first section presents 
the relevant literature on military education. The second section is devoted to the review 
of literature written about curriculum theory and history and the third section is a review 
of adult education literature. Together, these sections help formulate the conceptual 
framework of this study.   
Military Education 
 
 Well prepared leaders are the heart of United States military capability—and will 
continue to be the most critical element in the military‘s ability to navigate the changes 
inherent in today‘s volatile international security environment. Success in war depends 
as much on intellectual superiority as it does on numerical or technological superiority. 
The United States military therefore, places great value on refining the intellectual 
capabilities of its officer corps through PME.  
 The importance of PME to the United States cannot be overstated. In fact, 
creation of a Congressional Panel on Military Education in 1987 and the release of its 
report in 1989 signify recognition by the United States Congress of the vital role of PME 
to national security. According to the Report, ―Creation of the Panel signifies 
recognition by the Congress that rigorous, high-quality professional military education 
(PME) is vital to the national security. It is an investment in the future military 
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leadership for war and peace.‖12 In creating the Panel, Hon. Les Aspin, Chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee, sought to review the Depart of Defense‘s plans for 
implementing the joint education dictates of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that 
reorganized the Department of Defense with the objective of strengthening the joint 
elements of the military. In addition, the Panel was to ―assess the ability of the current 
Department of Defense military education system to develop professional military 
strategists, joint war fighters, and tacticians.‖13 The Skelton Report acknowledged that 
senior United States military officers must be able to think strategically and contribute to 
the development and execution of military and national security strategy, and that the 
PME system is a key contributor to strategic thinking.14 
  PME is an investment in future military capability. The critical role of PME is to 
prepare officers to meet the increasingly complex challenges in sustaining the global 
leadership of the United States and to cope with revolutionary changes in the military 
profession.15 An analysis of the skills required of senior military officers was put forth in 
1957 by John Masland and Laurence Radway, who argue that Professional Military 
Education prepares military officers for the policy roles they relate: 
 It is obviously not enough for the armed forces to provide good soldiers, sailors, 
 and airman, and the leaders necessary to command them in battle. Today, many 
 of these leaders are called upon to work closely with foreign affairs experts, 
 industrial managers, scientists, labor leaders, and educators. They participate in 
 the drafting and promotion of legislation, in the preparation of a national budget, 
 and in the determination of the American position on a wide variety of foreign 
                                                 
12 House Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 
1989, 11. 
13 Ibid, v. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and 
Progress (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997).  
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 policy issues. They are required to understand, to communicate with, and to 
 evaluate the judgment of political leaders, officials of other executive agencies, 
 and countless specialists; they must make sound judgments themselves on 
 matters which affect a wide variety of civilian concerns. They are called upon to 
 evaluate the motivations and capabilities of foreign nations and to estimate the 
 effects of American action or inaction upon these nations. And above all, the new 
 role of military leaders requires of them a heightened awareness of the principles 
 of our democratic society.16   
 
 Certain competencies and traits are necessary for senior officers to possess if 
they are to effectively wield the United States‘ military instrument of national power to 
achieve national objectives. These include a solid knowledge of the politico-military 
context in which United States and allied forces are employed, a thorough knowledge of 
the ways and means of proper force employment, and the ability to foster a warrior spirit 
(esprit de corps) which inculcates an adherence to a code of ethics and sense of 
community which distinguishes the profession of arms from other occupations.17 Also, 
senior officers must learn to think critically, recognize the limits on resources and 
subsequent impacts these limits have on operations, and understand the role of 
diplomacy and economics in development of national security strategy; they must 
become war fighters and strategists.18 In addition, a broad military education provides 
the important qualities of independent thought, mature judgment, analytical skills, and 
self-reliance that have been present in great military commanders throughout history.19 
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 The ability to employ the high-tech weaponry of the twenty-first century is 
critical for senior military commanders today. The United States invests enormous 
amounts of money for advanced weapons technologies; therefore, senior military 
commanders need to understand the tactical and strategic effects the use of these 
technologies can produce. Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO) reminds us that these new 
technologies are useless unless they are employed by military leaders who know how to 
use them effectively on the battlefield through an understanding of the art of warfare, 
which is a key component of PME.20  
 The Department of Defense publishes a dictionary of military and associated 
terms in order to standardize the terminology used by all Department of Defense 
components. This dictionary, Joint Publication 1-02, defines military education as ―the 
systematic instruction of individuals in subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the 
science and art of war.‖21 This is a very broad definition. A more specific definition is 
given in Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 
published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. PME is defined as educational programs designed 
to produce: 
 Graduates prepared to operate at appropriate levels of war in a joint environment 
 and capable of generating quality tactical, operational and strategic thought from 
 a joint perspective; Critical thinkers who view military affairs in the broadest 
 context and are capable of identifying and evaluating likely changes and 
 associated responses affecting the employment of U.S. military forces; Senior 
 officers who can develop and execute national military strategists that effectively 
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 employ the armed forces in concert with other instruments of national power to 
 achieve the goals of national security strategy and policy.22  
 
Although very specific, this definition of military education by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is lengthy and of limited utility in academic writing.  
 More concise definitions of military education have been put forth in scholarly 
work. Military education has been defined as ―how society, specifically Western Europe 
and the United States, has prepared their military leaders to deal with war.‖23 In addition, 
military education has been defined as an ―educational system used by the armed forces 
to develop officers capable of coping with the issues of national security.‖24 Each of the 
definitions of military education put forth is essentially stating that military education 
prepares officers to lead military forces in war.   
In the military context, education is not the same as training. Military education, 
like civilian academe, is a broad concept. Education seeks to develop individual intellect 
and thought processes that can be applied to multiple circumstances. Education 
cultivates wisdom and judgment which can be applied to any set of circumstances or 
situations.25 Thus, education cultivates independent thinking. According to both Kenneth 
Lawson and Carol Reardon, education is thus designed to create independent, critical 
thinkers who have mastered a theoretical body of knowledge.26 
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 Military training seeks the mastering of specific skills to accomplish a particular 
task that can be repetitively performed, such as firing a rifle or repairing a vehicle. The 
concept of training is thus narrower, identifying instruction oriented toward a particular 
specialty and designed to impart a particular technical skill.27 Moreover, training 
methods involve the demonstration of correct and incorrect ways of accomplishing a 
task, with a clear distinction being made between right and wrong methods. Training is 
planned, coordinated, and executed in a comprehensive manner, and embraces 
established rituals, patterns, and behaviors. Training methods change with the 
development of new techniques and equipment, thus, training requires retraining and 
practice.28 
 A central tenet of training is that it involves learning with a specific purpose. A 
trained person has a role to fill, with an emphasis on performance in relation to the 
purposes which justify the training. For example, a pilot is trained to fly fighter aircraft, 
but the training purpose is for the pilot to fly fighter aircraft in combat.  Training is job 
oriented; to be trained is to learn to do something specific.29  
 The concepts of military education and training may be different, but they are 
interrelated. In today‘s technologically advanced military, training of military members 
is only effective if the trainee is adequately educated. Trainees must be literate and 
possess critical thinking and interpretative skills in order to adapt to unpredictable and 
fast-moving changes on the modern battlefield. According to authors Steve Kime and 
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Clinton Anderson, in order to be properly trained to support military missions, a person 
must also be educated in addition to specifically trained.30 In short, the military trains for 
certainty, and educates for uncertainty.   
 Professional Military Education, as a professional military endeavor, is a product 
of the nineteenth century. Prior to the nineteenth century, emphasis was placed on the 
practical issues of warfare that involved training for specific skills and indoctrination for 
cooperative group effort in battle. Preparation for war through training was the key 
element for military leaders.31 
 In ancient Greece, war was an exercise in physical strength and courage, and 
military commanders acquired their qualifications through experience. No formal 
schools for senior commanders existed; advancement came through experience and 
proven success.32 The Roman system for selecting and training its military commanders 
resembled that of the Greek city-states, with the exception that politico-military careers 
were highly structured. Although Roman soldiers and centurions were battle-hardened 
professionals well versed in combat experience, Roman prefects and tribunes (senior 
commanders) were political appointees who often had little or no military experience. 
Thus, from antiquity, throughout the Middle Ages, and up to the nineteenth century, war 
was not thought of as an affair that could be mastered through study. Rather, war was 
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considered a rigorous physical contest which emphasized courage, training, and 
experience.33  
 Throughout most of history, armies were composed of illiterates, and the soldiers 
served part-time. Technical changes, such as the introduction of gunpowder and 
firearms, tended to undermine peasant levies.34 Arming those who were illiterate with 
technologically advanced weaponry (in time period context) was not always the best 
course of action. A.C. White illustrates this point by recalling that in 1643, Charles I 
attempted to invade Scotland and discovered that less than two hundred of his five 
thousand men could even fire a musket.35 The use of gunpowder and artillery cannons 
represents the introduction of broad scientific knowledge into warfare. The study of 
ballistics and with it, the study of mathematics, geometry, and physics became important 
to design instruments to measure the inclination of gun barrels and calculate distances to 
targets. The practical aspects of gunpowder, artillery, and subsequent changes in 
fortification design brought about concern for theoretical issues and the need to look 
beyond training to broader education in mathematics was recognized.36 
 The emergence of Professional Military Education has its roots in the rise of the 
military as a professional organization in Western society. Prior to 1800, professional 
officer corps‘ did not exist. Of course, officers had led armies and navies prior to 1800, 
but these officers were not professionals; they were either mercenaries or aristocrats 
motivated by profit or honor and adventure respectively. Mercenary officers were the 
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dominant type of officers from the end of feudalism through the latter half of the 
seventeenth century. Aristocratic amateurs replaced mercenary officers as a result of 
national monarchs who consolidated power and recognized the need for permanent 
military forces to protect their rule. Aristocratic officers were the last dominant type of 
pre-professional officer in Western society.37 
    Two types of preliminary military schools were established in Europe during 
the latter half of the eighteenth century. The first type was only open to aristocrats of 
noble birth. These schools included the French Ecole Militaire founded in 1751, the 
Prussian Ritter Akademie founded in 1765 by Frederick the Great, and a naval academy 
established by the English government in 1729. Military subjects had only a minor role 
in their curriculum because of the aristocratic belief that courage and honor were the 
only prerequisites for military command. The Ecole Militaire was designed specifically t 
subsidize the French nobility rather than to improve the army. Frederick the Great‘s 
Akademie trained nobles for diplomatic and military service; sons of nobility entered the 
Prussian army at around age 14, and received scant training before assuming command. 
England‘s naval academy was of similar poor quality, and the English army had no 
preliminary training school at all.38 
 The second type of preliminary school formed in the eighteenth century was 
technical schools established to train officers for service in artillery and engineering. The 
state of military science at this time was still very primitive; nonetheless, the artillery 
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and engineer branches were the only branches that promoted intellectual exercise. 
Prussia established an engineering school in 1706, and England established The Royal 
Military Academy for artillery and engineers in 1741. The French established an 
engineering school at Mezieres in 1749. The educational quality of these schools varied 
widely, and these schools did not question the theory that aristocratic officers possessed 
inherited qualities that that qualified them for command. However, these technical 
schools and the noble academies were as close to military education as Western society 
would get in the eighteenth century. Military schools to prepare officers for higher 
command and staff positions did not yet exist.39 
 Credit for originating the professional officer goes to Prussia. After the defeat of 
the Prussian military by Napoleon Bonaparte of France at Jena in 1806, sweeping 
military reforms led by Gerhard Von Scharnhorst and the Prussian Military Commission 
were instituted. These reforms included the establishment of institutions and ideals that 
ultimately became the model upon which virtually all other officer corps were eventually 
patterned. Moreover, these reforms mark a distinct break with the eighteenth century and 
are considered the beginnings of the military profession in Western society.40 
 Prussia‘s humiliating defeat at the hands of Napoleon in 1806 convinced Prussian 
leaders that its eighteenth century style military was no longer sufficient for national 
defense. Thus, Prussian reforms included the abolition of class restriction on entry into 
the officer corps, a General Staff system, and a system of educational and examination 
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requirements as a condition of promotion. The education and examination requirements 
were designed to instill a basic level of competence in all officers. In addition, officer 
pay was raised to reduce reliance on outside income.41 
 In 1810, Scharnhorst founded the Kriegsakademie (War Academy) in Berlin as a 
military university in which officers studied the science of war. Subjects included 
general topics such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry along with French and 
German language. Military subjects included strategy, tactics, artillery, and military 
geography.42 The science of war had expanded greatly with the emergence of Napoleon 
Bonaparte and the armies he fielded, and thus required study. Armies and navies were 
much larger and were complex because they contained many diverse specialties. A 
specialist was needed to coordinate these diverse elements successfully during war.43 
 A new theory emerged to address this new state of warfare. Karl von Clausewitz, 
a Prussian officer and confident of Scharnhorst, formulated this theory in his famous 
book Vom Kriege (On War) which was published posthumously in 1832. A basic 
element of Clausewitz‘s theory is the dual nature of war. War is both an autonomous 
science with its own methods and goals, and a science that is subordinate to politics. 
Clausewitz emphasized the importance of education, refinement of leadership skills, and 
development of mature judgment. Clausewitz in effect introduced intellectual rigor into 
the study of war as he tried to get to the essence of Napoleonic warfare.44  
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 The efficacy of Prussian reforms was demonstrated in the Franco-Prussian War 
fought in 1870-71. The Prussian military soundly defeated French forces, which 
prompted the French to explore advanced military education like the Prussians had done 
after their earlier defeat by Napoleon. The French had opened new preliminary military 
schools after the French Revolution. These included the Ecole Polytechnique, an artillery 
and engineering school in 1794; the Special Military School for cavalry and infantry in 
1803, and a Naval School in 1827. Instruction at these schools was almost exclusively 
scientific and technical. Not until the Ecole Militaire Superieure was founded in 1878 
did France establish a true war academy with military education at a much higher level 
than prior to 1870.45  
 In the United States, Professional Military Education developed slower than in 
Europe. Prior to the Civil War in 1861, military education in the United States was 
confined to the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. 
These schools provided pre-commissioning officer education, which, combined with 
follow-on training and experience, was considered sufficient to prepare military leaders 
for war. However, after the Civil War, there was a growing realization among United 
States officers that warfare had grown so complex that additional study in strategy and 
warfare was required above that gained at the academies and through experience.46  
    The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century increased the scale of 
warfare as well as provided the necessary resources to provide professional education 
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and training to military members.47 For example, the introduction of rifled weapons in 
the form of new artillery cannons with increased range and accuracy as well as repeating 
rifles required new infantry tactics on the battlefield. In addition, the expansion of 
railroads following the Civil War and new communications technology enabled large 
numbers of troops and supplies to be moved quickly to and from the battlefield, forcing 
a re-evaluation of deployment planning and execution of military strategy. Thus, Army 
officers began to see the need for more thorough preparation for command.48 
 Reform-minded officers who led the effort for advanced military education in the 
United States were William Tecumseh Sherman, Emory Upton, and Stephen B. Luce. 
General William Tecumseh Sherman served as Commanding General of the Army from 
1869 – 1883, and was thus in a position to effect changes. In 1875, Sherman sent 
Brigadier General Emory Upton on a tour of military organizations in Europe and Asia 
and to report what could be learned from them, especially in the area of military schools. 
Upton returned in the fall of 1876 and subsequently wrote two books, The Armies of 
Asia and Europe and The Military Policy of the United States. Upton used these books to 
push for Army reforms. Upton‘s proposed reforms included establishing a general staff 
and a system for educating officers patterned after those he visited in Europe, especially 
Germany. Upton concluded that the traditional United States policy of a citizen/soldier 
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model was no longer sufficient for national defense and that the United States should 
develop and rely on a professional military force.49 
 Although Emory Upton died in 1881, his writings remained influential in the 
Army‘s reform efforts. General Sherman ordered the establishment of a School of 
Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1881. Although the 
Army had established technical schools for the Artillery and Engineer branches, the 
School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry was the first real attempt at military 
education above the pre-commissioning level in the United States. Initially, the school 
taught junior officers small unit tactics, but new instructors Captains Eben Swift and 
Arthur Wagner moved the curriculum toward a more analytical approach to learning and 
the school stressed instruction in the science and practice of war.50 The School of 
Application for Infantry and Cavalry underwent several organizational and name 
changes over the years and is today known as the United States Army Command and 
General Staff College. 
 In 1884, just a few years after the United States Army established a School of 
Application for Infantry and Cavalry, the United States Navy established its Naval War 
College at Newport, Rhode Island. Navy Commander Stephen B. Luce, a Civil War 
veteran and leading advocate for the professionalization of the United States Navy, 
firmly believed in the scientific nature of warfare. Luce believed warfare was a science, 
and therefore, could be taught and learned. Luce was an admirer of the military colleges 
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in Europe for their systemic study of the art of war and military history and he was 
convinced United States naval officers would benefit from similar study. Thus, Luce 
worked for the establishment of a Naval War College where naval officers would 
become educated specialists in the conduct of war.51  
 Luce succeeded in convincing Secretary of the Navy William Chandler to 
establish the Naval War College in 1884. Initially, curriculum at the Naval War College 
consisted of lectures on military tactics and strategy, international law, and military 
history. Practical exercises were later added, and the curriculum gradually grew more 
robust with the addition of war games and war planning under the leadership of 
Commander Alfred Thayer Mahan as Commandant of the Naval War College. War 
games and war planning helped give the war college a forward-looking focus toward the 
nature of future warfare. Mahan‘s 1890 publication of his seminal work, The Influence of 
Sea Power Upon History, garnered him international acclaim and helped increase the 
reputation of the Naval War College.52  
 Both the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry and the Naval War 
College were closed at the outset of the Spanish-American War in 1898 due to increased 
demands for manpower to fight the war. The Naval War College reopened in 1900, but 
the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry remained closed until 1902 when it 
was reopened as part of the larger reforms that were instituted in the Army by Secretary 
of War Elihu Root. These larger reforms consisted of a comprehensive educational 
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system designed to educate Army officers at specific stages as their careers progressed, 
increase in the size of the Army, and the creation of an Army General Staff.53 
 Secretary Root‘s reforms were far-reaching for the Army, and were an outgrowth 
of the United States experience in the Spanish-American War. Root explained his 
rationale for reform in his annual report for 1901, and is quoted as follows: 
 In the reorganization of the enlarged army, about 1,000 officers have been added 
 from the volunteer force, so that more than one-third of all the officers of the 
 army have been without any opportunity whatever for the systematic study of the 
 science of war. On the other hand, the rapid advance of military science, changes 
 of tactics required by the changes in weapons, our own experience in the 
 difficulty of working out problems of transportation, supply, and hygiene, the 
 wide range of responsibilities which we have seen devolving upon officers 
 charged with the civil government of occupied territory, the delicate relations 
 which constantly arise between military and civil authority, the manifest 
 necessity that the soldier, above all others, should be familiar with the history and 
 imbued with the spirit of our institutions, all indicate the great importance of 
 thorough and broad education for military officers. I cannot speak too highly of 
 the work done in our service schools for a number of years before the war with 
 Spain. It was intelligent, devoted and effective, and produced a high standard of 
 individual excellence, which has been demonstrated by many officers in the 
 active service of the past four years. There was, however, no general system of 
 education.54 
  
Schools comprising the general system of education Root established included post 
technical schools for individual branches such as artillery and engineering, the General 
Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth (renamed from the Infantry and Cavalry 
School) and the Army War College at the apex.55 The General Service and Staff College 
became two schools: the Army School of the Line, and the Army Staff College. Only the 
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best graduates of the post schools attended the School of the Line, and only the best 
graduates of the School of the Line went on to the Army Staff College.  
 Curriculum at the Army Staff College was designed to bridge the gap between 
the tacticians of the School of the Line and the strategists of the Army War College. 
Instruction included staff duties, original research in military history and strategy, 
lectures in naval warfare, geography, logistics, and practical studies through visits to 
Civil War battlefields. Staff College students also prepared and evaluated tactical 
problems for School of the Line students.56 
 Root envisioned the Army War College as an adjunct body of the newly created 
Army General Staff, with curriculum consisting of staff duties, the science of war, and 
the application of military science to national defense. Students in the first Army War 
College class reported in 1904. Captain John J. Pershing, who would later command the 
American Expeditionary Force in World War I, was a member of the first Army War 
College class. War College students solved practical military problems and presented 
solutions to the General Staff. In addition, students received instruction in war planning, 
conducted war games, and attended lectures and discussions on current military events 
and weapons developments. Curriculum at the Army War College gradually shifted 
away from an emphasis on war planning to an emphasis on conducting military 
operations.57  
The entrance of the United States into World War I in 1917 again forced the 
closure of the Naval War College and the schools in the Army‘s educational system, the 
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same as during the Spanish-American War. Each school reopened after the war. Any 
doubt that may have existed concerning whether or not the military schools in the United 
States were producing the caliber of officers needed to fight and win the nation‘s wars 
was erased with the wartime performance of Navy and Army graduates of their 
respective service‘s educational programs. Both the Army and Navy had faced 
mobilization, planning, command and control, and staff work on an unprecedented scale 
during the war. Graduates of the Naval War College, as well as graduates of the Army 
Staff College and Army War College were well placed in command and staff positions 
to effect solutions to these difficult problems, thus enhancing the reputation of the 
nascent military education system in the United States.58   
 The interwar years between World War I and World War II were a boon for 
expansion of Professional Military Education in the United States. In the lean budgetary 
years between the wars, military procurement and modernization funds were scarce, 
especially during the Great Depression years of the 1930s. Thus, with little money to 
spend on new weapons systems, the services emphasized education of their officer 
corps.59 Three new military education institutions were established during the interwar 
period: the Army Industrial College, the Marine Corps Field Officer Course, and the Air 
Service School.  
 In 1924, the Army Industrial College was established as a response to efficiency 
problems with military and industrial mobilization during World War I. Output of 
industrial mobilization fell far short of expectations. For example, only one antiaircraft 
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gun was manufactured prior to the armistice, and none of the 25,000 tanks ordered by 
the War Department arrived in Europe before war‘s end. Only as the war ended did the 
industrial programs designed to build a bridge of ships and planes to Europe begin to 
show produce results.60 
 Although the school‘s name suggests it is an Army school, students attending the 
Army Industrial College included officers of the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps, as well 
as government civilians. By 1932, fully 25% of the student body was non-Army 
personnel. Curriculum at the Army Industrial College emphasized the procurement of 
military supplies, provision for material mobilization, and industrial organization needs 
during wartime. The Army Industrial College was the first joint military education 
school in the United States, and is today known as the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces.61 
 Recognizing the success of the Army school system, the Marine Corps 
established the Marine Corps Field Officer‘s Course at Quantico, Virginia in 1920 to 
prepare Marine officers for the complexity of the modern battlefield. Initially, the 
curriculum modeled the Army schools and emphasized the conduct of land operations 
and battles. A curricular shift away from an Army-style focus to an emphasis on 
amphibious operations in conjunction with the Navy took place in 1933. This shift was a 
move by Marine Corps leadership to orient Marine education toward the primary 
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mission of the Marine Corps as part of the Navy Department, which was to employ 
Marine expeditionary forces for overseas base duties with the active Navy fleet.62 
 The Air Service School was established at Langley Field, Virginia in 1920 as a 
professional school for Air Service officers in recognition of the fact aviation had 
reached equal status with other Army branches such as cavalry, artillery, and infantry. 
The purpose of the school was to educate air officers in the employment of airpower in 
war. The school name was changed to Air Corps Tactical School in 1926 when the Air 
Service became the Air Corps, and the school moved to Maxwell Field, Alabama in 
1931 to take advantage of better flying weather.63  
 Air Corps Tactical School curriculum stressed the command of units in the air, 
tactical and bombardment aviation, antiaircraft defense, communication, staff duties and 
annual aerial maneuvers. Most importantly, a theoretical atmosphere that went beyond 
evidence and capabilities of existing military aircraft, permeated the staff, and in turn, 
the students of the Air Corps Tactical School. Within this atmosphere of virtually pure 
theory, innovation flourished and the doctrine of high-altitude, precision daylight 
bombardment against an enemy‘s vital industrial centers was developed. During World 
War II, it was this bombardment doctrine that played out in the skies over Europe and 
Japan.64 
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 Emphasis on military education during the interwar years paid handsome 
dividends during World War II. Major Henry (Hap) Arnold, military aviation pioneer 
and future commander of the Army Air Corps, was a member of the first graduating 
class of the Army Industrial College. Major Dwight Eisenhower, future Allied Supreme 
Commander in Europe, graduated from both the Army War College and Army Industrial 
College and served on the faculty of the Army Industrial College. Almost all of the 
Marine Corps commanders at or above the regimental level were either graduates or 
faculty of the Marine Corps Field Officer‘s Course. In addition, of the 320 Army Air 
Force general officers on active duty at the end of World War II, 261 were graduates of 
the Air Corps Tactical School.65 A 1997 Center for Strategic and International Studies 
report argued that one of the few things the United States did right militarily during the 
disarmament years of the 1920s and 1930s was to enhance its military educational 
institutions.66  
 Wartime need for officers during World War II was too great to allow for 
continued operation of military education schools. Thus, like during the Spanish-
American War and World War I, all military education schools were closed until after 
the war. However, World War II was the last time military education schools in the 
United States were completely closed at the outbreak of hostilities. For future conflicts 
in Korea and Vietnam, military schools remained open as before or shortened their 
academic year. 
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 The nature of military operations during World War II convinced military leaders 
that the United States needed officers educated in joint operations. To meet this need, the 
Army-Navy Staff College was created in 1943 as a five-month course for officers 
destined for joint duty. The focus of the school was on planning, coordinating, and 
executing operations together with multiple services. Students of the Army-Navy Staff 
College included Allied officers from Britain, Australia, and Canada as well as United 
States officers.67 Following World War II, military education in the United States 
underwent another transformation. 
 Within a year of the end of World War II, the United States made significant 
changes to its military education system. The Army-Navy Staff College was renamed the 
Armed Forces Staff College and its mission was to teach the integrated employment of 
air, land, and sea forces at the operational level of war. The Army Industrial College was 
renamed the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, with its curriculum still focused on 
mobilization and defense resource management. The National War College was created 
with its mission to teach grand strategy and the employment of national resources to 
implement grand strategy. These three schools were placed under the direct supervision 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.68 
 In addition, Air University was founded in 1946 as an umbrella organization 
resembling a civilian university system. Air University encompassed a newly created Air 
War College and the Air Command and Staff School (name changed to Air Command 
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Staff College in 1962), a new school created in place of the previous Air Corps Tactical 
School, which was not reopened. Air University and its schools became part of the Air 
Force after the Army Air Corps became an independent Air Force in 1947. Air 
University was designed to provide continuing professional education for Air Force 
officers as they progressed through their careers.69 The military education system put in 
place after World War II is largely the system in place today. 
Air Force PME 
 
 At its inception, Air University was used by the Air Force as a center for the 
development and dissemination of USAF doctrine.70 Experience in World War II led to 
the ideas of strategic bombing and air superiority through control of the air being 
institutionalized as Air Force doctrine. Thus, effective employment of air power was the 
central focus of Air Force doctrine publications during the Cold War.71 This doctrinal 
thinking was reflected in the ACSC curriculum for much of the Cold War. 
 From its inception in 1946 to the start of the Korean War in 1950, curriculum at 
ACSC was focused toward preparing officers for command duty as well as staff work on 
Wing Headquarters and higher staffs. Students received instruction in tactical and 
strategic air operations, air defense, logistics, intelligence, new aircraft developments, 
and military management (staff work). The curriculum also included annual field trips to 
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tour various military installations, including Army and Navy bases in order to view other 
service capabilities.72 
 United States entry into the Korean War in 1950 prompted a reduction in the 
length of ACSC‘s course of instruction and student body enrollment. The five-month 
course was reduced to three and one-half months, and student enrollment dropped by 25 
percent. At the same time, the Air Force closed its Special Staff School, and transferred 
its academic courses to ACSC. ACSC entered a specialist phase in its curriculum, which 
now included a squadron officer course, a field officers course, and special staff courses 
in logistics, comptroller, judge advocate, intelligence, academic instructor, and special 
weapons. Officers qualified for a particular specialty, such as comptroller, enrolled in 
that course and were excused from the field officer‘s course. The specialized courses 
were removed from ACSC in 1954, the academic year was lengthened to nine and one-
half months, and enrollment was back to pre-Korean War levels.73 
 From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, the ACSC curriculum was split into two 
phases. Phase one focused on fundamentals of advanced command and staff duties to 
prepare officers for duty as commanders and as part of a headquarters staff. Phase two 
emphasized applying the principles learned in phase one to hypothetical command and 
staff problems and employment of air forces in support of national policy matters. 
Instruction was also given in military doctrine and technological developments, and field 
trips remained a central feature of the school.74 A reorganization of the curriculum took 
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place in 1963, and the academic portion of the program contained three broad subject 
areas. These included military employment, which included basic Air Force doctrine 
about the use of air power, military management, and international conflict, which 
focused on international security problems and strategy relative to the Communist Bloc 
and the free world.75 
 With direct United States involvement in Vietnam beginning in 1964-65, 
enrollment at Air University schools again declined. Not until 1971-72 would class 
enrollment reach pre-Vietnam War levels.76 The three subject area curriculum structure 
implemented in 1963 remained in place at ACSC during the war, with additional topics 
added or deleted each year as the faculty refined the curriculum. For example, the 1967 
curriculum contained a 39-hour war game which allowed students to analyze and apply 
current weapon systems in a simulated combat environment. In 1969, independent study 
accounted for 26 percent of the curriculum, research accounted for 12 percent, and 
elective courses accounted for 4 percent of the curriculum. In 1970, a study of the 
problems of race relations was introduced, including a panel discussion between black 
officers and their white counterparts.77 These changes not only represent the evolving 
educational philosophy of Air University, but recognition of changes in the larger 
American society. 
  In the mid-1970s, after the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the ACSC 
curriculum began to emphasize leadership and management aimed at improving the 
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managerial skills of mid-career officers. The curriculum was aligned into four main 
areas: communication and research, command and management, aerospace policy and 
planning, and military employment, which included instruction in military doctrine. 
Other subject areas included independent study and research, electives, and 
commandant‘s options.78 
 In the 1980s, ACSC curriculum remained focused toward leadership and 
management, but also began a gradual shift toward its previous war fighting emphasis.  
The curriculum included instruction in warfare studies, force employment, strategy, and 
air force and military doctrine in addition to command, leadership, and resource 
management.79 This new curricular shift can be seen in the change in course hours 
devoted to war fighting subjects. Total hours devoted to warfare studies increased from 
269 in 1978 to 359 in 1988; low-intensity conflict hours increased from 30 hours in 1978 
to 52 hours in 1988; and the study of military history increased from 4 hours in 1978 to 
77 hours in 1988.80 
Air Force PME became deeply institutionalized during the Cold War. As the 
preceding paragraphs show, the curriculum gradually grew broader in scope and 
reflected the tenets of basic Air Force doctrine leading up to the end of the Cold War.81 
The quality of Air Force PME was assessed and reassessed in a number of studies. 
Between 1946 and 1987, over 120 assessments of the Air Force PME system were made 
                                                 
78 Harrold, 1987; Davis and Donnini, 1991. 
79 Davis and Donnini, 1991. 
80 Tatom, 1988. 
81 Harrold, 1987. 
 38 
by various study groups, ranging from minor references to comprehensive analyses.82 
However, none of these assessments had as profound an impact on the future of military 
education in the Air Force as the Skelton Report. 
 The United States Congress established a Panel on Military Education in 1987, 
chaired by Representative Ike Skelton, (D-MO). The Panel became known as the 
Skelton Panel. The Skelton Panel was formed to consider ways to implement the 
provisions of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly known as the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, into military education, and to assess the ability of the entire 
military education system to ―develop military thinkers, planners, and strategists.‖83  
 The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated the creation of joint specialty officers in 
the United States military. Goldwater-Nichols came about in response to a growing 
perception that the armed forces were not performing as well as they should. Vietnam, 
the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980, joint coordination problems in the 
1983 Grenada invasion, and the 1983 terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut 
prompted Congress to seek defense reforms. The Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clarified combatant command authority, and created a new 
category of military officer called joint specialists.84 Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel 
Policy, is the Goldwater-Nichols Act provision that impacted military education by 
calling for emphasis in joint war fighting in military education.  
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 The Skelton Report recommended a two-phase Joint Specialty Officer education 
process. Phase one joint education would take place at the service intermediate-level 
command and staff colleges, such as ACSC. Curriculum would emphasize the 
capabilities and limitations, doctrine, organization, and command and control of the 
forces of all services as well as joint force planning and the role of service commands as 
part of a joint unified command. Thus, ACSC curriculum would be required to include 
instruction on Army, Navy, and Marine capabilities in addition to Air Force capabilities 
and the additional joint education requirements. Phase two joint education would take 
place at the Joint Forces Staff College after graduation from a service intermediate-level 
command and staff college and concentrate on the integrated employment of joint forces. 
Graduates of both phases of joint education would then become Joint Specialty 
Officers.85 The Skelton Panel also commented on the quality of military education at 
each school in the PME system. The Panel was critical of military education schools 
across the board, primarily for a lack of curricular focus and rigor. Air Command and 
Staff College received especially stiff criticism, stating that the school had ―a reputation 
for poor quality and lack of focus.‖86 The ACSC mission statement was criticized as too 
broad and vague, which gave the commandant and faculty little guidance in developing 
curriculum. Over half of the curriculum was devoted to primarily staff and 
communications skills, which caused the Panel to ―question whether the Air Force has 
thought through the purpose of its intermediate school.‖87  
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 The Skelton Panel further noted that ACSC had failed to impart the Air Force 
purpose for existing to its students, which was unfortunate since many officers will not 
progress to the Air War College. In addition, the Panel ranked ACSC behind its Army 
and Marine Corps counterparts in imparting its service doctrine to students, stating 
ACSC was ―missing a magnificent opportunity to teach the use of air power in the full 
range of possible contingencies from the tactical to the strategic levels.‖88 Finally, ACSC 
was criticized for manning the preponderance of its faculty with majors recruited from 
graduating classes, stating ―they have little or no more experience than their students and 
are, in general, not subject matter experts. Consequently, their teaching abilities are 
limited to facilitating discussion, and they may be only a day ahead of their students.89 
 The Skelton Report lists 85 specific recommendations for the United States 
Professional Military Education system as a whole. Thirty-six of these recommendations 
applied to Air University, 31 of which applied to Air Command and Staff College. Thus, 
as the forty-year Cold War was ending in 1989, Air Command and Staff College had to 
face its past and embrace a future of change mandated by Congress while contemplating 
the impact of a new and uncertain international security environment ushered in by the 
end of the Cold War. This is the context and point in time in which this study begins. 
Curriculum Theory and History 
 
 Because this study is a historical investigation of a curriculum, literature 
addressing curriculum theory and curriculum history can help the reader comprehend the 
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concept and importance of curriculum. A myriad of definitional variations for the word 
―curriculum‖ can be found throughout the literature on curriculum topics. Arno Bellack 
defines curriculum as ―a planned program of teaching and learning‖90 and C.R. 
Stroughton defines curriculum as ―all organized activities under the auspices of the 
school.‖91 George Beauchamp argued that the term ―curriculum‖ can be used in three 
ways. First, curriculum is a ―written document depicting the scope and arrangement of 
the projected educational program for a school.‖92 Curriculum can also be a ―system 
within which decisions are made about what the curriculum will be, how it will be 
implemented, and how it will be evaluated.‖93 Finally, curriculum can be considered a 
―field of study‖ in which professional educators consider curricular issues.94 This study 
defines curriculum as a set of courses or course content that is offered at a school. It is a 
specific learning program that is determined by an authoritative body.  
Theory is a body of beliefs, assumptions, and propositions that are used to 
explain a series of events or phenomena. Curriculum theory then is a way of describing 
the educational philosophies behind approaches to development and delivery of 
curriculum. George Beauchamp situates curriculum theory within educational theory, 
which accounts for all components of education, including instructional theories, 
counseling theories, evaluation theories, and curriculum theories.95 Ralph Tyler stated 
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that the basis for curriculum theory is the nature of knowledge, the nature of society, the 
nature of the learner, and the nature of learning.96 William Pinar argues that in 
curriculum theory, theory identifies and describes variables and their relationships to 
each other in a curriculum.97 According to C.R. Stroughton, curriculum theory comes 
about as a result of ―attempts to segmentize and develop relationships between segments 
of the school curriculum.‖98 Thus, curriculum theory provides a guiding framework for 
curriculum development and research. 
Curriculum theory and practice can be approached in many ways. Four common 
approaches to curriculum theory and practice are curriculum as knowledge to be 
transmitted, curriculum as a product, curriculum as a process, and curriculum as praxis. 
Curriculum is commonly associated with a syllabus, which is a statement of the contents 
of a particular course that lists or explains the subject areas that will be examined during 
the course. An approach to curriculum that focuses exclusively on syllabi is most likely 
concerned strictly with course content and the process by which this content is 
transmitted to students. In this sense, curriculum is a body of knowledge; it is subject 
matter content to be transmitted via the most effective methods that can be devised.99  
Curriculum as a product is using curriculum as an attempt to achieve particular 
educational ends in students. Educational objectives are established, a curricular plan is 
composed and applied, and then the outcomes, or products, are measured. Rather than 
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how the curriculum itself is thought about, the emphasis is on curricular objectives. 
According to Franklin Bobbitt, one of the earliest curriculum scholars,  
Education that prepares for life is one that prepares definitely and adequately for 
specific [life] activities. This requires only that one go out into the world of 
affairs and discover the particulars of which their affairs consist. These will show 
the abilities, attitudes, habits, appreciations and forms of knowledge that men 
need. These will be the objectives of the curriculum.100  
 
Bobbitt proposed five steps for developing curriculum: analysis of human experience, 
job analysis, deriving objectives, selecting objectives, and planning in detail.101 This 
approach to curriculum focuses on what people need to know in order to work and live. 
Ralph Tyler also advocated this approach to curriculum. Tyler put forth four questions 
on which to base curriculum: 
1. What educational purposes should the school seek to attain? 
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these 
purposes? 
3. How can these educational experiences be effectively organized? 
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained?102 
For Tyler, the real purpose of education was not for teachers to perform certain 
activities, but rather to bring about significant changes in the behavior of students. The 
formulation of behavioral objectives is central. One appeal of this curriculum approach 
is that it is systematic and can be highly organized. Curriculum can be designed outside 
of the confines of the school, educators apply the programs designed, and are then 
judged on the products of their actions.  
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 Curriculum as process views curriculum as the interaction of educators, students, 
and knowledge rather than curriculum as a physical entity. Curriculum is activities 
which take place in the classroom, and what teachers do to prepare and evaluate. 
Lawrence Stenhouse put forth a process model by arguing that curriculum is an ―attempt 
to communicate the essential principles and features of an educational proposal in such a 
form that it is open to critical scrutiny and capable of effective translation into 
practice.‖103 Stenhouse likened curriculum to a cooking recipe: 
A curriculum, like the recipe for a dish, is first imagined as a possibility, then the 
subject of experiment. The recipe offered publicly is in a sense a report on the 
experiment. Similarly, a curriculum should be grounded in practice. It is an 
attempt to describe the work observed in classrooms that it is adequately 
communicated to teachers and others. Finally, within limits, a recipe can be 
varied according to taste. So can a curriculum.104 
Curriculum as process is a way for educators to think about their work as constant 
interaction and make judgments through continual evaluation of the process.  
 Praxis is the process by which a theory or idea is practiced or realized, or 
informed and committed action.  Shirley Grundy writes that curriculum as praxis is the 
interaction of action and reflection.105 Teachers enter classrooms with an understanding 
of their role and encourage conversations with and between students. Out of this 
interaction comes informed and committed action. Teachers then continually evaluate 
the process and what they see as outcomes. According to Grundy, ―Curriculum is not 
simply a set of plans to be implemented, but rather is constituted through an active 
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process in which planning, acting, and evaluating are all reciprocally related and 
integrated into the process.‖106 At the center is informed, committed action, or praxis.   
Practitioners of curriculum history seek to understand why ideas about a 
curriculum or its particular areas are established and subsequently flourish or fail. In 
addition, curriculum historians seek to understand the changes that occur over time 
within a curriculum or particular curriculum subject area. 
 Herbert Kliebard and Barry Franklin, in their essay ―The Course of the Course 
of Study: History of Curriculum‖ define curriculum history as: 
 Scholarly attempts to chronicle, interpret, and ultimately understand the 
 processes whereby social groups over time, select, organize, and distribute 
 knowledge and belief through educational institutions.107 
 
Indeed, the importance of curriculum history lies in its ability to inform current practice. 
Laurel Tanner states ―curriculum history is more than useful; it is essential for improving 
the character of curriculum reform efforts.‖108 In addition, George Willis states 
curriculum scholars have recognized ―the value—and, in fact, the necessity—of 
historical understanding for informing the on-going educational task of creating 
curricula in practice.‖109 Curriculum developers can use knowledge of the historical 
evolution of key ideas in the curriculum as a tool for solving curricular problems.   
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 This particular study focuses on influences that determine how curriculum is 
shaped over time. Possible reasons why curriculum changes or is resistant to change are 
numerous. Daniel Tanner and Laurel Tanner devote an entire chapter in their book on 
curriculum development to conflicting educational theories as an influence on school 
curriculum and another chapter to society, knowledge, and the learner as influential to 
school curriculum.110 Kliebard and Franklin list other reasons curriculum either changes 
or remains static: 
 They [reasons] include, of course, social change, potent elites, the legal structure, 
 the weight of tradition, economic considerations, the organizational structure of 
 schools, changes in the size and nature of the school population, the energy and 
 dedication of individuals and interest groups, intellectual movements, general 
 demographic factors, political upheaval, significant changes in certain social 
 institutions, and even, here and there, a powerful idea.111 
 
Moreover, Kliebard, in his book The Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958 
looked at curricular changes in American schools and concluded that curriculum reflects 
the forces of groups or individuals with competing interests. Kliebard showed the 
―evolution of the modern American curriculum could be interpreted in terms of the 
interplay among predominant interest groups that saw in the course of study the vehicle 
for the expression of their ideas and the accomplishment of their purposes.‖112 In his 
concluding chapter, Kliebard stated that curriculum is indeed a ―contested terrain for 
values that an important social institution would pass to the next generation.‖113 
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 A theme emerges in the curriculum history literature in which the authors seek to 
understand the persons and events that influenced the emergence or disappearance of 
specific curricular content. Thus, the study of curriculum history is relevant to this study 
to understand how the curriculum at ACSC evolved after the publication of the Skelton 
Report and the end of the Cold War and the forces that acted to shape the curriculum.  
Adult Education 
Students attending PME schools are adults. Therefore, a review of literature on 
adult education is appropriate for this study. The teaching of adults is not a new concept, 
yet it was not until the twentieth century that the differences between the way children 
and adults learn began to garner serious scholarship. Eduard Lindeman laid the 
foundation for the study of adult education in his 1926 book, The Meaning of Adult 
Education. Lindeman wrote, ―In conventional education the student is required to adjust 
himself to an established curriculum; in adult education the curriculum is built around 
the student‘s needs and interests.‖114  Lindeman stated that the setting for adult education 
constituted of: 
Small groups of aspiring adults who desire to keep their minds fresh and 
vigorous, who begin to learn by confronting pertinent situations, who dig down 
into the reservoirs of their experience before resorting to texts and secondary 
facts, who are led in the discussion by teachers who are also searchers after 
wisdom and not oracles: this constitutes the setting for adult education.115   
 
Lindeman further wrote that in adult education, student experience counts just as 
much as teacher knowledge and that the role of the teacher is to ―engage in a process of 
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mutual inquiry with them [students] rather than to transmit his or her knowledge to them 
and then evaluate their conformity to it.‖116  Lindeman‘s writings became the starting 
point for additional scholarship in the area of adult education. 
Malcolm Knowles is known as the father of the adult learning theory called 
Andragogy. Andragogy is perhaps the best known effort to understand adults as learners 
and define the field of adult education apart from other areas of education. Andragogy is 
the art and science of helping adults learn, and focuses on the adult learner and their life 
experiences. Knowles put forth the following assumptions about adult learners: 
1. As a person matures his or her self-concept moves from that of a dependent 
personality toward one of a self-directing human being. 
2. An adult accumulates a growing reservoir of experience, which is a rich 
resource for learning. 
3. The readiness of and adult to learn is closely related to the developmental 
tasks of his or her social role. 
4. There is a change in time perspective as people mature—from future 
applications of knowledge to immediacy of application. Thus, an adult is 
more problem centered than subject centered in learning. 
5. The most potent motivations are internal rather than external. 
6. Adults need to know why they need to learn something.117 
 
Knowles expounded on Lindeman‘s thoughts by writing that the richest resource in adult 
learning is the learner himself. Thus, the ―emphasis in adult education is on experiential 
techniques—techniques that tap into the experience of the learners, such as group 
discussion, simulation exercises, problem-solving activities, case method, and laboratory 
methods instead of transmittal techniques.‖118 For Knowles, these assumptions were the 
necessary foundation for designing educational programs for adults. 
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 Learning as a process is concerned with what happens when learning takes place, 
and explanations of what happens when learning takes place are called learning theories. 
Many explanations and theories of how adults learn exist. In their book, Learning in 
Adulthood, Sharon Merriam, Rosemary Caffarella, and Lisa Baumgartner explore five 
traditional learning theory orientations. Newer, emerging theories of adult learning are 
also explored in their text. Each of the traditional learning perspectives presents different 
assumptions about learning: behaviorist, humanist, cognitivist, social cognitive, and 
constructivist.119 Because each of these theories are based on different assumptions 
about learning, the curriculum development strategies that a school or individual chooses 
to employ to enhance adult learning will depend on one‘s orientation. According to the 
authors, ―Instructors and learning developers can use this review of major learning 
theories to identify their own theory of learning and discover the strategies for 
facilitating learning that are most congruent with their theory.‖120 While Merriam, 
Caffarella, and Baumgartner‘s text explores newer, emerging adult learning theories the 
five traditional theories of adult learning are the most relevant for my study. Each of 
these five learning theories will be briefly explored. 
 Adherents of the behaviorist learning theory define learning as a change in 
behavior. The focus is on a learner‘s overt behavior, which is a response to some 
stimulus. Pauline Grippin and Sean Peters outline three assumptions that behaviorists 
hold to be true. First, observable behavior, rather than internal thought processes is the 
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focus. Learning takes place through a change in behavior. Second, behavior is shaped by 
the learner‘s environment. What is learned is not determined by the individual learner, 
but rather by the elements of the learning environment. Lastly, the learning process is 
explained by contiguity, or how close in time two events must be for a bond to be 
formed, and reinforcement.121  
 According to Merriam, Caffarella, and Baumgartner, in adult education, 
―behaviorism is the philosophy that most underlies adult career and technical education 
and human resource development.‖122 Adult career and technical education goals focus 
on identifying the skills needed to perform successfully in a given occupation, teaching 
those skills, and then requiring a certain standard of performance in the practice of those 
skills. The role of the teacher then is to ―design an environment that elicits desired 
behavior toward meeting these goals and to extinguish undesirable behavior.‖123 
Teachers arrange the learning environment so that the desired behavior will occur and is 
reinforced. 
 In contrast to behaviorist learning theory is humanist learning theory, which 
emphasizes human nature and human potential. Humanists consider learning from the 
―perspective of the human potential for growth.‖124 The humanist learning theory posits 
that perceptions are rooted in experience and learners have the freedom and 
responsibility to become what one is capable of becoming. According to Merriam, 
Caffarella, and Baumgartner, these tenets ―underlie much of adult learning theory that 
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stresses the self-directedness of adults and the value of experience in the learning 
process.‖125  
 In humanist learning theory, the motivation to learn comes from the adult learner 
himself or herself. The goal of adult education then becomes meeting the needs of the 
adult learner and emphasizing the adult learner fulfilling his or her potential and 
becoming self-actualized. According to Merriam, Caffarella, and Baumgartner, in 
humanist theory, ―learning involves more than cognitive processes and overt behavior. 
It‘s a function of motivation and involves choice and responsibility. Self-directed 
learning is grounded in humanist orientation.‖126 Self-actualization is the primary goal, 
and the role of the teacher is to bring this about. 
Cognitivists are interested in how the mind interprets stimuli in the environment 
and how information is processed, stored, and retrieved. Two key assumptions underlie 
the cognitivist learning theory. According to Margaret Gredler, these two assumptions 
are ―the memory system is an active organized processor of information‖ and ―prior 
knowledge plays an important role in learning.‖127 The mind reorganizes experience in 
order to make sense of stimuli from the environment.  
 Learning, thus, is a cognitive phenomenon. Learners reach a solution after 
pondering a problem. According to Merriam, Caffarella, and Baumgartner, ―the learner 
thinks about all the ingredients necessary to solve a problem and puts them together 
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cognitively first one way and then another until the problem is solved.‖128 This emphasis 
on the individual learner‘s mental processes rather than on the learner‘s environment is 
characteristic of cognitivist learning theory. The control of the learning process rests 
with the individual who has control over his or her internal mental processes. The major 
concern of this learning theory is how aging affects an adult‘s internal mental ability to 
process and retrieve information. 
 Social cognitive learning theory posits that people learn through observing others 
in a social setting. Dale Schunk wrote,  
Social cognitive learning theory highlights the idea that much human learning 
occurs in a social environment. By observing others, people acquire knowledge, 
rules, skills, strategies, beliefs, and attitudes. Individuals also learn about the 
usefulness and appropriateness of behaviors by observing models and the 
consequences of modeled behaviors, and they act in accordance with their beliefs 
concerning the expected outcomes of actions.129 
 
People learn about the appropriateness of their behaviors and associated consequences 
through observing others in one‘s immediate environment. Learning takes place through 
the interaction of the person, the environment, and the behavior. According to Merriam, 
Caffarella, and Baumgartner, ―Social learning theories contribute to adult learning by 
highlighting the importance of social context and the processes of modeling and 
mentoring.‖130 The role of the teacher then is to model and guide the desired behavior. 
 Finally, constructivist learning theory posits that learners construct their own 
knowledge through their experiences. Adults learn through the process of making sense 
from their experience and constructing meaning from that experience. In this sense, 
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learning is an active, not passive endeavor. It is self-directed learning and reflective 
practice. Phillip Candy writes, ―The constructivist view of learning is particularly 
compatible with the notion of self-direction, since it emphasizes the combined 
characteristics of active inquiry, independence, and individuality in a learning task.‖131 
The role of the teacher in constructivist learning theory is to facilitate meaning through 
the cognitive processes of the learner. 
 The process of learning is a complex topic. There are many theories that seek to 
explain how adults learn, and the preceding discussion of behaviorist, humanist, 
cognitivist, social cognitivist, and constructivist theories are but a few. However, these 
five learning theories help provide both a vocabulary and a conceptual framework 
through which we can look for solutions to problems in adult education. The theories do 
not give solutions, but they do focus attention to the variables that aid in finding 
solutions.  
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CHAPTER III 
 METHODS 
 
 Qualitative research methods were the best choice for this particular study. 
Sharon Merriam defines the characteristics of qualitative research, which include the 
researcher assuming the role of data collection and analysis instrument in order to 
engage in inductive research.132 Furthermore, Corrine Glesne explains that qualitative 
research methods are used whenever a researcher seeks to understand ―social phenomena 
from the perspectives of those involved,‖ and to place issues in their proper social, 
political, or cultural context.133 In order to gain an understanding of ACSC curriculum 
from the perspective of those who experienced the curricular changes, data collection 
and analysis needs to be conducted by the researcher. Thus, qualitative research methods 
were the best methodological choice for this study. 
 Specifically, this study used a historical research design method. In their book on 
education research, Meredith Gall and Walter Borg define the historical research method 
as it relates to education as ―a process of systematically searching for data to answer 
questions about a past phenomenon for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of 
present institutions, practices, trends, and issues in education.‖134 Researchers engaged 
in historical research collect and analyze data, and then interpret the data while 
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considering the specific context in which the data emerged. The historical research 
method was chosen for this study because this study sought to systematically gather and 
analyze data to answer the research questions posed earlier on how the curriculum at 
ACSC evolved over a specific period of time. 
Sources of Data 
 
 Three sources of data were used for this study. The first source is a group of 
people, consisting of past and present members of Air Command and Staff College who 
once held or currently hold positions of leadership through which they had or have 
insight into curricular decisions. The second source of data is published material, which 
consists primarily of Air Command and Staff College course catalogs, unit history 
reports and curriculum planning documents that contain useful information such as 
school mission statements, course offerings, and instructional methodology. Other 
materials include official Department of Defense and Air University regulations and 
guidance pertaining to professional military education, official board and commission 
reports, and relevant journal and news articles. The final source of data is unpublished 
material, which includes internal Air University and Air Command and Staff College 
memos, reports, briefings and documents, as well as any personal files kept by members 
of Air Command and Staff College that were made available to the researcher. 
Data Collection 
 
 Datum was collected via two methods: (1) review of published and unpublished 
material and (2) personal interviews. Documents were collected, reviewed, and 
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photocopied where permissible. Where document photocopying was not permitted, 
documents were read and notes taken. Key members (past and present) of Air Command 
and Staff College such as commandants, deans, department directors, and course 
directors were interviewed. In person, one-on-one interviews were conducted whenever 
possible, with telephone interviews conducted when in person interviews were not 
possible. With permission, audiotapes were used to record interviews.  
 A semi-structured interview format was used to gather data for this study because 
respondents each had specific but unique experiences with the ACSC curriculum.  Thus, 
more open-ended and fewer highly structured interview questions were the most 
appropriate for this study. According to Merriam, in a semi-structured interview 
 Either all of the questions are more flexibly worded, or the interview is a mix of 
 more and less structured questions. Usually, specific information is desired from 
 all the respondents, in which case there is a highly structured section to the 
 interview. But the largest part of the interview is guided by a list of questions or 
 issues to be explored…this format allows the researcher to respond to the 
 situation at hand, to the emerging worldview of the respondent, and to new ideas 
 on the topic.135 
 
The interview guide constructed for this study is appended at Appendix A.   
 
 Prior to the conduct of interviews, permission to speak with members of Air 
Command and Staff College was acquired from the Air Force and the Commandant of 
Air Command and Staff College. Institutional Review Board guidelines were followed 
to protect human subjects, which included explaining all potential risks and benefits up 
front, and informing human subjects of their right to withdraw their participation in the 
study at any time as well as their right to keep their identities confidential.     
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Treatment of Data 
 
 Data collected was stored in the home of the researcher with access limited to the 
researcher in accordance with Institutional Review Board guidelines. Once collected, 
interviews were transcribed verbatim by the researcher. Transcripts were analyzed using 
the constant comparative method, an inductive (moving from specific to broad) data 
analysis procedure. Although the constant comparative method is usually associated with 
grounded theory research design, the constant comparative method of data analysis is 
applicable across all qualitative research designs.  Merriam states, ―Because the basic 
strategy of the constant comparative method is compatible with the inductive, concept-
building orientation of all qualitative research, the constant comparative method of data 
analysis has been adopted by many researchers who are not seeking to build substantive 
theory.‖136  
 As its name implies, the constant comparative method compares particular 
incidents from an interview transcript with another incident in either the same set of data 
or in a different set of data. According to Merriam, these comparisons then lead the 
researcher to form categories which are then compared to each other. Thus, 
―comparisons are constantly made within and between levels of conceptualization‖ in 
order to formulate meaning from the data.137 Furthermore, data was organized 
chronologically and thematically to facilitate identification of evolving curricula and the 
curriculum influences which emerged, as well as to identify common themes that 
emerged over time.  
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The findings of the study are presented as a narrative discussion. John Creswell 
states narrative discussions have no set form, can vary widely, and are often used in 
qualitative research to describe events in their context as well as present chronological 
experiences.138 In addition, Creswell states, ―Qualitative research is interpretive research, 
and you will need to make sense of the findings.‖139 The findings of this study were 
interpreted in order to draw some larger meaning about the curriculum evolution at 
ACSC during the time period studied.  
 Accuracy and credibility of the findings of this study are of paramount 
importance. This study used peer examination, a method used to verify internal validity, 
to ensure accuracy and credibility. Internal validity seeks to ensure that the findings of a 
study capture what is really there, and peer examination enlists the help of colleagues to 
review and comment on findings presented by the researcher.140 In this study, colleagues 
of the researcher were enlisted to review the findings, verify that the evidence collected 
supports the findings presented and that the results and interpretations drawn are in fact 
plausible.    
Timeline of Completion 
 
 Data collection for this study was conducted January – September 2007. 
Following data collection, data analysis and writing of findings were conducted from 
September to December 2007, and a completed draft of the study was turned in to the 
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dissertation committee in September 2008. The oral dissertation defense took place in 
October 2008, and content and format revisions were mandated by the committee before 
the dissertation was cleared for turn-in to the university Thesis Office.  
 Immediately after the dissertation defense, the researcher was ordered to Iraq on 
a one year military deployment. Upon return from military deployment in November 
2009, content and format edits previously identified by the committee were undertaken 
and a one-year extension was granted to the researcher to meet university requirements 
for dissertation completion after a successful oral defense. The final dissertation was 
turned in to the university Thesis Office by the October 22, 2010 deadline in order to 
meet university requirements for graduation in December 2010.  
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CHAPTER IV 
A NEW DAWN: ACSC AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
 
Context 
The timeframe 1989 – 1992 represents the beginning of a new era in Professional 
Military Education (PME) overall and especially, for Air Command and Staff College. 
The convergence of several events in the latter half of the 1980s had significant impact 
on the overall PME system and PME curriculum. These events were the passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the published report in April, 
1989 (known as the Skelton Report), from the House Panel on Professional Military 
Education, formed in 1987 to review the implementation of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act, and the end of the Cold War, which was 
ushered in by the fall of the Berlin wall in November, 1989.  
 PME had remained largely static for much of the 40-year Cold War period, with 
little change occurring in PME structure and mostly a minor tweaking of curriculum. By 
time the decade of the 1980s was giving way to the 1990s, the combined educational 
dictates of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the recommendations of the Skelton Report, 
as well as the uncertain international security environment brought on by the end of the 
Cold War clearly signaled that a new era in Professional Military Education was starting 
to emerge. 
   The Goldwater-Nichols Act was not born out of thin air. Justification for the 
Act had been building for some time. Recognition by members of Congress, senior 
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military leaders, and the general public that United States military forces had not been 
performing as well as they had during World War II was growing in the wake of 
experiences in Korea and Vietnam, the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980, 
and the 1983 invasion of Grenada. The loss of American lives, especially during the 
highly publicized failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt, was a stark reminder that the 
United States was losing some of its military prestige in the eyes of the press, the 
Congress, the American public, and the world.141  During a Senate address in 1985, 
Senator Barry Goldwater, co-sponsor of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization 
Act, pointed to the difficulty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide timely and 
useful military advice to civilian authorities, poor military performance in joint 
operations, confusing command and control relationships, and an inefficient Joint 
Chiefs‘ organization. Senator Goldwater stated, ―It is broke, and we need to fix it.‖142  
 President Reagan signed the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 into public law on 
October 1, 1986. By enacting this legislation, Congress stated its intent was: 
 To improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security 
 Council, and the Secretary of Defense; 
     
 To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the 
 Department; 
    
 To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified 
 combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those 
 commands; 
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 Ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified 
 combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those 
 commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands; 
    
 To increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; 
    
 To improve joint officer management policies; 
    
 To provide for more efficient use of defense resources; 
    
 To enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management 
 and administration of the Department of Defense.143 
 
By passing the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, Congress served notice 
that it expected the Department of Defense to embrace the idea of joint operations as the 
standard for future United States military action. Independent military departments 
acting autonomously during military operations were clearly no longer acceptable. 
 Title IV of the new law signaled a new direction for PME in the United States; a 
shift away from traditional service dominance in PME toward more joint-focused 
institutions. Title IV mandated that the Department of Defense orient its PME system 
toward joint education and revise the way officer career paths and promotions were 
managed. For the first time, Congress was dictating curricular focus in United States 
PME schools. No longer would the Department of Defense be able to completely 
determine what was taught within their PME schools. Congress reasoned that by 
instilling a requirement for joint education in United States PME schools, it could 
inculcate a joint mindset within the officer corps and thus produce senior officers 
knowledgeable about and comfortable with planning and executing joint military 
operations. The provisions of Title IV are listed in Appendix D of this study. 
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 The idea of jointness was not a new concept in the military. Military officers 
recognized that the provisions of Title IV required a new way of managing officer 
careers. Army Colonel Don Snider observed:  
 
 The joint officer personnel provisions of the new law create a historic departure 
 for officer development and management in our armed forces. Congress has 
 finally  overcome the unfortunate spectre of `The Man on Horseback', and has 
 now legislated the foundations necessary for a joint staff of the armed forces, one 
 that can be educated, trained, and promoted over time to insure its progression, 
 continuity, and freedom of action from undue influence from the services.144 
 
Lieutenant General Thomas Hickey, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
(1986 – 1991) stated, ―The Air Force has embraced jointness as an integral part of its 
mission and [Air Force officers] should be ready to work with their Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps counterparts.‖145  In order to implement the military education portion of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress formed a panel to study the current state of 
military education in the United States and recommend courses of action. 
 
The Skelton Panel  
On November 13, 1987, Congressman Les Aspin, (D-WI), Chairman of the 
House Committee on Armed Services, appointed a Panel on Military Education of the 
Committee on Armed Services with Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO) as the panel 
chairman. This panel became known as the Skelton Panel. The Skelton Panel was given 
a two-fold mission by Congressman Aspin. First, the panel was to ―review Department 
of Defense plans for implementing the joint professional military education requirements 
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of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring that this education provides 
the proper linkage between the Service component officer and the competent joint 
officer.‖146 Second, the panel was to ―assess the ability of the current Department of 
Defense military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint war 
fighters and tacticians.‖147 
 The Skelton Panel held formal hearings between December 2, 1987 and 
September 22, 1988 with representatives from the ten exiting intermediate and senior 
military education schools for field grade and senior officers in the Department of 
Defense, as well as the Capstone course for newly-appointed general and flag rank 
officers. In addition, the Skelton Panel visited the campus of each school to conduct 
further research and interview faculty, staff, and students. The schools in the DoD 
military education system investigated by the Skelton Panel included the National War 
College, the Armed Services Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 
the Army War College, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Naval War 
College, the College of Naval Command and Staff, the Marine Corps Staff College, the 
Air War College, and the Air Command and Staff College. The Skelton Panel issued its 
findings in a 206-page report to Congress published on April 21, 1989; this report 
became known as the Skelton Report.  
 The Skelton Report sent shockwaves through much of the military education 
system due to its pointed criticism of the PME system as a whole and its far-reaching 
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recommendations. Although the Skelton Report described the DoD military education 
system as ―sound‖ overall, the Report made it clear there was plenty of room for 
improvement. The Skelton Report criticized the existing PME framework for a lack of 
focus stating, ―The current focus of each [PME] level is not explicit and clear. The 
results in the current system are a lack of concentration on what should be the primary 
focus, a diffusion of efforts, and unnecessary redundancy.‖148 The Report went on to 
state, ―The panel believes a framework that has distinct primary teaching objectives and 
that integrates the PME schools into a coherent system should be developed and 
implemented.‖149 Overall, the Skelton Report made 36 recommendations directed at 
either the entire PME system or specific schools. Nine recommendations were listed as 
key recommendations in the Report‘s Executive Summary. These recommendations are 
listed in Appendix B of this study. 
 The Air Force, especially the Air Command and Staff College, was the recipient 
of some of the Skelton Report‘s harshest criticism. The faculty at Air University schools 
was compared to the faculties of the other Service PME schools, and the Skelton Report 
found that Air University‘s faculty was ―not generally of the same caliber as other 
service schools.‖150 This conclusion was based on a recognition that Air University had 
over time gained a reputation that had suffered in comparison with other PME schools. 
The Skelton Report stated,  
 According to former officials interviewed by the panel, the reputation of the Air 
 University has always suffered in comparison with most of the other PME 
                                                 
148 House Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth 
Congress, 21. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid, 186. 
 66 
 schools. That reputation, whether fair or not, may cause officers to believe that 
 Air University schools are second-rate and explains their clear bias toward being 
 assigned to another PME school. The reputation becomes self-filling for both the 
 student body and faculty—there is no ―magnet‖ to attract the best to the Air 
 University.151 
 
 Concerning the Air War College, the Skelton Report criticized the Air War 
College‘s mission statement as ―broad and vague and gives the commandant and faculty 
little direction in developing the curriculum. The broad mission statement may explain 
the high percentage of hours in the curriculum that do not contribute to the war fighting 
education of the students.‖152 In addition, the Skelton Report chided the Air War College 
for a lack of rigor in its curriculum. The Report stated, ―The panel‘s curriculum review 
indicated that roughly 60 percent of the core program is passive learning. This is far 
higher than other senior colleges and would seem to indicate less rigor than at other 
schools.‖153 
 The Skelton Report‘s harshest criticism of Air University and its schools was 
directed toward the Air Command and Staff College. Like the Air War College, Air 
Command and Staff College was criticized for a broad and vague mission statement. The 
Report stated, ―Its lack of precision supports comments heard from several officials who 
have visited or lectured at ACSC that the Air Force has issued no clear, detailed mission 
statement for the intermediate-level course. The course has a reputation for poor quality 
and lack of focus.‖154 The curriculum at ACSC received very pointed criticism from the 
Skelton Panel, and is worth quoting at length: 
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 In the panel‘s estimate, roughly one-third of the ACSC curriculum is devoted to 
 joint matters, about 10 percent to strictly Air Force operational matters, and over 
 half to a profusion of other subjects, primarily staff and communication skills. 
 This diffusion of focus causes the panel to question whether the Air Force has 
 thought through the purpose of its intermediate school. The emphasis clearly is 
 not on war fighting and supporting. This failure to impart the Air Force raison 
 d‘etre is doubly unfortunate because, as the Commandant reminded the panel, for 
 many officers this will be the last PME of their careers. Unlike the Army and 
 Marine Corps intermediate colleges, the Air Command and Staff College devotes 
 little time to Air Force doctrine. Because the Air Force responsibility for doctrine 
 development is now assigned to the Center for Aerospace  Research, Doctrine, 
 and Education (CADRE) at Maxwell, the school may be missing a magnificent 
 opportunity to teach the use of air power in the full range of possible 
 contingencies from the tactical to the strategic levels.155 
 
Air Command and Staff College was praised in the Skelton Report for the quality of its 
students, but the quality of its faculty was called into question. The Report stated, 
 The preponderance of faculty members are majors recruited from the graduating 
 class and function as ―seminar leaders.‖ They have little or no more experience 
 than their students and are, in general, not subject matter experts. Consequently, 
 their teaching  abilities are limited to facilitating discussion of each lesson, and 
 they may be only a day or so ahead of their students. The panel believes that the 
 Air Force will have to institute significant changes in faculty recruitment and 
 assignment policies at ACSC to make it as productive as other service schools.156 
 
 This criticism of Air University schools did not go unanswered. Officials at Air 
University took exception to the Skelton Report‘s characterization of Air University 
schools as havens of passive learning which lack intellectual rigor. At the core of Air 
University‘s disagreement with the Skelton Report was a difference of opinion as to 
what constituted passive learning. The Skelton Report defined passive education as 
lectures, films, and symposiums that do not require a direct response from students. 
Congressman Skelton said, ―To have such a disproportionate amount of lectures and 
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films and passive type education I think defeats the purpose of a thinking military leader 
that you want…passive education does not challenge a student that much.‖157  
 Lieutenant General Ralph E. Havens, then Commander of Air University, said, 
―I‘d say that when we have (the commander in chief of Strategic Air Command) General 
John Chain here and he gives a pitch for about 50 minutes, followed by another 50 
minutes of questions and answers on any subject they want, followed by random 
participation in seminar, followed by a working lunch, that is more than passive 
education.‖158  The Commandant of Air War College, Major General David C. Reed, 
agreed with General Havens and stated, ―We‘re going to be reducing the number of 
hours our students spend in the auditorium listening to lectures… (But) if you‘ve seen 
the student officers sitting there listening to the chief of staff of the Air Force laying out 
his perspective on the Air Force, I would suggest that they are all fully engaged in 
that.‖159 At Air Command and Staff College, lectures were seen as the substance from 
which academic rigor was created in the seminar room. After an ACSC lecture, students 
were split into seminars of 13 or 14 students. Major Johnny R. Jones, an ACSC 
instructor said, ―That [a seminar] is where we discuss, tear apart, put together and find 
out what did this guy really tell us, what is its applicability to the Air Force, to the Army, 
to the Navy, and to joint operations.‖160 
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 The Skelton Report defined the notion of academic rigor as consisting of a 
challenging curriculum, student accountability for mastering the curriculum, and 
establishing standards by which student performance is measured. Air University was 
faulted by the Skelton Report for not having enough academic rigors at its schools. 
Again, Air University officials defended their programs. Colonel Jerry Sailors, Vice 
Commandant of Air Command and Staff College said, ―If you take just a general broad 
definition that (rigor) is how hard are they working, are they actually projecting, are they 
actually having to use their brain, are they having to analyze…I think we‘ve made some 
long strides in that area. We are requiring them to analyze. We are requiring more 
outside work than we had before.‖161 Glen Spivey, Educational Advisor at Air 
Command and Staff College agreed with Colonel Sailors, stating, ―If they [students] 
have had to do some things to cause them to think, projecting themselves into situations, 
scenarios, to reflect on what they are studying, to me that is rigorous.‖162 
 Congressman Skelton pointed out that students at ACSC told a very different 
story about academic rigor than the ACSC leadership. According to Skelton, ―When we 
got rid of the colonels and generals out of the room, the comments that these majors 
[students] made to us—‗This is a snap.‘ Another fellow said, ‗I could get through here 
without cracking a book.‘‖163 Spivey indicated that for the first time, ACSC students 
were being required to read two books, specifically The American Way of War by 
Russell Weigley, and The Air Campaign by John A. Warden III. The weekly reading 
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load for ACSC students amounted to about 230 pages a week. Congressman Skelton 
countered, ―Do they have to read 700 pages a week like at the Naval War College?‖164 
Air University officials cautioned that considering page count totals in isolation is a 
misleading practice. An unnamed Air University spokesman said, ―Other schools may 
assign more reading, but they also provide scheduled preparation time in lieu of 
classroom contact time…Air Force students spend more time in the classroom each 
week than students at other schools.‖165 
 Another measure that ACSC pointed out it was taking to inject academic rigor 
into its program was an increased emphasis on war gaming and combat scenario study. 
ACSC instructor Major Joe Zahrobsky said, ―We take real world expertise from a this-
is-the-way-it-is-today briefing, down here in the lecture hall. We take that data, coupled 
with other information from readings and from outside sources, apply it to a whole new 
situation, to bring them up to a higher level of understanding by actually having to take 
tools and manipulate them in whole new situations.‖166 Congressman Skelton 
acknowledged that Air University was taking steps to improve its curricula, stating, ―I 
applaud them on some of these advances. I‘m not totally negative about it. I think they 
are making strides.‖167 General Havens admitted that Air University would have to agree 
to disagree with Congressman Skelton and the Skelton Report on the issues of passive 
education and academic rigor, stating, ―There isn‘t a magic formula for rigor. Part of it is 
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simply perception.‖168 In the end, despite its disagreements with the Skelton Report 
criticisms, Air University and its schools had no choice but to embrace the Skelton 
Report and press forward with efforts to implement the Report‘s recommendations.  
 In total, the Skelton Report made 85 specific recommendations for improving 
PME in the United States, which were summarized as 9 key recommendations in the 
executive summary of the Report. Of the 85 specific recommendations made by the 
Skelton Report, 36 applied to Air University. Thirty-one of the 36 recommendations 
applicable to Air University applied directly to Air Command and Staff College, 
including 4 of the Report‘s 9 key recommendations. The Skelton Report‘s 9 key 
recommendations are listed in Appendix B of this study. The 36 Skelton Report 
recommendations applicable to Air University are listed in Appendix C of this study, 
and the 31 recommendations impacting ACSC are flagged with an asterisk. To 
understand the Skelton Report criticisms of ACSC, this study reviewed the ACSC 
curriculum for Academic Year (AY) 1988, which was the curriculum in place at the time 
of the Skelton Panel‘s visit to Air University in March 1988.  
ACSC Curriculum in 1988  
 
 ACSC‘s Mission Statement for AY 1988 read, ―To enhance the professional 
knowledge, skills, and perspectives of mid-career officers for increased leadership roles 
in command and staff positions.‖169 This is the mission statement labeled as broad, 
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vague, and unclear in the Skelton Report. The AY 1988 ACSC curriculum consisted of 
864 total hours of academic instruction, which was divided among five curriculum 
divisions: Command, Leadership, and Combat Support; Staff Communications and 
Research; National Security Affairs; Warfare Studies; and Space Operations. Included in 
the academic instruction was a 48-academic hour electives program that enabled 
students to pursue more in-depth study in areas of particular interest. United States 
officers attended three 16-hour elective courses during the course of the academic year, 
and each foreign officer attended two elective courses. The curriculum for AY 1988 is 
shown in Table 1 on the following page, and the elective courses offered that year are 
listed in Table 2. 
Two key initiatives with significant impact for the ACSC curriculum were being 
planned when the Skelton Panel members visited Air University March 17-18, 1988. 
First, a new 250-academic hour joint education curriculum was being developed for 
inclusion in the ACSC curriculum to comply with the Title IV educational mandates of   
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Table 1.  ACSC AY 1988 Curriculum Summary 
 
  Academic 
Hours 
 
Core Curriculum Sem Lecture Total 
 
Area 1: Staff Communication and Research 61 10 71 
Advanced Staff Communications and Applications 52 10 62 
Staff Research Program 9 0 9 
Area II: Command, Leadership, and Combat 
Support 
70.5 109.5 180 
Leadership Studies 41.5 50.5 92 
Leadership Symposium 0 8 8 
Combat Support 29 51 80 
Area III: National Security Affairs 55 70.5 125.
5 
US National Security Policy 13.5 20.5 34 
USSR and Europe 11.5 18 29.5 
Latin America 8.5 11.25 19.7
5 
Asia, Africa, and Middle East 11.5 20.75 32.2
5 
The Crisis Game 10 0 10 
Area IV: Warfare Studies 155.5 203.5 359 
Thinking About War (Theory, History, Doctrine, and 
Strategy) 
29.5 47.5 77 
Low-Intensity Conflict 16 36 52 
Theater Warfare 73 83 156 
Nuclear Warfare 37 37 74 
Area V: Space Operations 11 29.5 40.5 
 
Other Academic Instruction 48 40 88 
Electives  48 0 48 
Commandant‘s Special Lectures 0 40 40 
 
Total—Academic Hours 401 463 864 
 
Source: Air University Catalog: 1987 – 88, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University Press, 1987), 44-45. 
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Table 2.  ACSC AY 1988 Elective Courses 
 
American Civil War Intelligence Community 
Arabic Language Instructional System Development 
Arab-Israeli Conflict Introduction to Data Base Management Systems 
Army Functional Area 54 Qualification Introduction to Desktop Computers 
Army Overview Introduction to Islamic Political World View 
Contemporary Africa Introduction to Word Processing 
Creative Thinking Joint Middle East Exercise 
Dealing with Death in the Military Community Latin America—US relations 
Development of the Soviet Military Establishment Media Relations for Staff Officers 
East Asia and US Security Next Assignment—Air Staff 
Effective Staff Briefing Nuclear Weapons and Issues 
Effective Writing The People‘s Republic of China 
Electronic Combat Personal Financial Planning and Management  
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy Sources of the Soviet Mind-Set 
Executive Fitness Soviet Foreign Policy 
German Language Spanish Language 
System Acquisition Issues Update on Army Issues, Parts I and II 
US and Soviet Navies Vietnam War 
USAF Roles and Missions: Then and Now War and Morality: Ethics and the Military Profession 
  
  
 
Source:  Air University Catalog: 1987 – 88, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University Press, 1987), 43-44. 
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the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Secondly, the entire ACSC 
curriculum was being reworked in anticipation of implementing an Air University 
decision that would shorten the ACSC academic year from 40 weeks to 24 weeks 
beginning with AY 1990. These initiatives, combined with minor curricular changes, put 
the ACSC curriculum in a state of flux by time the Skelton Panel visited ACSC. 
 
A New Joint Curriculum  
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act directed the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop new policies and procedures for educating and 
training members of the armed forces in joint matters, especially for a new cadre of joint 
specialty officers. To qualify for joint specialty officer status, officers were required to 
complete a joint education program and a joint duty assignment. Moreover, the law 
required 50 percent of all officers serving in joint duty assignments to be either joint 
specialty officers or joint specialty officer nominees. One hundred percent of 1,000 joint 
duty positions identified as ―critical joint assignments‖ had to be filled by qualified joint 
specialty officers.170 Responding to these dictates, the Chairman formed a Senior 
Military Schools Review Board in October 1986 to study military education and 
appointed retired Air Force General Russell Dougherty, former Commander-in-Chief of 
Strategic Air Command, to lead the Board. The Board consisted of three other retired 
general and flag officers and became known as the Dougherty Board.   
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 The Dougherty Board reviewed several aspects of military education, including 
curriculum content, length, and standards; faculty qualifications; lecture topics and 
speakers; student selection and evaluation; and graduate follow-on assignments. The 
Board submitted its final report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 May 
1987. The Board recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop 
joint education curriculum standards among the intermediate and senior level PME 
schools without losing the essential service orientation of each school and accredit the 
schools for joint education through a periodic accreditation process to validate joint 
curriculum currency and ensure compliance. In addition, the Board recommended 
establishment of a division within the Joint Staff to provide liaison between the service 
colleges and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.171 The Chairman tasked Air Force 
Lieutenant General Bradley Hosmer, President of National Defense University, to 
develop the educational program and standards recommended by the Dougherty Board 
to prepare officers for joint duty assignments. The Chairman however decided not to 
accredit all graduates of the individual service intermediate and senior level schools as 
joint PME qualified because he believed Congress would perceive that the Department 
of Defense were turning the service schools into joint schools at the expense of service-
specific education.172 
 The joint educational program development effort was led by NDU, but was 
developed in consultation with each service school commandant. In August 1987, NDU 
                                                 
171 Senior Military Schools Review Board Report (Dougherty Board), Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1987. 
172 Background Paper on Joint PME Status/Issues, HQ AU/XPOS, April 20, 1988, 2. 
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forwarded their proposed Joint Specialty Program to the Air War College and Air 
Command and Staff College commandants for comments and suggestions. Both 
commandants were united in their belief that the Joint Specialty Program needed to be 
developed and implemented by a joint qualified faculty; that the Joint Specialty Program 
should not be restricted to only a select portion of the student body; and that the earliest 
dates that the Joint Specialty Program could be implemented at Air University was 
during Academic Year 1990.173 Under the National Defense University‘s proposed Joint 
Specialty Program which was forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
28 September 1987, producing officers qualified for nomination as Joint Specialty 
Officers through senior level schools required a 110-hour joint curriculum; a faculty mix 
of air, ground, and sea force officers, 75% of which should be senior service school 
graduates and more than 50% of military faculty should have joint experience; and each 
student seminar should contain a minimum of 15% representation from each military 
department. NDU‘s proposed program for intermediate level schools required between 
235 and 275 hours of joint curriculum with faculty and student mixes identical to that of 
senior level schools.174 
 The Chairman approved in principle NDU‘s proposed joint education program 
standards and curriculum of 28 September 1987 as the basis to be used by all service 
schools to qualify officers as Joint Specialty Officer nominees. Each service was then 
tasked to use the NDU standards and curriculum to develop distinct ―joint track‖ 
programs that could be implemented as pilot programs in their military education 
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colleges in 1988 for the Academic Year 1989. Only those PME students identified for 
future joint duty assignments would be given the joint track curriculum. Additionally, an 
accreditation process called the JCS Process of Accreditation for Joint Education (PAJE) 
was established to ensure each service‘s pilot program met the intent of the approved 
joint education standards.175 
 Air University‘s pilot program proposal was forwarded to the Air Staff on 16 
December 1987 and included requirements for additional faculty and student support 
from the other services. Air University‘s proposal included the assumptions that (a) both 
Air War College and ACSC would receive required additional resources, (b) the Air 
Force Military Personnel Center would identify joint track students before class begins, 
and (c) all sister service students would be enrolled in the joint track program. The Air 
Force Military Personnel Center indicated that Air University would need to produce 
between 70 and 215 Joint Specialty Officer nominees annually, depending upon the final 
joint duty requirements from the Department of Defense and the Air Force‘s portion of 
those final requirements.176     
 ACSC‘s pilot program for joint education curriculum totaled 240 hours of 
instruction across five major areas. Approximately 144 ACSC students (78 Air Force, 44 
Army, and 22 Navy and Marine students) were slated to receive instruction in 
Organizational and Command Relationships, Joint Command, Control, Communications 
and Intelligence, The Operational Level of War, Defense Planning Systems, and Joint 
Staff Operations. In addition, joint track students were required to develop an 
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operational plan and employ joint forces in response to a computer-generated 
scenario.177 ACSC‘s pilot program called for the formation of 11 joint seminars 
consisting of 13 students each in which joint curriculum not covered in ACSC‘s existing 
core curriculum would be taught. Seventy-one percent, or 170 total curricular hours of 
ACSC‘s pilot program were not previously covered in the core curriculum.178 Additional 
requirements for ACSC‘s pilot program included 9 sea service students, 3 Army and 5 
sea service faculty members to replace the loss of Air Force faculty transferred to sister 
service colleges, and 5 joint-qualified Air Force faculty.179 
 On 15 January 1988, the Air Force submitted Air University‘s pilot programs to 
an Initial Certification Group (ICG) chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The ICG was formed to review and assess all senior and intermediate college pilot 
programs and included representatives from all services. The ICG was tasked to 
recommend for certification those programs which had a high probability of being 
accredited through the PAJE.180  The ICG met periodically throughout the spring and 
early summer of 1988 to ensure the service pilot programs were meeting the joint 
education standards approved by the CJCS and resolve problems and issues that could 
delay implementation of the pilot programs for AY 1989. By May 1988, Air 
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University‘s pilot programs had been recommended for certification by the ICG.181 
Approximately 144 joint-track students at ACSC were slated to receive 250 hours of 
joint instruction, which included 25 hours of instruction in Joint Organization and 
Command Relationships, 25 hours in Joint Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence, 45 hours in Joint Forces and the Operational Level of War, 95 hours in 
Defense Planning Systems, and 60 hours in Joint Staff Operations. The joint curriculum 
culminated with a Tunisia-based joint war game hosted by the U.S. Air Force War 
Gaming Center, also located at Maxwell Air Force Base.182 All ACSC students received 
70 hours of joint war fighting instruction in the core curriculum, but the 180-hour 
increase in joint instruction would only be taught to those students designated as joint-
track students. Moreover, joint-track students would have longer class days and more 
homework than the other students. Table 3 below depicts the curriculum given to Joint 
Specialty Track students during AY 1989. 
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Table 3.  ACSC AY 1989 Joint Specialty Track Curriculum 
 
Courses  Academic Hours 
 
 
 New 
Hours 
 
Core Hours  
Organizational and Command Relationships 19 6  
Joint Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence 16 9  
Joint Forces and Operational Level of War - 45  
Defense Planning 85 10  
Joint Staff Operations 50 -  
    
    
Total—Academic Hours 170              70 240 
 
Source: Air University Course Catalog: 1988 – 89, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University Press, 1988), 54. 
 
 
24-Week Curriculum Proposal   
  The second major curricular initiative being planned at ACSC at the time of the 
Skelton Panel hearings was transitioning ACSC from its 40-week academic year to a 24-
week academic year scheduled to begin during Academic Year 1990. Reducing the 
ACSC academic year was not without precedent. ACSC was reduced from its then 9-
month academic year to a 22-week program in 1948 during the Berlin Airlift. Later, 
during the Korean War, ACSC was again reduced, this time down to a 15-week course, 
until 1954 when ACSC returned to its original 9-month program. Since the end of the 
Korean War, shortening the ACSC academic year had twice been considered. The first 
consideration came in 1961 when an Air University committee was formed to study the 
feasibility of splitting ACSC into two short courses per year in the interest of doubling 
the number of annual ACSC graduates. In 1974, reducing ACSC was again considered 
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when Lieutenant General Felix M. Rogers, Air University commander at the time, 
decided to shorten ACSC to 22-weeks long for Academic Year 1977. General Roger‘s 
decision was overturned by his replacement, Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong, 
before the shortened ACSC program could be implemented. In both of these cases, the 
ultimate decision to remain with the by then 10-month ACSC program was based on the 
belief that a shorter ACSC program would be lacking in content, would create more 
problems than it would solve, and its graduates would likely be of inferior quality than 
graduates of the 10-month program.183  
 Reducing the ACSC program again came into consideration in 1987 when then 
Air University commander Lieutenant General Truman Spangrud again opened the 
issue. General Spangrud and then Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch 
believed that reducing the ACSC program from 40 to 24 weeks beginning in AY 1990 
would benefit the Air Force by increasing the number of ACSC graduates, eliminating 
what they saw as too much time being devoted to subjects covered in the curriculum, 
and allowing select ACSC graduates to attend a one year follow-on course being 
developed to focus on strategic studies. The strategic studies follow-on course for select 
ACSC graduates being developed at this time became the School of Advanced Airpower 
Studies, today known as the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.  
 Resistance to the new ACSC reduction proposal was stiff. A group of former Air 
Force senior officers expressed their sentiments on the proposal in a letter to Senator 
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Sam Nunn in April 1988. The letter stated Lieutenant General Spangrud had reopened 
the issue ―against the recommendations of his staff and the conclusions of all previous 
studies on the subject‖ and that General Spangrud‘s motivation was his ―desire to 
increase resident attendance opportunity from 20 to 30 percent, even though the USAF 
has not established that goal. The staff‘s effort to explain that the marginal gain in 
attendance opportunity was a poor trade-off for the long term educational losses went 
unheeded.‖184 The annual Air University Board of Visitors that reviewed the ACSC 
program in 1988 also expressed concern about the pending ACSC course reduction. In 
its report to the Air University commander, the Board of Visitors stated, ―Changes in the 
40-week program can be easily justified, but the proposed move to a 24-week program 
appears unduly arbitrary, and it may well produce an abbreviated curriculum.‖185 
 To accommodate the reduction in program length, ACSC curriculum developers 
designed a new streamlined curriculum for AY 1990, which revolved around adapting 
the AY 1989 curriculum. The 24-week curriculum retained approximately 62 percent of 
the AY 1989 core curriculum, which represented a net reduction of 316 hours of 
instruction. Specifically, the 24-week curriculum was accomplished by (1) eliminating 
redundancy in student lectures, seminars, and readings; (2) reducing or eliminating 
subjects concerning strategic studies and shifting the curricular focus towards thinking 
about war at the operational level; (3) tasking students with situations and issues that 
emphasize out-of-class analysis and problem solving individually and in groups, using 
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knowledge gained in class; and (4) streamlining individual core curriculum lessons and 
more efficient class scheduling. The integration of the joint curriculum requirements for 
the joint-track students was also part of the 24-week program.  
 In addition to planning the integration of joint education curriculum and a new 
24-week curriculum, ACSC was in the midst of instituting minor changes at the time of 
the Skelton Panel visit. ACSC‘s Command, Leadership, and Combat Support Division 
was renamed for AY 1988 from AY 1987 when the division was called the Command, 
Leadership, and Resource Management Division. The curricular focus of the Resource 
Management phase was on financial management (federal budgeting process from 
formulation to execution), acquisition cycle processes, and logistics (including combat 
support doctrine, international logistics, and the relationship of logistics to strategy). The 
Combat Support phase still contained instruction in financial management, acquisition, 
and logistics; however more emphasis was placed on the funding, equipping, and 
sustaining of military forces. The renaming of the Resource Management phase of the 
division to Combat Support, came about to ―more appropriately reflect the division‘s 
responsibilities‖ and to incorporate guidance from the Air Force Chief of Staff to 
―concentrate on more war fighting‖ in the ACSC curriculum.186 
 Another division name change was made at ACSC in 1988 for AY 1989. The 
Staff Communications and Research Division became the Staff Communications and 
Analysis Division as a result of changes mandated by Brigadier General Frank E. Willis, 
then Commandant of ACSC. General Willis decided to eliminate for AY 1989 ACSC‘s 
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sponsored research project requirement each student accomplished. Students wrote one 
25-page, single-spaced paper in which they were required to write convincing arguments 
and defend a position on an issue of importance to the Department of Defense. To 
replace this requirement, General Willis decided students would write three Professional 
Issue Papers (PIPs) of 5 – 15 double-spaced pages in length each. In addition, six 
additional in-class writing assignments were added that focused on traditional action 
officer staff memos and other official correspondence. Topics for the PIPs 
complemented the existing curriculum and were supplied to the students by the ACSC 
faculty, subject to General Willis‘s approval. General Willis retained the opportunity for 
students, on a strictly voluntary basis, to conduct Department of Defense sponsored 
research if they so desired.187  
 General Willis based his decision to alter student writing requirements on three 
factors. First, feedback from students and graduates consistently ranked research and 
writing requirements as the least enjoyable aspect of ACSC. Second, the DoD-sponsored 
research program required a 500 – 800 hour annual work load on faculty members which 
could be better utilized by faculty to develop and implement the new joint education 
curriculum. Finally, the impending transition to a 24-week academic year required 
eliminating and reducing core curriculum requirements.188 Thus, when the Skelton Panel 
visited ACSC in March 1988, its members were confronted with a school significantly 
engaged in developing a joint education curriculum to meet the Title IV requirements of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, developing and preparing to implement a major curriculum 
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reduction from 40 to 24 weeks long, as well as instituting other changes impacting the 
core curriculum. 
 The Department of Defense‘s effort to implement a joint education curriculum 
and accredit PME schools to produce Joint Specialty Officer nominees garnered the 
attention of Congress while the Skelton Panel was still in the midst of its hearings. 
Congress was concerned that the Department of Defense was making long-term changes 
to joint education and accreditation. In a letter to Secretary of Defense Frank C. 
Carlucci, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services cautioned 
the Department of Defense on joint education. The letter, signed by six members of the 
House Committee on Armed Services, including Congressman Ike Skelton, stated,  
 We understand the interim need for a joint track and support conducting it in 
 academic year 1988 – 89 as a pilot program. Second, on other (non-JSO) PME, 
 we applaud the enhancement of education in joint matters in the Service colleges. 
 Third, we still oppose accrediting entire Service colleges as joint schools until a 
 more thorough analysis of the implications of such a decision and the 
 alternatives, has been completed.189 
 
The letter suggested the Department of Defense delay long-term decisions until after the 
results of the PME review being conducted by the Skelton Panel and reiterated that the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act ―did not contemplate converting the Service military education 
colleges into joint schools.‖190 Based on this letter, the Department of Defense did not 
make permanent changes but did press forward with its plan to implement joint 
education pilot programs in AY 1989, but only as an interim solution and did not 
accredit any entire PME college for joint education. Thus, all graduates of PME colleges 
                                                 
189 Letter from U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services to Frank C. Carlucci, 
Secretary of Defense, 20 June 1988, in History of Air University, 1 January – 31 December 1988, Volume 
III, Part I, p.II-87. 
190 Ibid. 
 87 
were not accredited as joint nominees; only graduates of joint-track curriculums were 
accredited. 
Criticism of the 24-Week Curriculum Proposal  
The Skelton Panel expressed serious concern about ACSC‘s plan to shorten its 
program from 40 to 24 weeks during its hearings. During the testimony of General Larry 
D. Welch, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Skelton Panel requested the following 
questions be submitted and answered for the record: 
 The Air Force intends to conduct ACSC twice annually. This will reduce the 
 course  length from 40 weeks to 24 weeks. If the NDU joint curriculum is taught 
 in the 24 week course as part of the ―joint track‖ what will prevent the essence of 
 ACSC from being significantly altered? Isn‘t there a body of ―Air Force 
 knowledge—doctrine, philosophy, etc.‖ that won‘t be taught as a result? Will 
 ACSC be able to accomplish its mission?191 
 
The Air Force responded with the following answer: 
 Yes, the character of ACSC will be changed with the introduction of two classes 
 a year,  especially if there is a continuing requirement to provide a joint track. 
 However, reducing the ACSC course has driven a reevaluation of our philosophy 
 for intermediate PME. In addition to a greater emphasis on ―war fighting‖ and a 
 somewhat lesser focus on the  ―staff‖ areas, there is an opportunity to incorporate 
 additional joint aspects of war fighting into the course. To accomplish this we 
 plan integration of JSO certifiable instruction, meeting NDU requirements, into 
 the core curriculum received by all ACSC students beginning the summer of 
 1989.  
 
 Further, careful selection of lesson material and integration of joint issues should 
 not significantly diminish the body of Air Force knowledge essential to the 
 intermediate level officer. Joint requirements will not detract from ACSC‘s 
 ability to accomplish its mission and continue to produce effective and 
 professional officers. There is no doubt, however, that a continuing requirement 
 to cover all the stringent NDU curriculum, stressing detailed training aspects of 
 the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), places an increased burden on our 
 planning for the new ACSC program. A follow-on course for JSO candidates to 
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 cover these training details would alleviate this burden and ensure ACSC can 
 retain the essence of airpower necessary for the credibility of Air Force officers 
 selected for joint duty.192 
 
Despite its concern during the hearings, the Skelton Panel did not specifically address 
ACSC‘s proposed 24-week program in its Report. The Report made only a casual 
reference to the 24-week ACSC initiative in the context of the proposed one year follow-
on course to ACSC. The Report stated, ―The panel encourages the Air Force to establish 
this course in the near future. It also hopes that the course may help the Air Force 
recognize there is useful material to be studied in a year-long Air Command and Staff 
College course.‖193 
 After the Skelton Report was published however, the 24-week ACSC initiative 
remained a sticking point with Congressman Skelton. Congressman Skelton struck a 
deal with Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch to delay implementation of the 
proposed 24-week ACSC program by one year from AY 1989 to AY 1990 to allow more 
time for Skelton to better understand the Air Force position on the initiative.194  In June 
1989, shortly after publication of the Skelton Report, Congressman Skelton suggested a 
curricular focus for ACSC to Lieutenant General Ralph Havens, then Commander of Air 
University that hinted strongly that Skelton did not support a 24-week curriculum at 
ACSC. Congressman Skelton‘s proposed curriculum focused on Air Force and Joint 
Resource Management, Military History and Theory, Airpower in Joint Operations, Joint 
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Force Planning, Joint and Combined Operations, an Electives Program, and Research.195 
In his letter, Congressman Skelton told Lieutenant General Havens, ―You will probably 
need 12 months to do this properly. However, if you work the students hard you could 
probably get it done in 10 months.‖196 That same month, Congressman Skelton sent a 
letter to Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee 
informing him that Skelton intended to introduce legislation ―requiring all intermediate 
and senior level war colleges to be a minimum of 10 months duration.‖197  
 Congressman Skelton‘s reiterated his concern about ACSC‘s 24-week initiative 
in a September 1989 Air Force Times report. In the report, Skelton said, ―The service 
(Air Force) should focus less on the quantity of officers who attend ACSC and more on 
the quality of their education…instead of sending more people to ACSC in the shortened 
course, more should be required to take it through correspondence and seminar.‖198 
Furthermore, Congressman Skelton expressed to the Air Force his concern ―that a 
shorter ACSC course would not meet the requirements for Phase I PME‖ and that 
―students in a shorter ACSC course would be at a disadvantage with students in a 10-
month ISS course.‖199  
 Congressman Skelton was joined by the Air University Board of Visitors in 
expressing concern about ACSC‘s reduced curriculum plan. During their annual meeting 
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at Air University in April 1989, the Board of Visitors noted that any benefits resulting 
from the new 24-week ACSC program would not outweigh the benefits of the 40-week 
course. First, the Board noted the 24-week program could encourage students not to 
bring their families with them, thereby resulting in family separations which negatively 
impact quality of life for students as well as impacting the traditional social interchange 
present in the 40-week program. The Board of Visitors also felt that additional efforts 
should be made in the 24-week program to reserve time for students to reflect and think. 
Some Board members even felt that the academic pace of the longer ACSC program 
prevented student burnout and mental fatigue while the shorter course would likely 
cause student fatigue.200  
 The Board of Visitor‘s most pointed criticism of ACSC‘s 24-week curriculum 
was directed at the reduction in elective courses. Under the 24-week program, time 
allotted for elective courses would diminish, negatively impacting the broadening effect 
of the electives on the students. The Board noted, ―In a time when the dangers of a major 
world conflict seem to be receding in the direction of more diverse and subtle 
international competition, it strikes many as short-sighted to have national security 
aspects of the course cut back.‖201  
 The Air Force finally succumbed to the growing chorus of objections to the 24-
week ACSC initiative. Congressman Skelton subsequently withdrew his legislative 
amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990 which would have 
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established a 10-month statutory duration for PME schools.202 However, due primarily to 
Congressman Skelton‘s and the Board of Visitor‘s concerns, the Air Force indefinitely 
postponed implementation of the ACSC 24-week initiative.203 The initiative has not been 
raised again. 
 
Incorporation of Skelton Report Recommendations 
 Academic Year 1989-1990 was the first full academic year for which ACSC had 
the opportunity to include the Skelton Panel recommendations into its curriculum. The 
Skelton Report criticized ACSC for a lack of war fighting focus in its curriculum. For 
AY 1990, ACSC focused its curriculum more toward war fighting at the operational 
level of war, increased its Professional Reading Program requirement for students, and 
incorporated Phase I of the Program for Joint Professional Military Education (PJE) into 
its core curriculum. The separate Joint Specialty Track curriculum was deleted for AY 
1990; all graduates of ACSC, beginning with the class of AY 1990, received credit for 
Phase I Joint Education. Phase II of Joint Education was taught at the Armed Forces 
Staff College (Today known as the Joint Forces Staff College) in Norfolk, Virginia. 
 In emphasizing war fighting in its AY 1990 curriculum, ACSC curriculum 
planners made four significant curricular changes from years past. First, how-to lessons 
on basic Air Force written staff communications were eliminated in favor of assigning 
students briefings and papers tied directly to the Warfare Studies curriculum. Second, 
ACSC eliminated redundancy in basic leadership concepts which are also presented at 
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Squadron Officer School in favor of a focus on leadership in command positions. Third, 
the Warfare Studies curricular area was increased by 113 hours over AY 1989 and 
included a clearly defined war fighting focus; Sixty percent of the ACSC curriculum was 
now in the Warfare Studies area. Warfare Studies now included a more thorough study 
of doctrine, Low-Intensity Conflict scenarios and campaign planning addressing a low 
intensity threat, addition of a computer war game with a Central European scenario, 
addition of a rapid deployment exercise featuring a Middle Eastern scenario, and 
addition of an in-depth study and analysis of an operational level campaign. Moreover, 
Warfare Studies for AY 1990 increased study of joint force employment through 
incorporation of joint concepts and principles from the AY 1989 Joint Specialty Track 
curriculum, and added an operational naval scenario to complement its existing 
operational land scenario. ACSC‘s increased staff of sister service faculty were also 
tasked to write and teach joint operational concepts.204 
 Another significant change in the Air Force PME system as a result of the 
Skelton Report was the establishment of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies 
(SAAS) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The U.S. Army had established its School 
of Advanced Military Studies(SAMS) in June 1983 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to 
provide select Army officers with a one-year advanced education in military operational 
art and science, and the Skelton Panel was impressed with this effort by the Army to 
create strategic thinkers. The Skelton Panel encouraged the Air Force to create a similar 
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course, which was in fact being planned by the Air Force at the time the Skelton Report 
was published in 1989. Thus, in 1990, the Air Force created SAAS and placed the new 
school under the jurisdiction of ACSC. SAAS was established as a similar concept to the 
Army‘s SAMS. SAAS became a ten-month follow-on course to ACSC for select ACSC 
graduates with a curriculum focused on military history, theory, and doctrine with an 
emphasis on airpower. The Air Force planned for approximately 25 students to attend 
the course annually with the first class beginning in the summer of 1991.205     
 In 1990, Congressman Skelton asked the United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) to examine the efforts of PME schools to implement Panel 
recommendations from its April 1989 report. The GAO completed its review of ACSC 
implementation efforts in December 1990, and found that 30 of the 31 Skelton Panel 
recommendations applicable to ACSC had been implemented or partially implemented. 
Nine recommendations were partially implemented while 21 recommendations were 
fully implemented.206 The lone recommendation not implemented was the recommended 
use of officer efficiency reports instead of training reports to document student academic 
accomplishments. ACSC had always used training reports to document student 
performance, and felt its use of training reports was as effective as officer efficiency 
reports would be, especially since the training reports became part of an officer‘s 
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permanent record. Therefore, ACSC decided not to implement this particular 
recommendation.207 
 Six of the 9 partially implemented recommendations dealt with the ACSC 
faculty, two dealt with students and one partially implemented recommendation 
concerned active versus passive instruction and the use of student letter grades. For 
Academic Year 1990-91, ACSC had planned for 65% of its curriculum to be taught 
using active learning methods, which it defines as time spent studying, researching, 
writing, and seminar activity, a 14% increase over the 51% active learning methodology 
noted in the Panel Report.208 In addition, ACSC officials decided to keep its current 
practice of evaluating student performance and not to implement the part of the Panel‘s 
recommendation that suggested the use of letter grades in evaluating student 
performance because ACSC emphasized operational competence, which they felt was 
not necessarily captured through letter grades. ACSC kept the following practice of 
grading student performance: 
 Superior: Students who exceed the expectations for satisfactory completion of 
 course  materials. 
  
 Professionally competent/average: Students who satisfactorily meet pre-
 established criteria for satisfactory comprehension of certain course materials. 
  
 Referral/failed: Students who failed to meet criteria established for professionally 
 competence.209  
 
 The six partially implemented faculty recommendations concerned faculty 
teaching Strategy, the mix of military faculty on staff, the percent of military faculty 
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mix, a faculty development program, faculty-student ratios, and a faculty exchange 
program with the Air Force Academy. The Panel recommended that faculty teaching 
Strategy courses include retired three and four-star generals whose experience can 
contribute significantly to teaching national military and national security strategy. No 
retired three and four-star generals are permanent members of the ACSC faculty; such 
officers are invited to ACSC as guest lecturers for specific topics and ACSC elected to 
continue this practice.210  
 The Panel recommendations concerning the mix of military faculty and percent 
of military faculty mix are very similar and related. The Panel recommended that faculty 
representation from each military department at each PME school be ―eventually 
substantially higher than today‖ and then quantified its ideal military faculty mix as 10% 
faculty representation from each of the two non-host military departments in a separate 
recommendation.211 The reason these Panel recommendations were only partially 
implemented by ACSC can be traced to the May 1990 implementation of a new military 
education policy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This new military 
education policy was codified in the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD), a 
comprehensive document that established policies for coordinating military education 
for members of the armed forces, with an emphasis on Joint PME. The MEPD also 
established guidelines for student and faculty mix and ratios, teaching methods, 
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curriculum, and accreditation.212 ACSC had 5% of its faculty represented by U.S. Army 
officers and 6% of its faculty represented by U.S. Navy officers for AY 1990-91. These 
faculty mix percentages were below the Panel‘s recommended 10% sister service faculty 
mix, but in line with the MEPD‘s recommendation of a combined 10% faculty mix from 
other services. ACSC chose to keep its sister service faculty mix percentages in line with 
the MEPD.213 
 The Report recommended the services develop programs to qualify their military 
faculty members and ensure they are prepared to teach. In the same recommendation, the 
Panel opposed the practice of retaining service school graduates as faculty members for 
the following year. ACSC prepared its military faculty members to teach through a 
faculty development program that included an orientation course and a month-long 
assignment to Air University‘s Academic Instructor School (AIS) at Maxwell Air Force 
Base, Alabama. AIS prepared new military faculty through practical instruction in 
realistic classroom environments. Additionally, ACSC used weekly faculty development 
meetings to bring together faculty instructors and curriculum developers to discuss 
lesson objectives and optimal teaching strategies. However, ACSC decided to keep its 
practice of retaining 10 – 15% of its graduates each year for faculty duty because the 
practice ―provides for the maximum production of personnel resources and diligent 
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expenditures of scarce funds.‖214 In addition, ACSC officials stated that its graduates are 
usually experts in their career fields and ―exhibit a concern and enthusiasm in faculty 
positions unlike the more senior faculty members brought in from other assignments.‖215 
 Student and faculty ratios were recommended to be in the range of 3 or 4 to 1, 
low enough to ―allow time for faculty development programs, research, and writing.‖216 
When the Panel visited ACSC in March 1988, the ACSC student/faculty ratio was 4.7 to 
1. The ratio was reduced by Academic Year 1990-91 to 4.4 to 1 due to the arrival of 
additional U.S. Army and Navy faculty members. The GAO report noted that with the 
planned addition of five civilian faculty members for Academic Year 1991-92, ACSC 
will be able to lower its student/faculty ratio to meet the Panel recommendation.217  
 The final partially implemented recommendation dealing with faculty concerned 
the recommendation that the services study the feasibility of using faculty members from 
service academies on an exchange basis to help improve their PME school faculties. At 
the time of the GAO report, ACSC had one Air Force Academy faculty member enrolled 
as a student. This former Air Force Academy faculty member was earmarked to remain 
at ACSC as a faculty member following graduation in Academic Year 1991-92. 
However, the exchange was only one way as there was no ACSC faculty member 
teaching at the Air Force Academy due to personnel shortages at ACSC.218 
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 The partially implemented recommendations concerning student mix and 
percentage of student mix are, like that of faculty, similar and related. The Panel 
recommended representation from each military department in the student body of PME 
schools and in a separate recommendation, set a representation goal of one officer from 
each of the two non-host military departments per student seminar by Academic Year 
1990-91 and two officers per seminar by Academic Year 1995-96.219 For Academic 
Year 1990-91, ACSC had one U.S. Army student in each seminar, but did not have at 
least one U.S. Navy/Marine Corps officer in each student seminar. ACSC planned to 
have one officer each from the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps in each 
seminar for Academic Year 1992-93.220  
 
Summary 
 Events during the latter half of the1980s signaled a new era for PME in the 
United States. The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986, the published report in 1989 of the House Panel on Professional Military 
Education, and the end of the Cold War in 1989 had significant impact on PME in the 
United States. Almost no area of PME was left untouched by these events; school 
structure, curricular focus, teaching methodology, length of academic year, faculty and 
student issues were all impacted. One of the more heavily impacted schools was the Air 
Command and Staff College, one of the PME schools that are part of the Air Force‘s Air 
University.    
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 The Goldwater-Nichols Act came about in response to failed U.S. military 
operations such as the Vietnam War, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, and the U.S. 
Marine bombing in Lebanon. The Act made legislative changes to the function of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and strengthened the ability of the armed services 
to work together by mandating joint operations, joint education and joint assignments for 
senior military officers. The Act also created requirements for a Joint Specialty Officer, 
specially trained and educated in joint matters. Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols forced the 
Department of Defense to focus its PME system toward joint education and revise the 
management of officer career paths and promotions. For the first time ever, Congress 
was dictating curricular focus in United States PME schools. 
 The Department of Defense began to focus the curriculum of its PME schools 
toward joint education in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. PME schools 
including ACSC implemented a Joint Specialty Track curriculum for a percentage of the 
student body in order to fulfill the new joint education requirements. The Joint Specialty 
Track curriculum was short-lived however, due to the recommendations of the House 
Panel on Military Education.      
 Congress chartered the House Panel on Military Education in 1987, known as the 
Skelton Panel after its Chairman, Congressman Ike Skelton, to ensure the mandates of 
GNA Title IV were implemented and to assess the ability of the U.S. PME system to 
develop strategic-minded senior officers. The Panel released its report in April 1989 and 
sent shockwaves through the PME system. The Report pointed out shortcomings in 
curricular focus, teaching methodology, faculty and student qualifications, and academic 
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rigor. The Report was critical of all PME schools, but was especially critical of ACSC. 
In fact, the Panel questioned whether or not the Air Force had thought through the 
purpose of ACSC. In all, the Panel made 85 specific recommendations to improve the 
state of PME in the United States. Air University and ACSC officials defended the state 
of ACSC and other Air Force schools in the wake of the Skelton Report, but also 
embraced the Panel‘s recommendations. By December 1990, ACSC had implemented or 
partially implemented 30 of the Panel‘s 31 recommendations that applied directly to 
ACSC.      
 In addition to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Report, ACSC was 
busy with minor in-house curriculum changes as well as planning an initiative to reduce 
the length of its course from 40 to 24 weeks in order to double the number of in-
residence graduates annually. After much planning, debate, and criticism, especially 
criticism from Congressman Ike Skelton, the Air Force indefinitely delayed 
implementation of its 24-week ACSC curriculum.  
 The years 1989 – 1992 were marked with significant activity for ACSC. 
Curricular changes and other initiatives initiated by both internal and external influences 
kept ACSC faculty and curriculum developers extremely busy. By Academic Year 1991-
92, ACSC‘s curriculum was heavily focused toward war fighting, was more rigorous 
than in years past, and was certified for Phase I of Joint Professional Military Education. 
As the decade of the 1990s got underway and with the tumultuous last 4 years behind 
them, officials at ACSC looked ahead to a period of hopeful curricular stability. What 
they did not yet know was that changes at ACSC were only just beginning. Colonel John 
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Warden, who would become arguably the most reform-minded Commandant at ACSC, 
was on his way to assume the position of ACSC Commandant.   
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CHAPTER V 
 THE WARDEN REVOLUTION 
 
 The years 1992 – 1995 mark a period of extraordinary change in the history of 
Air Command and Staff College due to the efforts of Commandant John A. Warden III. 
Colonel John Warden arrived at Maxwell Air Force Base in August 1992 to assume the 
position of Commandant of ACSC following a long and successful career as a pilot and 
commander. When Colonel Warden left ACSC and retired from the Air Force in June 
1995, ACSC barely resembled the organization it was before he arrived. Virtually no 
aspect of ACSC was left untouched.  
 Colonel Warden moved the curriculum from lecture-based to book and seminar-
based and from a fragmented to an integrated curriculum. Warden also significantly 
altered ACSC‘s organizational structure to facilitate implementation of his curriculum 
vision. Colonel Warden‘s procedural changes included taking the curriculum 
development process out of the hands of curriculum developers and putting it in the 
hands of the instructors who would teach the curriculum as well as instituting an open 
curriculum planning concept for the entire faculty. Additionally, Warden wholeheartedly 
embraced emerging technology. He was the first ACSC Commandant to issue state-of-
the-art laptop computers to all students, link the curriculum with emerging technology, 
and implement a building-wide computer network. Colonel Warden also tackled facility 
issues, upgrading existing auditoriums and conference rooms. Even today, officials at 
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ACSC still refer to Colonel Warden‘s tenure as Commandant as ―The Warden 
Revolution.‖221 
A Preview of John Warden 
 Colonel Warden‘s military biography is impressive. John A. Warden III 
graduated from the Air Force Academy in June 1965, receiving his commission as a 
second lieutenant. Warden received his pilot wings in 1966 and subsequently flew 266 
combat missions during the Vietnam War in the F-4 fighter and OV-10 Forward Air 
Control aircraft. Warden‘s Air Force career after Vietnam spanned nearly three decades 
and included tours in Italy, Spain, Germany, and the United States. Warden served in a 
variety of high-profile positions, including Assistant Executive Officer to the Air Force 
Chief of Staff (1979 – 1981), Commander of a Tactical Fighter Wing (1987 – 1988), 
Deputy Director for Strategy, Doctrine, and War fighting for Air Force Headquarters at 
the Pentagon (1988 – 1991), and Special Assistant to the Vice President of the United 
States (1991 – 1992). Warden also graduated from the National War College and earned 
a Master‘s Degree in Political Science from Texas Tech University.  
 Colonel Warden is perhaps best known for his lead role in formulating the 
coalition air strategy for the Gulf War in 1991. Colonel Warden had been serving as the 
Air Force Deputy Director for Strategy, Doctrine, and War fighting at the Pentagon for 
two years when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. In this position, Colonel Warden 
and his staff were uniquely poised to play a pivotal role in formulating the air war 
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strategy against Iraq. Warden and his staff devised Instant Thunder, the codename 
Warden gave the air campaign plan ultimately used against Iraqi forces in Kuwait and 
Iraq. Warden, a Vietnam War veteran, came up with the name Instant Thunder to 
distinguish his plan from Rolling Thunder, the failed aerial bombardment plan the U.S. 
used against North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Instant Thunder was designed to 
expel Iraqi military forces from Kuwait through sustained strategic air attacks 
specifically targeting the sources of Iraqi national power. Although Instant Thunder 
underwent many alterations between its initial draft and final form, Warden‘s concept 
remained the centerpiece of the strategic air campaign that was executed during the Gulf 
War.222  
Warden conceptualized the enemy as a system, graphically depicted in his Five 
Rings model shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1.  Five Rings Model. 
Source: Image taken from John A. Warden III, Col, USAF, ―The Enemy as a System,‖ 
Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (1995): 40-55. 
 
In the model, each ring represents one of the enemy's centers of gravity, which are the 
elements that are most influential for stable and successful operation of the system as a 
whole. Leadership is the enemy‘s government or head of state; Organic Essentials are 
those materials and processes required for leadership to function; Infrastructure refers to 
the underlying framework of a country, such as roads and communication networks; 
Population is the people of a country and fielded forces are the armed forces of a 
country. The idea is to attack each of the rings to paralyze their forces, an objective also 
known as physical paralysis. Warden believed total paralysis of an enemy would result 
by engaging as many rings as possible, with special emphasis on taking out the center 
ring, which is the enemy's leadership. Warden explained his Five Rings model as 
follows: 
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 The five rings diagram gives us several key insights. First, it shows us that we are 
 dealing with an interdependent system. That is, each ring has a relationship with 
 all of the others and all play some role. Seeing the enemy as a system gives us 
 enormous advantages over those who see him merely as an army or air force, or 
 worse yet, as some quantity of tanks  or airplanes or ships or drug pushers 
 without ever understanding what it is that allows these tanks or ships to 
 operate and for what purpose. 
 Second, it gives us some idea of the relative importance of each entity contained 
 within a given ring. For example, the head of a drug cartel (the leadership ring) 
 has the power to change the cartel considerably whereas the street soldier (in the 
 fielded military forces ring) assigned the job of protecting a pusher in a back 
 alley can have virtually no effect on the cartel as a whole.  
 Third, it portrays rather graphically an ancient truth about war: our objective is 
 always to convince the enemy to do what we want him to do. The person or 
 entity with the power to agree to change is the leader in the middle. Thus, 
 directly or indirectly, all of our energies in war should be focused on changing 
 the mind of the leadership.  
 Fourth, our rings clearly show that the military is a shield or spear for the whole 
 system, not the essence of the system. Given a choice, even in something so 
 simple as personal combat, we certainly wouldn‘t make destruction of our 
 enemy‘s shield our end game. Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy 
 military is not the essence of war; the essence of war is convincing the enemy to 
 accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best a means to an end 
 and at worst a total waste of time and energy. (Warden‘s emphasis). 
 Fifth, and last, the rings give us the concept of working from the inside to the 
  to taking a strategic rather than a tactical approach to winning wars.223  
 Critics of Warden‘s ideas pointed out that describing an enemy state in terms of 
the five rings of leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded 
forces is obvious and therefore offers nothing new or profound. They also pointed out 
that Warden‘s template would not work against non-state actors and may even be 
inappropriate for some future peer competitor. In addition, critics argued there was no 
way to prove causality between the five rings since obviously each ring would be 
                                                 
223 Ibid, 49. 
 107 
attacked simultaneously. Others decried Warden‘s five rings as the type of mechanistic 
thinking that would inadequately prepare officers for needed critical thinking ability.224  
Warden‘s plan was not without controversy and his unapologetic advocacy of his ideas 
won him some enemies among some of the Air Force‘s top leadership. Tactical Air 
Command leadership, wedded to a doctrine of close air support to U.S. ground forces, 
was particularly not impressed with Warden or his strategic air campaign plan and was 
quick to point out flaws in his plan.225    
 Warden was undeterred by criticism and vigorously advocated his ideas, which 
may have cost him a lead role in finalizing the Gulf War air plan. During the final weeks 
of planning leading up to the start of the air campaign portion of Operation Desert 
Storm, Colonel Warden was working in the Pentagon while some members of his staff 
were assigned to the theater of operations to oversee the final draft of the coalition air 
plan. Despite this professional slight, Warden was somewhat vindicated by the success 
of the Gulf War air campaign. In the month-long air campaign which served as a prelude 
to the 100-hour ground war, coalition air forces inflicted crippling damage to Iraqi 
forces, which undoubtedly saved lives and established air power as the decisive factor in 
the coalition‘s victory over Iraq.226 General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff during the Gulf War, wrote the following about Colonel Warden‘s air plan: 
 The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of 
 Colonel John  Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force 
 intellectual on the use of airpower…Warden‘s original plan would undergo 
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 numerous modifications…but his original concept remained the heart of the 
 Desert Storm air war.227 
 
 After the Gulf War, Colonel Warden was not promoted to Brigadier General, 
although he was eligible. Warden was made Special Assistant to Vice President Dan 
Quayle for one year following the Gulf War, but again was not promoted. In the summer 
of 1992, Colonel Warden was assigned to Maxwell Air Force Base to be the new 
Commandant of Air Command and Staff College, a position that has traditionally been 
reserved for Brigadier Generals or Colonels who have been promoted to Brigadier 
General but have not yet pinned on their new rank. By posting Colonel Warden to the 
position of ACSC Commandant, the Air Force appeared to recognize Warden‘s value by 
charging one of the Air Force‘s leading air power theorists with educating the next 
generation of Air Force senior leaders. However, Colonel Warden was not promoted 
during his entire three year tenure at ACSC. When he retired in 1995, Colonel Warden 
became the first Commandant of ACSC since 1958 to not be a general officer.  
Commandant of ACSC 
 Despite being overlooked for promotion, Colonel Warden accepted his 
assignment as ACSC Commandant with zeal. Warden brought an unofficial mandate 
from General Michael Carnes, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force with him to Maxwell. 
Warden recalled that General Carnes told him to fix ACSC because he believed that 
ACSC was broken and was not producing the caliber of officers the Air Force needed in 
the post-Cold War era. Moreover, General Carnes felt Graduates of ACSC did not 
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possess the knowledge or the ability to think that the Air Force needed, due primarily to 
a curriculum that was largely irrelevant to the emerging post-Cold War world.228 For 
Warden‘s part, he felt the Air Force was still thinking too tactically and not functioning 
at a strategic level; his goal was to push airpower in a strategic direction and he saw 
PME as a key piece of the answer. Specifically, Warden wanted officers to understand 
the strategic effects of airpower capability, which he felt was especially relevant on the 
heels of the decisive role strategic air power played in the Gulf War victory.229 Thus, 
Warden knew significant changes needed to be made at ACSC, and these changes 
needed to be implemented right away since he did not know how much time he would 
have as Commandant. If history was any judge, Warden would not have a lot of time 
because none of the four Commandants who preceded Warden had stayed at ACSC 
longer than one year. 
 Colonel Warden found plenty about ACSC he wanted to change upon his arrival. 
Right away Warden did not like the curriculum or the curriculum development process. 
Warden felt ACSC‘s curriculum was too heavily focused on Russia and the Cold War, 
lacked rigor, and overall was irrelevant because of the perception he shared with General 
Carnes that ACSC graduates were not prepared to assume positions of higher 
responsibility.230 Warden did not like the fact that seminar instructors did not develop 
the curriculum nor teach it to students. Warden had inherited a faculty that was assigned 
either as curriculum developers or seminar instructors. Curriculum developers built the 
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ACSC curriculum in isolation, independent from faculty assigned as seminar instructors, 
and seminar instructors in reality functioned more as homeroom monitors as opposed to 
instructors. That is, seminar instructors were handed a curriculum with lesson plans 
developed strictly by the curriculum developers, brought those lessons into the seminar, 
and then assigned a student to teach each lesson. Students were then given time to 
prepare their lesson for presentation to the seminar. The faculty instructor simply 
facilitated the student-presented lesson by ensuring the seminar stayed on task and then 
grading the students on how well they presented the lesson.231  
 One of Colonel Warden‘s first acts as Commandant was to restructure the faculty 
organization. Colonel Warden assembled the entire faculty and told them, ―This 
becomes a real school, which means it‘s going to have a real faculty, and it‘s going to 
have a real curriculum. Teachers will teach and students will be students.‖232 Thus, 
Colonel Warden disbanded the existing Directorate of Curriculum and put the 
curriculum development process in the hands of the instructors who would teach the 
students. No longer would curriculum developers hand off a curriculum to other 
instructors to bring into seminar.  Now, every faculty member was expected to 
participate in both curriculum development and teaching.  In addition, Colonel Warden 
decreed that students would no longer present lessons in seminar. Rather, students would 
spend their time reading, studying, and learning while teaching became the responsibility 
of instructors. This change challenged faculty members to greatly expand their teaching 
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capability because Colonel Warden wanted true, high caliber teachers in ACSC 
classrooms.233 From that time on, being a member of the ACSC faculty meant you were 
expected to teach the curriculum you helped develop. 
 A high priority for Colonel Warden was building a world class faculty. He 
accelerated existing plans to hire more civilian Ph.D.‘s onto the faculty and instituted an 
Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) program to create military faculty with Ph.D.‘s. In 
partnership with the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), ACSC began to select 
military faculty members to attend civilian university institutions for a three-year tour to 
acquire doctoral degrees in subjects such as military history, political science, 
international relations, computer technology, and education. Upon completion of the 
doctoral degree, officers would return to ACSC as teaching faculty. Colonel Warden 
would not enjoy the fruits of this program during his tenure due to the time required to 
get the degree. However, he viewed the program as a long-term investment to increase 
the quality of the ACSC faculty in line with the Skelton Report recommendation to 
improve the quality of PME faculty by increasing the number of faculty with doctoral 
degrees.234 
Organizational Changes   
 Colonel Warden instituted a major change by significantly altering the ACSC 
organizational structure he inherited in 1992 (Figure 2). The new organizational 
structure (Figure 3) went into effect in late spring 1993 after the class of AY 1993 
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graduated. Course instructors and curriculum developers were combined under the Dean 
of Education and Faculty, and administrative management of students, including 
ACSC‘s personnel and support functions, were combined under the Dean of Students 
and Support. The Directorate of Curriculum was disbanded, and three distinct teaching 
departments were then established under the Dean of Education and Faculty: Command 
and Strategic Structures Department (DEA), the War and Theater Level Studies 
Department (DEB), and the War Theory and Campaign Studies Department (DEC). 
Each department had responsibility for teaching three courses, and together, these nine 
courses made up ACSC‘s core curriculum.235  
 
 
 
Figure 2.  1992 ACSC Organizational Chart. 
Source: History of the Air Command and Staff College, 1 July 1992-30 June 1993, 
Volume I, IRIS no. 01115478 in the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL., 14. 
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Figure 3.  1993 ACSC Organizational Chart. 
Source: History of the Air Command and Staff College, 1 July 1992-30 June 1993, 
Volume I, IRIS no. 01115478 in the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL., 15. 
 
Under the 1992 organizational structure, the Dean of the Curriculum Directorate 
managed ACSC‘s curriculum development personnel spread across three divisions: 
Command, Communications and Combat Support; National Security Affairs; and 
Warfare Studies. The Dean of Curriculum was responsible for the creation and 
coordination of all resident academic programs in direct support of ACSC‘s academic 
goals. Faculty members assigned to ACSC as seminar instructors were aligned under the 
Dean of Operations in the Directorate of Operations. The Dean of Operations was 
responsible for daily management of activities pertaining to students and seminar 
instructors, including academic scheduling, evaluation, and the International Officer 
Program as well as the Spouse Enrichment Program.236 The new ACSC organizational 
structure consisted of only three branches below the Commandant instead of six. 
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Curriculum development and instruction was now combined under one organization. For 
the first time, curriculum would be developed by those who were assigned to teach it. 
ACSC Associate Programs was also aligned under the Dean of Education & Faculty, 
while the Dean of Students and Support absorbed the old Directorates of Education 
Systems and Plans and Administration. The School of Advance Airpower Studies 
remained unchanged.  
Procedural Changes 
 
 Not only did Colonel Warden put the curriculum development process in the 
hands of teachers, he changed the curriculum development process itself. Warden 
characterized the curriculum development process as stove-piped when he became 
Commandant. That is, he felt there was no systematic approach to curriculum 
development and the individual curricular pieces were not integrated together into an 
overall curriculum focus. Those faculty members who developed Military History 
curriculum for example, were concerned only with Military History, and could not 
explain how their Military History curriculum helped shape an overall curricular focus. 
Warden believed this stovepipe approach to curriculum development helped create 
―fiefdoms‖ within ACSC, which resulted in a fragmented curriculum consisting of 
individual curricular pieces that may or may not relate to or complement one another. 
What Colonel Warden wanted was a systematic approach to curriculum development 
that eliminated fiefdoms and resulted in an integrated and focused curriculum.237 
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Colonel Warden‘s systematic curriculum development methodology began with an all-
encompassing, unifying idea and then working backwards so all individual curricular 
pieces fit into the overall curricular vision. For the duration of Colonel Warden‘s tenure 
at ACSC, a strategic Air Campaign would serve as the overall vision that provided the 
needed curricular focus. This overall curricular vision came from Colonel Warden 
himself.238 The success of the air war during Operation Desert Storm had convinced 
Colonel Warden that future U.S. military leaders needed to be well versed in the 
planning and execution of a modern strategic air campaign. Thus, planning and 
executing a strategic air campaign became the centerpiece of Colonel Warden‘s 
curricular vision.  
 Colonel Warden made sure all faculty members were familiar with the new 
curricular focus. He wanted a faculty that knew the curriculum, its purpose, and how all 
individual curricular pieces fit together to complement one another. Warden believed it 
was critical to have a faculty able to think strategically about the ACSC curriculum and 
its purpose based on his overall vision. Thus, through a concept he called Open 
Curriculum Planning, Warden periodically assembled the entire faculty in the auditorium 
and facilitated a discussion on the current state of the curriculum, focusing on ―how the 
faculty thinks the curriculum is going and where we need to go from here.‖239  
 Warden used open planning sessions to garner buy-in from the faculty for his 
curricular initiatives. At times, open planning sessions were contentious, especially if 
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some faculty members were not convinced of the value of new ideas. During his 
interview, Dr. Rich Muller recalled an instance during a session in which someone 
loudly cried out, ―Sir, why are we doing this?!‖240 This type of reaction, however, was 
exactly what Colonel Warden wanted. He used comments and questions from the faculty 
during open planning sessions as a springboard to debate and discuss the philosophical 
issues surrounding the current and proposed curriculum. In these large group meetings 
with assembled faculty, it was impractical to attempt to undertake the smaller tasks 
associated with curriculum development, such as syllabus design or selection of 
readings. The details of the curriculum were ironed out in smaller group meetings.  
 Although Warden hoped for faculty buy-in for his ideas, some remained 
skeptical. Dr. Muller recounted that faculty members who were intrigued with Warden‘s 
curricular ideas eagerly participated in the smaller group meetings that were held to 
hammer out the details associated with developing and implementing the new 
curriculum, while those who remained skeptical adopted a ―wait-and-see‖ attitude. In 
addition, Dr. Muller mentioned that there was some faculty who felt marginalized 
because they disagreed with Warden‘s ideas and were not on the forefront of 
implementing new curriculum. These faculty members continued to perform their duties, 
but they kept out of the limelight. In any case, those faculty members who wished to be 
involved with the new curriculum taking shape had ample opportunity to do so.241  
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Need for Curricular Change 
 
 Colonel Warden completely reinvented the ACSC curriculum. He and General 
Carnes believed that because the Cold War was now over, the ACSC curriculum needed 
to be re- thought. Neither men believed the current curriculum could simply be tweaked 
into relevance; the curriculum would need to be completely revamped.242 Thus, Colonel 
Warden was determined to create a curriculum relevant for future senior military officers 
and inject significant rigor into that curriculum. However, the timing of his arrival in 
August 1992, only a few weeks prior to the start of Academic Year 1993, made it 
impossible to start a new class of students with a completely new curriculum. Warden 
therefore began his first academic year as ACSC Commandant implementing a 
curriculum he did not like. Warden determined to do away with the existing curriculum 
as quickly as he could, and wasted no time in starting planning for Academic Year 1994. 
In fact, Warden signaled an end to the current curriculum during his introductory 
briefings with the faculty. Rather than listening to traditional welcome briefings given to 
new ACSC Commandants, Warden assembled his faculty, reviewed the existing 
curriculum, explained what he believed was wrong and what he saw as the solution.243  
 The curriculum for Academic Year 1993 (Table 4) that Colonel Warden 
inherited contained a total of 938 hours spread across three core curricular areas, 
electives, and special programs. The three core curricular areas included Command, 
Communications, and Combat Support; National Security Affairs; and Warfare Studies. 
The first curricular area was designed to give students the tools and techniques required 
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to be an effective squadron commander through development of team building and 
problem solving skills. National Security Affairs was designed to impart an 
understanding of the complex environment in which military professionals operate, 
including national security policies and objectives. The third and largest curricular area, 
Warfare Studies, examined the levels of conflict from low intensity conflict through 
strategic nuclear war. During this block of study, students were expected to comprehend 
the unique nature of war through an examination of military theory, airpower theory, and 
military history.  
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Table 4.  ACSC AY 1993 Curriculum Summary 
Core Curriculum  Academic Hours  
 Seminar Lecture Total 
Area 1: Command, Communication, Combat Support 126.75 67.25 194 
     Phase 1: Profession of Arms 16 12.25 28.25 
     Phase 2: Staff Communications 26.5 5.5 32 
     Phase 3: Quality Concepts 6 4 10 
     Phase 4: Combat Support 53.50 24.75 78.25 
     Phase 5: Command 24.75 20.75 45.5 
    
Area II: National Security Affairs 68.5 45.25 113.75 
     Phase1: US National Security Policy 12.25 7 19.25 
     Phase 2: Regional Studies: CIS 7 10.75 17.75 
     Phase 3: Regional Studies: Europe 14.25 3.5 17.75 
     Phase 4: Regional Studies: Latin America & Africa 14.5 11.5 26 
     Phase 5: Regional Studies: Middle East & Asia 20.5 12.5 33 
    
Area III: Warfare Studies 322.75 149.25 472 
     Phase 1: Military History & Doctrine 61.25 31 92.25 
     Phase 2: Low Intensity Conflict 28.25 24 52.25 
     Phase 3: Theater Warfare 162 62.25 224.25 
     Phase 4: Strategic Nuclear Warfare 45 13 58 
     Phase 5: Space 26.25 19 45.25 
    
Electives (Non-Graded)   48 
Evaluation (Counted in phase hours) 
 
Special Programs 
  23.5 
Commandant’s Specials (Guest Speakers)   40 
Commandant’s Wellness Program   7.25 
Orientation    7 
Intelligence Briefings   6 
Athletics   24 
Ceremonies   10 
Administrative & Conference Time   16 
    
Total   938 
 
Source: Air Command and Staff College AY 1993 Curriculum Compendium, in the 
official files of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL., 3. 
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Overall, the curriculum used a building block approach to broaden students‘ Air 
Force perspective with an emphasis on war fighting and related areas. Students began 
the academic year with an introduction to staff communications, command studies, and 
national security affairs, which was designed to establish a solid foundation of 
knowledge on which warfare studies would follow through the end of the year. In 
addition to the core curriculum, three 16-hour elective courses were offered to allow 
students the opportunity to pursue areas of interest in greater depth.244 The AY 1993 
curriculum was virtually the same curriculum that had been presented to students in AY 
1991 and AY 1992. Minor curricular modification occurred in National Security Affairs; 
Regional Studies were previously grouped together as USSR/Europe and the Developing 
World, but were then split into the separate areas of CIS, Europe, Latin America and 
Africa, and Middle East and Asia. Otherwise the curriculum had remained intact for the 
previous three years.245  
 During his interview, Colonel Warden stated that he viewed the AY 1993 
curriculum as too focused on Cold War issues and out of touch with current strategic 
thinking on air power.246 He challenged his faculty to think strategically about the 
curriculum and its purpose. His challenge to his faculty was, ―How could we better 
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challenge students to deepen their knowledge of operational art in the aerospace 
domain? Could the core curriculum be enhanced to better address campaign planning 
skills? Could electives be more focused on campaign planning and executed with more 
vigor? Could students take a different curriculum entirely?‖247 With these questions as a 
starting point, planning for a revamped ACSC curriculum got underway early in the fall 
of 1992.  
Planning a New Curriculum 
 Although Colonel Warden‘s plans and ideas were met with skepticism and 
indifference from some of the faculty, a small yet determined group of four faculty 
members emerged to spearhead the development and implementation of Warden‘s new 
curricular initiative. This group was led by Lt Col Larry Weaver, a graduate of ACSC 
who quickly climbed the faculty ranks to become Dean of Education and Faculty. Lt Col 
Weaver was joined by Dr. Richard Muller, a military historian and one of the first three 
civilian Ph.D.‘s hired by ACSC as a result of the Skelton Report‘s recommendation to 
bring more civilian expertise to PME schools, Earl Tilford, a retired Air Force 
Lieutenant Colonel and military historian, and Lt Col Albert Mitchum. The group 
extended an open invitation to the rest of the faculty to join them in embracing the 
opportunity to work real change in the ACSC curriculum, but not everyone did. Some 
faculty members appreciated what the core group was trying to do and joined the 
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planning effort while some faculty viewed Lt Col Weaver‘s group a dangerous and elitist 
―cabal‖ upsetting a relatively quiet life at ACSC.248  
 The group met often during the fall of 1992, and met regularly with Colonel 
Warden for updates and direction. Their goal was to create a more integrated and 
coherent curriculum aimed at improving the campaign planning skills of students.249 By 
early October 1992, a new curriculum outline began to emerge in the form of an Air 
Campaign Course. Colonel Warden was so impressed with the proposed Air Campaign 
Course and the speed with which the faculty had produced it that he decided to press for 
a test implementation of the Air Campaign Course in January 1993 after the Christmas 
holiday break. Many of the faculty was dumbfounded at Warden‘s goal for a January 
1993 implementation, and even the core group was taken back at such ambitious 
thinking. Nevertheless, Warden pressed ahead with his plan.250  
 The Air Campaign Course initiative was briefed to the Air University 
Commander on 15 October 1992. Upon approval from the Air University Commander to 
implement the test initiative, a final detailed course outline was developed and briefed to 
the ACSC students on 26 October 1992. The month of November 1992 was spent 
finalizing the curriculum, assigning faculty instructors to present the new curriculum, 
and identifying the students who would take the course which was scheduled to begin on 
4 January 1993.251  
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 The Air Campaign Course comprised three instructional blocks and a directed 
research project totaling 81.5 hours over 12 weeks. The blocks included Air Campaign 
Planning Process (15 hours), Contextual Elements (32 hours), and Operational Art (31.5 
hours). Three hours were set aside for end-of-course evaluation. Five objectives were 
established for the new course: 
 1. Comprehend the ―Revolution in Warfare‖ 
 2. Comprehend Operational Art in the Aerospace Domain 
 3. Comprehend the Synergistic Contributions of Airpower to Theater Campaign 
 Plans 
 
 4. Apply Operational Art in the Aerospace Domain 
 5. Analyze Examples of Operational Art in all Domains252 
Students began the new course with the Air Campaign Planning Process block, garnering 
a conceptual framework for a more detailed examination of planning elements. Students 
were taken through various iterations of what the campaign planning process is and what 
it should look like. In addition, students examined the nature of revolution in warfare 
through a case study of the recent Gulf War experience. Next, the Contextual Factors 
block explored the relevance and significance of various inputs into the campaign 
planning process, including political, cultural, social, historical, and geographical 
factors. Students used case studies of past military campaigns to explore the significance 
of these factors to the planning process. The Operational Art block of instruction delved 
into the significance of military inputs into the campaign planning process as well as the 
application of the campaign planning process to non-lethal campaigns. The course ended 
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with an application exercise in which students applied what they had learned in 
designing an actual air campaign plan.253  
 Colonel Warden insisted that the Air Campaign Course be about more than just 
air power. Therefore, the course was an eclectic course, offering an opportunity to think 
about more than simply putting together an air campaign plan. Warden‘s idea was not to 
teach students the art of air campaigning, but rather to teach students a ―grasp of strategy 
from a process standpoint‖ so students would understand what was involved in creating 
an overall strategy for war, and then know how to apply air power at the operational 
level of war against applicable enemy centers of gravity in support of strategic 
objectives.254 
 Colonel Warden decided to allow students to volunteer to enroll in the Air 
Campaign Course rather than make it mandatory for everyone. Volunteering students 
were made aware of the increased workload they would face the last half of the 
academic year. Some students refused to volunteer for the new course thinking it would 
require too much additional study time and thus hurt their chances to earn a 
distinguished graduate award. Other students were reluctant to volunteer for the new 
course unless they were guaranteed the benefit of enhanced career opportunities. In his 
interview, Warden recalled that despite some uncertainty among the student body, ―over 
100 students out of a class of 580 volunteered to enroll in the new course.‖255 
 Students not enrolling in the Air Campaign Course saw no change in their 
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academic schedule as they remained with the normal curriculum through graduation. 
The volunteer students were excused from a portion of the normal curriculum. Faculty 
members met to determine which elements of the curriculum would be required for all 
students, particularly those lessons meeting joint education requirements, and which 
lessons the volunteer students could be excused from. The Air Campaign Course was 
then scheduled around the lessons deemed mandatory for all students, and volunteer 
students were excused from lessons deemed not mandatory for all students during the 
second half of the year. Volunteer students were made aware that they were signing up 
for a much heavier academic workload than the students opting not to take the new 
course. In addition to basic coursework in the Air Campaign Course, more responsibility 
was placed on the volunteer students to read, study, and participate in discussions 
regarding contemporary strategic thought, all of which required several hours of daily 
preparation.256  
 By the end of the first month of the course, Colonel Warden felt the course was 
accomplishing what he wanted it to, and that this test run proved that the Air Campaign 
Course was good enough for the entire ACSC student body. Therefore, he directed that 
planning begin to revamp the entire ACSC curriculum for AY 1994 using the strategic 
concepts of the Air Campaign Course as the unifying curricular idea from which the new 
curriculum would be built.257  
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New Curriculum Implementation 
 Implementation of the Air Campaign Course as a pilot program at ACSC 
coincided with the annual review of Air University‘s programs and policies by the Air 
University Board of Visitors (BOV). The BOV‘s visit to ACSC represented a unique 
opportunity for an unbiased examination and critique of the new ACSC curricular 
initiative during its initial trial. BOV personnel talked at length with Colonel Warden, 
faculty members, and a sample of the student population from both the normal core 
curriculum and the Air Campaign Course curriculum. The BOV presented its comments 
and recommendations to Lieutenant General Jay W. Kelly, Air University Commander, 
on April 30, 1993. 
 In its report to the Lieutenant General Kelly, the BOV had both positive and 
cautionary comments concerning the new initiatives at ACSC. The BOV said, ―We, the 
committee, applaud the initiative, think the time to try it is now, and raised what we hope 
are useful, supportive questions. This change is very demanding on students and faculty, 
and its success is not a foregone conclusion.‖258 Feedback from students and faculty to 
BOV members was positive. The BOV noted, 
 In discussions with faculty and students alike, the new curriculum was almost 
 universally applauded. It was seen as a move that would put ACSC at the 
 graduate school level and, importantly, challenge and treat the students as 
 graduate students. Students and faculty approached the new curriculum with 
 open eyes.259 
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Faculty members voiced their approval for their new role in teaching the curriculum they 
helped develop. The BOV report noted that faculty members ―liked the idea of becoming 
more expert in selected subject areas‖ and ―welcomed being more in a teaching role 
rather than constantly watching and evaluating students.‖260 Lastly, the BOV 
underscored three challenges they believed ACSC would face as it further refined its 
new curriculum. The first was to ensure that a sense of jointness is created and sustained 
throughout the campaign planning model, taking care to ensure that the land and sea 
service components were given the opportunity to inject their views and contributions. 
Secondly, the BOV cautioned that evaluation methods for the new curricular model must 
be perceived as comprehensive and fair. The third challenge dealt with slower students. 
The BOV noted that the new curriculum was fast-paced and fraught with ample 
opportunities for some students to be left ―hopelessly behind.‖ To prevent this 
occurrence, the BOV recommended ACSC describe the curriculum up front to students 
and suggest preparation such as computer literacy, and then carefully track student 
progress to determine if any students were becoming overwhelmed.261 
 The BOV report was well received by Air University and ACSC. Colonel 
Warden and his core faculty group were satisfied that the Air Campaign Course pilot 
program demonstrated that this was the curricular direction they needed to pursue to 
make the ACSC curriculum more relevant and rigorous. The new curriculum had 
survived its experimentation phase and was now the centerpiece of a completely new 
curriculum which took final shape during the summer of 1993. In the wake of the 
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successful Air Campaign Course and to launch the curriculum planning effort for the 
final AY 1994 curriculum, Colonel Warden convened an open planning session with his 
faculty to ensure everyone understood the key considerations which were at the root of 
such a significant curricular change.  
 Colonel Warden did not base his curricular ideas on any formal educational or 
curriculum theory. Warden recalled that educational and curriculum theories or models 
were not part of any curriculum discussions with the faculty or his superiors. He 
recognized that ACSC was teaching adults, but did not consciously attempt to develop 
curriculum in the context of any formal educational theoretical setting262. Instead, 
Warden talked about the future world environment, technology in the learning process, 
and the dominance of air power. He told his faculty and staff that ACSC graduates will 
serve in one of the most revolutionary periods in history based on current geopolitical 
realities and the military technical revolution demonstrated during the Gulf War. Even 
the rate that the world is changing is accelerating. Success in the future demands mental 
agility and top-down thinking versus bottom-up thinking, and students needed to be able 
to think like an architect as opposed to a bricklayer. Warden stressed that there is not 
enough time to teach all the basic knowledge students need to know, so his faculty must 
synthesize and integrate knowledge at a higher level and then teach at that level. In 
addition, technology had progressed significantly and that ACSC needs to do better to 
utilize technology when teaching students. Warden relayed his belief that air power 
promised to be the dominant military force in the foreseeable future, but its successful 
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application must be carefully considered. Thinking about air power capabilities should 
be approached from the strategic level through the operational level then down to the 
tactical level. Students needed to be able to think about ―food bombs‖ as easily as they 
think about ―iron bombs,‖ and must understand that every bomb dropped has political as 
well as military implications.263 Most of the faculty supported Warden‘s efforts. Even if 
they had reservations about Warden‘s ideas, a lot of the faculty was glad to be a part of 
raising the bar academically and making ACSC more rigorous.264  
 Changes for AY 1994 included a new and rigorous student reading list, a laptop 
computer for each student, shorter class day for students, and a re-vamped curriculum 
(Table 5). The strategic concepts of the initial Air Campaign Course were integrated and 
woven throughout all courses. A lot of thought and hard work went into developing this 
new curriculum. During faculty development sessions in preparation to teach the new 
curriculum, ACSC instructors Lt Col Albert Mitchum and Dr. Lewis Ware presented the 
following rationale for the new curriculum to the faculty: 
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Table 5.  ACSC AY 1994 Curriculum Summary 
 
Curriculum Lecture Seminar Academic Hours 
    
Overview 4.25 7.75 12 
Professional Skills 6.25 41.75 48 
War, Conflict, and Military 
Objectives 
10 14 24 
Military Theory 30.5 24 54.5 
Strategic Structures 36.50 43.75 80.25 
Operational Structures 54.5 46 100.5 
Campaign Concepts 17 30.5 47.5 
Air Campaign 15 89 104 
Campaign Termination 8.5 12 20.5 
Campaign 2000+ 24 15 39 
Wargames  80 80 
Total Academic Hours   610.25 
    
 
Source: Air Command and Staff College AY94 Curriculum Plan, in the official files of 
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL., 5. 
 
 
 Like an inverted pyramid, this new curriculum will begin with large conceptual 
 issues of politico-military operations and ends in practical case studies. In these 
 case studies, students will apply their knowledge and practice application of air 
 power to carefully selected case studies at the operational level. 
 
 The new curriculum has been conceived as a whole. Care has been taken to 
 integrate the instructional blocks. As the curriculum progresses, the students 
 should experience an intellectual flow of ideas and at any point be able to relate 
 their current studies to any other concept previously covered in the course. The 
 past division of the curriculum into discrete segments of study with arbitrary 
 boundaries will be removed in favor of a yearlong continuum. Instructors will 
 assist the students by performing multiple functions throughout the course in 
 accordance with their expertise.265 
 
 Each course was designed to build on the knowledge gained in the previous 
course. In Professional Skills, students gained a broad background in the skills needed to 
be a successful commander, the tools to succeed in developing a quality culture in Air 
                                                 
265 P. Mason Carpenter and George T. McClain, ―Air Command and Staff College Air Campaign Course: 
The Air Corps Tactical School Reborn?,‖ Airpower Journal 7, no. 3 (1993): 50.  
 131 
Force organizations, communication skills such as official writing and public speaking, 
basic computer literacy skills, and joint doctrine. In Military Theory, students were 
exposed to classical military theory from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz to the rise of modern 
warfare. During War, Conflict, and Military Objectives, students studied the motives and 
causes of war, objectives of war, various actors and levels of conflict. The Strategic 
Structures block explored a nation‘s instruments of power, strategy analysis, Warden‘s 
Five Rings model, and center-of-gravity analysis. The Operational Structures block 
focused on analyzing a military force, its center-of-gravity, and developing military 
objectives. Included in this block was a study of current and future military threats. The 
Campaign 200+ course took a long look into the future and challenged students to 
consider what kind of force would be needed to build a campaign in the 21st century. The 
Air Campaign block taught students to apply operational art in the aerospace domain 
through the use of air and space power in support of national and military objectives. 
Finally, the Campaign Termination course helped students understand the concepts of 
war and campaign termination and the military‘s role in the transition to peace. Woven 
throughout these courses were various computer-generated war games and exercises 
designed to provide students with a broad array of scenarios to practice the ideas and 
concepts learned.266   
 The new curriculum contained over 300 fewer hours than the previous year‘s 
curriculum. This reduction in contact hours was a deliberate action by Colonel Warden 
in order to reduce the amount of time students were in class each day and allow more 
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time for reading and studying. Under the new curriculum, students would spend an 
average of 3 to 4 hours in class rather than the traditional 6 to 7 hours. The resulting time 
was to be spent reading and studying; in short, students were to spend their time being 
students. Students would need the extra time to successfully navigate Warden‘s new 
reading list. 
 A 100-book reading list was instituted for AY 1994, a 400% increase in required 
reading over the previous year.267 In prior years, the reading load for ACSC students had 
been light. The amount of required reading had been increased after the publication of 
the Skelton Report, but the reading load was still not very rigorous.268 In fact, when Dr. 
Richard Muller, a military historian and one of the first civilian Ph.D.‘s hired at ACSC, 
joined the faculty in 1991, he was aghast at the lack of required academic reading. 
Muller began requiring his students to read The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth 
Century by Larry Addington in order to ―at least have them [students] read a real 
book.‖269 Colonel Warden was determined that ACSC students complete a rigorous 
reading program in military and aviation literary works while at school. Books were 
selected via a committee of faculty who met with Warden to propose books and discuss 
their merits. Colonel Warden reserved final authority over the list, but generally 
approved books recommended by faculty members.270 Additionally, students were able 
to keep the entire set of books issued to them to add to or start their own professional 
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reading library. Faculty members also received a copy of each book. The reading list for 
AY 1994 is listed in Appendix B of this study. 
 In order to accommodate faculty and students in the new shortened academic 
day, Colonel Warden instituted a two-mix student system. In the two-mix student 
system, approximately half the student body attended class during the morning hours, 
and the other half of the student body attended class during afternoon hours. While not 
in class, whether it was morning or afternoon, students were expected to spend their time 
reading, studying, and preparing for seminar discussions. This split system of class 
attendance is still in use today. 
 Colonel Warden firmly believed in the educational utility of emerging 
technology. Thus, technology played a central role in the changes sweeping ACSC 
during Warden‘s tenure as Commandant. Colonel Warden had the entire ACSC building 
wired for a computer network. All computers in the building were able to access this 
network. Beginning with the class of AY 1994, every student at ACSC was issued a 
personal laptop computer upon arrival. Warden believed that if today‘s officers were 
compared with cavalry officers of old, the laptop computer would be their saber.271 
Seminar rooms were also equipped with new computers. While in seminar, students and 
faculty had access to the ACSC computer network. Students were able to access many of 
the administrative functions associated with the curriculum, including class schedules, 
lesson plans, e-mail, and a new Electronic Bulletin Board used as a communication tool 
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for students and faculty. Auditoriums and conference rooms were also equipped with 
computers.272 
    Colonel Warden needed a significant influx of money above and beyond 
ACSC‘s normal budgetary allocation in order to fund his technological building 
upgrades and providing each student with 100 books and a laptop computer. Fortunately 
for Warden, he had high-level support in the Pentagon. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff 
General Carnes provided $395,000 to ACSC for the initial book buy and an additional 
$4,000,000 for the initial technology purchase. This money was in addition to the 
$1,827,281 distribution of funds ACSC received for its normal operations.273 General 
Carnes was an avid supporter of Colonel Warden‘s new initiatives at ACSC. General 
Carnes visited ACSC several times during Colonel Warden‘s tenure to get a first-hand 
look at the progress being made and was generally pleased with what he saw.274 
  Another part of Colonel Warden‘s efforts to move ACSC forward included 
changing the school‘s mission statement. Ironically, ACSC adopted a new mission 
statement just three months before Colonel Warden‘s arrival as Commandant which 
read, ―To produce officers who understand the profession of arms, the requisites of 
command, the nature of war, and the application of aerospace power at the theater level 
of war.‖275 Colonel Warden changed the school‘s mission statement to read, ―To educate 
mid-career officers to develop, advance, and apply air and space power in peace and 
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war.‖276 Colonel Warden felt this new mission statement more accurately reflected the 
new direction of ACSC.277 
 Feedback from students and faculty during AY 1994 was mostly positive 
concerning the new curriculum. Colonel Warden was pleased with the new curriculum 
and recognized that his faculty had worked extremely hard to develop and implement an 
entirely new curriculum in a very short period of time. Thus he decided to give students 
in the class of AY 1995 the exact same curriculum as AY 1994. This gave the faculty 
time to catch their breath and make minor adjustments and refinements to the new 
curriculum, including updating the student required reading list and building new case 
studies around current world events. The reading list for AY 1995 was updated to 
include 104 books, which is shown in Appendix 6 of this study. The major critique of 
the new curriculum came from Air University officials who found shortfalls in the 
subject area of Command stating, 
 The lack of emphasis on command and leadership and introduction of subject 
 material that provided little comprehension improvement with an underlying 
 quasi-subliminal philosophy that technology was the solution to leadership 
 problems. This caused the subject of Command to be relegated to the back burner 
 and usurped by other activities.278 
 
Despite such critique, Colonel Warden felt the new curriculum gave students more than 
adequate exposure to the concept of command and pressed ahead with minor curricular 
refinements.279 
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 Warden saw the changes taking place at ACSC as a renaissance of the old Air 
Corps Tactical School (ACTS). In the inter-war years between World War I and World 
War II, the ACTS was at the forefront of emerging airpower theory and provided the 
blueprint for strategic bombing that the U.S. and its allies used to defeat Germany and 
Japan during World War II. Colonel Warden had a long-held belief that there was no 
good reason Air University could not once again be on the forefront of ground-breaking 
work in airpower theory like during the heyday of ACTS. He believed his Air Campaign 
course curricular model was doing important work in the field of airpower theory by 
providing a laboratory for strategic and innovative thought from some of the brightest 
minds in the Air Force and sister services.280 Several of the faculty agreed with Colonel 
Warden‘s assessment and were proud to see ACSC raising the academic bar.281    
Other Curricular Influence 
 
 The years 1993 and 1994 were eventful ones for the U.S. military involved in 
military operations other than war (MOOTW) in Somalia, Haiti, and the Persian Gulf. 
The United States was learning some hard lessons in the area of peacekeeping with the 
Black Hawk helicopter shoot-down and ensuring battle in Mogadishu, Somalia and the 
accidental shoot-down of a helicopter by Air Force fighter jets patrolling the skies over 
Iraq. In July 1994, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the services to take 
action to ―apply the lessons learned‖ in recent peacekeeping operations.282  
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 Air University in turn directed its schools to include lessons in peacekeeping 
operations in their curriculum for AY 1995. All Air University schools included some 
form of MOOTW and peacekeeping in their curriculum, each developing their own level 
of instruction. ACSC revised some existing lesson plans and implemented new ones 
where appropriate to explore MOOTW, including using the Black Hawk incident in 
Somalia as a case study.283 
Colonel Warden’s Departure 
 
 The Warden Revolution at ACSC officially came to an end on August 8, 1995. 
On that day, Colonel Warden turned command of ACSC over to Brigadier General-
select John W. Brooks and then retired from active duty with over 30 years of service. 
Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogelman traveled from Washington D.C. to 
Maxwell Air Force Base to preside over Colonel Warden‘s retirement ceremony. 
Colonel Warden was awarded the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal for his service 
to the United States as a commander, air campaign architect for the Gulf War, and 
visionary educator.284         
Summary 
 In the span of three years, ACSC experienced some of the most profound 
changes to its educational program since the school‘s 1946 inception. Colonel John A. 
Warden III became ACSC Commandant in August 1992, and when he retired in 1995, 
ACSC hardly resembled the organization he inherited. Colonel Warden completely 
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changed the school‘s processes, procedures, organizational structure and academic 
curriculum. Warden‘s influence on ACSC is remarkable, and his tenure as Commandant 
is still known today as the Warden Revolution. 
  ACSC was entering a new era when Colonel Warden arrived. The scathing 
criticism of PME institutions, especially ACSC, from the 1989 Skelton Report led to 
new requirements for joint education and a reevaluation of educational programs. ACSC 
had made some progress in injecting more rigors into its curriculum, modestly increased 
its required reading, and had successfully met the new joint education requirements as 
outlined in the Skelton Report. However, ACSC was still far from the rigorous and 
robust PME institution envisioned by the Skelton Report. There was a sense among 
some of the Air Force‘s top leadership that ACSC had not fully embraced the curricular 
significance of the recent Gulf War, demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold 
War. Clearly, ACSC was at a crossroads.  
 Warden was an ideal choice for ACSC Commandant at this pivotal time. ACSC 
needed a leader who could re-establish ACSC as a premier PME institution and guide 
the school through the uncertainty of the emerging post-Cold War world. Warden, a 
strategic thinker and recent architect of the Gulf War air campaign plan, brought 
innovative ideas and a tireless work ethic with him to ACSC. Within weeks of his 
arrival, Warden had outlined his plan to reform all aspects of ACSC. 
 Virtually no area of ACSC was left untouched. Warden moved the curriculum 
from heavily lecture-based, non-integrated blocks of instruction to a heavily book and 
seminar-based, horizontally integrated curriculum built around the problem-solving 
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methodology of a theater campaign at the operational level of war. All joint education 
requirements were met or exceeded. He changed ACSC‘s organizational structure to 
reflect his new curriculum strategies by combining curriculum development and course 
instructors under a new Dean of Education and combined all administrative management 
of students, personnel, and support functions under a new Dean of Students and Support. 
Curriculum development and course instruction were no longer separate entities; now 
faculty who developed curriculum would teach that same curriculum. Students no longer 
had a role in seminar instruction; students‘ only responsibility was to learn.  
 Warden restructured the class day; students now spent 3-4 hours in class either in 
the morning or afternoon and the rest of the day studying and reading books from a 
rigorous list of 100+ books which students kept as part of their professional reading 
library. Emerging technology was a centerpiece of Warden‘s effort. ACSC was 
completely wired with a new computer network and all students were issued laptop 
computers to access the computer network while in seminar. Many curricular functions 
were placed on the network including class schedules, lesson plans, e-mail, and a new 
Electronic Bulletin Board. Computer capability was also place in conference rooms and 
auditoriums. 
 Colonel Warden initiated programs to create a world-class faculty. He instituted 
an open planning concept to involve all faculty members in thinking strategically about 
and having a voice in the curriculum. By getting everyone involved in curriculum 
development, those more skilled in curriculum planning or subject matter could teach the 
others, resulting in better trained curriculum instructors more comprehensively prepared 
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in the subject material. In addition, a program was initiated in partnership with the Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) in which select military faculty members were 
sent to civilian institutions of higher learning for doctorate degrees and then brought 
back to ACSC to teach. More civilians with Ph.D.‘s were hired as well. 
 The scope and speed of Warden‘s changes caused significant turmoil for faculty 
and students. The Warden Revolution was a very turbulent period with respect to 
curriculum development, leadership, and administration. In a very short period, ACSC 
had undergone dramatic and substantial change, some of which are still in effect today. 
Faculty and students responded well and worked harder than they ever had before. 
Feedback regarding his changes was mostly positive, and Colonel Warden retired after 
three years as Commandant satisfied that ACSC was back on track. 
 Normally, retiring Colonels in the Air Force do not receive the level of honor 
afforded Colonel Warden when he retired. Having the Chief of Staff preside over a 
retirement ceremony is almost always reserved for general officers. The fact that General 
Fogelman made a special effort to preside over Colonel Warden‘s retirement ceremony 
is a clear signal John Warden was no ordinary Colonel. Warden‘s legacy at ACSC is 
legendary. In the span of three years, ACSC had come out of the shadows of the Skelton 
Report criticism and was a premier PME institution on the forefront of current airpower 
thought and discussion.          
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CHAPTER VI 
 AN ERA OF EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
 
 ACSC entered the post-Warden era in need of a breather. The magnitude and rate 
of change during Warden‘s tenure had taken a toll on the faculty, and they looked 
forward to a time of relative stability.285 For the first five years after Colonel Warden 
retired, improvements in all facets of ACSC continued, but the magnitude and pace of 
change slowed considerably. Between 1996 and 2001, ACSC was led by four different 
Commandants: Brigadier General John W. Brooks (1995-1996); Brigadier General Jerry 
M. Drennan (1996-1998); Brigadier General John W. Rosa (1998-2000); and Brigadier 
General John T. Sheridan (2000-2002). However none of these officers instituted 
changes as revolutionary as Warden had made. This is not to say the Commandants 
during this period did nothing; rather, the changes to ACSC incorporated during this 
period were more measured and their implementation smoother. This period is 
characterized by gradual, continuous refinement that brought maturity to ACSC‘s 
curriculum, organizational structure, and processes. Dr. Richard Muller, who served in 
the positions of Department Chair, Vice Dean for Academic Affairs and Dean of 
Education and Curriculum during this period, referred to this period of ACSC history as 
―years of evolution, not revolution.‖286 
 During this period, ACSC introduced a structured system of curriculum 
development, methodically realigned its organizational structure, further refined its 
                                                 
285 Interview with Mr. Budd Jones, September 2007. 
286 Interview with Dr. Richard Muller, August 2008. 
 142 
curriculum and academic structure, and received approval to grant master‘s degrees to its 
graduates. World events and directives from Air University and the Department of 
Defense continued to influence curricular refinement and technological curriculum 
applications expanded exponentially. The curriculum continued to rest on an extensive 
reading program and an active, participatory learning environment. The timeframe 1996 
– 2001 is significant for its evolutionary changes and improvements to ACSC that 
resulted in a maturing of its development procedures, organizational structure, 
curriculum content, and academic structure.  
Procedural Changes 
 After Colonel Warden‘s departure, new curriculum development procedures 
were instituted. The new procedures were designed to put more structure into the 
curriculum process, ensure integration of all parts of the curriculum, and reduce 
redundancy among the courses. One of the first of Colonel Warden‘s initiatives to end 
was open curriculum planning sessions. The faculty no longer gathered in the auditorium 
with the Commandant to hammer out curriculum content. A side effect of this change 
was that course content began to drift, i.e., specific course content was not confined to 
one course.  
 With little oversight from the Commandant or the Dean, course directors felt free 
to break out of the strict curricular guidelines that were present under Colonel Warden. 
Thus, course directors built course content as they saw fit, and with no formal 
curriculum approval process in place, students often were presented the same subject 
matter in different courses. According to Dr. Muller, ―In the absence of a Commandant 
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who was as interested in the curriculum, or a Dean who was fired up about curricular 
matters, the course content began to drift. Some of the courses began to get into each 
other‘s lane.‖287 By getting into each other‘s lane, Dr. Muller was referring to separate 
courses covering the same topics. Dr. Muller recalled that topics that were considered 
particularly interesting or ―fun to teach‖ started being ―poached by earlier courses, 
making the later courses look like summer reruns.‖288 For example, several separate 
course directors may all decide to incorporate a case study of Linebacker II, the strategic 
bombing campaign of North Vietnam by the United States in 1972, in their course. 
Students thus study Linebacker II during multiple courses, and the course that is offered 
later in the year appears unoriginal and no different than previous courses in the eyes of 
students. In this case, Linebacker II is the course content, and it ―drifted‖ across several 
courses in the curriculum. No formal procedure existed through which the entire 
curriculum was vetted in order to prevent this type of curriculum drifting from 
occurring.   
 To combat this curricular drifting, Colonel Tommy D. Dickson, Dean of 
Education and Curriculum, instituted a curriculum advisory committee called the Core 
Curriculum Review Committee (CCRC) during Academic Year 1996-1997289. The 
CCRC implementation was spearheaded by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Forsyth and Dr. 
Rich Muller, who were serving as Chairs of the Command and Strategic Structures 
Department (DEA) and the War Theory and Campaign Studies Department (DEC) 
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respectively. Lieutenant Colonel Forsyth arrived in 1996, becoming one of the first 
active duty military instructors at ACSC to hold a Ph.D. He had served as an instructor 
at the Air Force Academy, was a seasoned educator, and held a doctorate in International 
Relations. Lieutenant Colonel Forsyth proved instrumental in shaping ACSC curriculum 
and processes in the years after his arrival.  
 During his interview, Forsyth recalled, that, upon his arrival to ACSC, his 
assessment of the curriculum was, ―We have a lot of courses that are doing the same 
thing. We are teaching aspects of Warden‘s Five Rings of the Air Campaign Planning 
Model in at least three different courses.‖290 In the fall of 1996, Lieutenant Colonel 
Forsyth and Dr. Rich Muller began to meet regularly for lunch and discuss the state of 
the curriculum. During one of these lunch meetings, Forsyth recalled, he told Dr. Muller, 
―You know, what we need is a way to institutionalize this [curriculum planning] 
stuff.‖291 Forsyth and Muller began to meet with Lieutenant Colonel Mark Brown, 
Department Chair for DEB, and the Dean Colonel Dickson to discuss formalizing the 
curriculum development process. From this beginning, the CCRC process was born. 
 Prior to the CCRC initiative, curriculum planning was decentralized. The Dean 
of Education talked with course directors and department chairs on matters related to the 
curriculum, but it was an ad hoc system. Course directors made course proposals directly 
to the Dean of Education, and other course directors and department chairs were often 
unaware of what their counterparts were doing.292 The CCRC centralized the curriculum 
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planning and development process for ACSC by allowing the Dean and all department 
chairs visibility into the entire curriculum so course content could be de-conflicted, 
redundancy eliminated, and curriculum delivery methods reviewed. In addition, the 
CCRC ensured mandatory external guidance was incorporated into the curriculum as 
well as provided strategic guidance to facilitate future curriculum development.293 
Members of the CCRC included the Dean of Education, the Vice Dean for Academic 
Affairs, Department Chairs, and course directors. Course directors built their courses 
based on guidance received, and then presented their course plan to the CCRC, who in 
turn approved or dictated changes to the course. Once approved, the CCRC presented the 
curriculum to the Commandant for final approval. 
 ACSC officially codified the CCRC as its ―primary mechanism for 
recommending changes to the content and structure of the resident curriculum‖ and to 
accomplish six tasks: 
 Sets strategic objectives and lays out guidance regarding how each course 
 contributes to the total ACSC curriculum. 
 
Makes broad recommendations on overall curriculum direction, scope, and 
content, as well as more specific recommendations concerning each course‘s 
scope, content, readings, instructional methodology, and technology materials. 
 
 Reviews lesson by lesson proposals developed by the course directors as well as 
 extensive supporting documentation, to include student critiques. 
 
Develops guidance which is then communicated to the course directors who then 
revise their proposals. 
 
Reviews final proposals, which then proceed to the Dean of Education (DE) and 
Commandant (CC) for approval. The department chair and course director then 
proceed with the development and execution of the course. 
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 Is accountable to the DE and through the DE to the ACSC senior leadership.294 
 
During 2004, the CCRC was renamed the Educational Program Committee (EPC), and 
today is known as the Corporate Council (CC). Although its name changed, its function 
did not: de-conflict course content, reduce curricular redundancy, and ensure the 
curriculum contained mandatory guidance. While ACSC formalized curriculum 
planning, Air University formalized its method of providing curricular guidance to its 
schools by establishment of the Air University Continuum of Education and Strategic 
Guidance (CESG). 
Air University Continuum of Education 
 In January 1997, Lieutenant General Joseph J. Redden, Air University 
Commander, met with his senior leaders to map the future course of Air University. At 
this meeting, Air University leadership determined that one of its most important tasks 
was to develop a continuum of education that integrated curriculum across all Air 
University schools. Lieutenant General Redding chartered a planning committee called 
the Continuum of Education Group to explore a start-to-finish, i.e., from the time of 
commissioning through retirement, approach to educational development for Air Force 
personnel that would ―provide students [of Air University schools] with the right 
information at the right time in their careers.‖295 The group examined how Air 
University schools taught their curriculum and how that curriculum was integrated 
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throughout an officer‘s career. The group sought to determine if the military education 
an officer received was at the appropriate stage in his or her career and whether that 
education was directed toward an appropriate goal. The group produced the Air 
University Continuum of Education Strategic Guidance (CESG). The goal of the 
continuum was integrate curriculum implementation across all Air University schools 
and to ensure an officer received the appropriate military education at the appropriate 
stage of his or her career. 
 Air University defined the continuum as ―a set of courses and programs all 
officers are expected to take as they progress through a career.‖296 The courses and 
programs represented in the continuum were tailored to the different levels of PME and 
designed to reduce redundancy in the courses officers were taught as they progressed in 
their careers through Air University schools (Figure 4). The continuum ―linked levels of 
learning and breadth and depth of core curriculum content so each course, school, or 
program builds on the knowledge gained at the previous level.‖297 Air University 
dictated core curriculum areas its schools must address through the CESG, and the 
schools then built curriculum in that core area tailored to their own level of emphasis. 
For example, ACSC emphasized the operational level of war for the core areas while 
AWC emphasized the strategic level of war. 
 Implementing the CESG took two years because Air University understood the 
implications such an initiative would have on the future of Air Force PME. Thus, 
General Redding ensured the Continuum of Education Group was not rushed into rash 
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decisions. In his charter to the Continuum of Education Group, General Redden wrote, 
―Establishing the Continuum of Education is vitally important to Air University‘s future 
and will take maximum time and effort.‖298 The Air University Board of Visitors (BOV) 
fully supported the initiative. The BOV called the CESG concept ―an excellent step in 
improving PME‖ because they believed ―there is a lack of continuity and cohesiveness 
with the professional military education provided officers even though discrete 
components are outstanding.‖ 299  
 The BOV also recognized that the CESG concept was a work in progress and 
that ―as this concept is introduced, it will be important to stress the need for senior 
leadership commitment.‖300 The BOV believed Air University would derive corollary 
benefits from establishment of the CESG, especially the encouraging of a more effective 
use of assigned faculty. The BOV noted,  
 Organizing the college curricula to support the five core areas of the continuum 
 means opportunities and benefits for use of specific faculty skills across college 
 boundaries will become more visible. Air University should energetically seek 
 and exploit such opportunities, which can lead, we believe, to substantial 
 improvements in quality of education, opportunity for faculty development, and 
 the appeal of Air University to potential faculty under recruitment.301 
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Figure 4.  AU Continuum of Education. 
Source:  Air University Command Board of Advisors Meeting briefing, October 1999, 
Slide 2, in the personal files of Dr. Jim Forsyth, Chair of the Department of Leadership, 
Command and Communication Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL. 
 
 
 Five core curriculum areas were established for each Air University school: 
Profession of Arms, Military Studies, International Security Studies, Communications 
Studies, and Leadership and Management Studies. These five core areas were selected 
due to their applicability to an officer‘s career from the time of accession into the Air 
Force through attendance at Air War College and into Flag Officer ranks. Moreover, Air 
University believed these were the five core learning areas critical for the intellectual 
growth of Air Force officers over the course of their careers. The CESG concept was 
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geared toward how the identified core curriculum areas were integrated throughout an 
officer‘s career, specifically seeking to ensure the PME an officer received was at the 
appropriate time and was building toward an appropriate goal.302 The Continuum of 
Education area contained the five core curricular areas for Air University schools along 
with supporting areas of curricular content, and the Strategic Guidance area explained 
how each school was supposed to address the curricular areas, i.e., to what level each 
school should teach the core areas. For example, ACSC might teach international 
security studies at the comprehension level, while Air War College teaches the same 
curricular area at the analysis level. The CESG was published in the fall of 1999 and 
became a significant curricular influence for all Air University schools.303 ACSC now 
had to ensure its curriculum lined up with the guidance laid out in the CESG. 
 Air University did not establish a minimum or maximum time interval for 
revision and re-publication of the CESG. The first edition of the CESG was published in 
1999, and the first revised edition was published in 2003. According to Dr. Dorothy 
Reed, Chief of Academic Affairs for Air University, the 2003 CESG is still in effect 
today (2008) pending completion of on-going revisions. A revised CESG is scheduled to 
be published in 2009.304 Moreover, the five core curricular areas have remained 
unchanged during revisions to the CESG. The only curricular areas that have been 
revised or are planned to be revised are those areas that support the five core curricular 
areas. Dr. Reed referenced two examples of core curriculum supporting areas that have 
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undergone revision in the past or will do so in the future: Ethics and Nuclear Arms. She 
indicated that emphasis on Ethics on and off duty for military officers‘ waxes and wanes 
with changes in senior Air University and Air Force leadership. While one senior officer, 
such as the Chief of Staff, may dictate a strong emphasis on Ethics in PME, another 
Chief of Staff may de-emphasize Ethics in favor of emphasizing a different area. Dr. 
Reed also indicated that emphasis on Nuclear Arms in PME is becoming much more 
acute due to the well-publicized mistakes made by the Air Force in 2007 and again in 
2008 regarding shipments of nuclear equipment305, and the planned 2009 edition of the 
CESG will reflect this emphasis.306     
Curriculum Changes 
 
 Brigadier General (select) John W. Brooks assumed command of ACSC from 
Colonel Warden. Rather than begin his tenure with revolutionary curricular ideas like 
Warden had, Brooks kept the basic curriculum structure put in place by Warden and 
emphasized areas he felt needed to be reenergized. Dr. Muller recalled a comment 
General Brooks made soon after he took over at ACSC, ―There‘s a lot of broken glass 
around here and everyone is scrambling to try to catch up to us.‖307 This comment 
indicates that although General Brooks felt Warden‘s curriculum could use some 
adjustment, he believed the changes made during Warden‘s tenure had been good for 
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306 Phone interview with Dr. Dorothy Reed, September 2008. 
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ACSC. In fact, Warden‘s transformation of ACSC had garnered ACSC the Air 
University‘s General Muir S. Fairchild Educational Achievement Award and the Air 
Force Organizational Excellence Award in both 1994 and 1995.308 General Brooks 
recognized that he was inheriting an ACSC that had reached new heights in scholastic 
standards after a lengthy period of mediocrity, and he was careful not to throw the 
curriculum out and start over.   
 General Brooks however, believed there was room for continued curricular 
adjustment. Specifically, General Brooks felt although students studied operational 
leadership traits of historical leaders such as Douglas Macarthur and George Kenney 
more than they did previously, the Air Campaign Course had displaced formal 
leadership courses to the detriment of the students.309 Thus, he reinstated leadership and 
command topics as separate courses in the curriculum during his one year tenure as 
ACSC Commandant. According to the ACSC official history report for 1995-1996, 
formal leadership and command topics had been virtually eliminated from the ACSC 
curriculum during Colonel Warden‘s tenure.310 Warden designed his curriculum so that 
students had to use leadership and command concepts to successfully complete the 
courses. Thus, although leadership and command was not a formal course in Warden‘s 
                                                 
308 The General Muir S. Fairchild Educational Achievement Award was first established in 1964 and is 
awarded annually by Air University to individuals, groups of individuals, or entire units for ―the most 
significant contribution to AU education or Air Force education in general. It is intended to stimulate and 
reward creative and outstanding achievement in military education.‖ See Air University Instruction 36-
2313, Air University-Conducted Education Awards Program, 25 May 2006, 3. The Air Force 
Organizational Excellence Award was first established in 1969 and ―recognizes acts or services that place 
the unit‘s performance significantly above that of other units of similar composition and mission 
responsibility.‖ See Air Force Instruction 36-2803, Air Force Awards and Decorations Program, 15 June 
2001, 23. 
309 Olson, John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power.  
310 History of the Air Command and Staff College, 1 July 1995 – 30 June 1996, Volume I, K239.07C v.1, 
IRIS no. 01121218 in the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
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Air Campaign-based curriculum, students were still learning how to lead and 
command.311 The AY 1994 and 1995 curriculum contained a course called Professional 
Skills which contained some leadership concepts, but this course also included 
instruction in Quality concepts and computer skills and did not concentrate solely on 
leadership and command. However, for AY 1996, Colonel Warden did, in fact, plan to 
reinstitute a formal Command and Leadership course concentrating solely on command 
and leadership principles312 
 Leadership and command as a formal course reentered the curriculum in AY 
1996 as an effort to ―reverse a perceived shortfall in command and leadership education 
noted in previous years‖ by Air University.313  The course consisted of 69 hours, was 
designed around a central theme called the ―learning leader concept‖ and was taught in 
two sequential blocks of instruction: a Leadership block and a Command block. The 
learning leader concept theorized that each individual student uniquely learns and 
applies leadership concepts. Thus, students were encouraged to find solutions to 
leadership problems through a juxtaposition of Air Force core values and their own 
leadership philosophy. The Leadership course block taught students to look for the 
attributes and competencies that make effective leaders in given situations and students 
were given tools that can make leaders more effective. The Command course then 
focused on recognizing and resolving common, day-to-day issues that commanders face 
                                                 
311 Interview with John A. Warden III, September 2007. 
312 Air Command and Staff College AY 1996 Curriculum Plan, in the official files of the Office of the 
Dean of Education, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
313 Ibid, 1. 
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in the military environment using principles learned earlier during the Leadership block 
of instruction.  
 To stimulate leadership topic discussions in addition to those in the formal 
courses, General Brooks introduced the Commandant’s Leadership Speaker Series in 
which senior military leaders were brought to ACSC once a month as guest speakers to 
share key leadership insights with students. After a senior leader‘s presentation to the 
entire student body, senior officer mentors from nearby Air War College visited ACSC 
seminars to discuss the leadership topic addressed by the guest speaker. Students were 
encouraged to use this seminar time to share their thoughts on the guest speaker‘s 
leadership topic with each other and seek insight from their AWC mentor who likely had 
previously served as a squadron commander and thus could share their personal 
leadership experience.314 
 Another new leadership-based initiative for AY 1996 was the introduction of a 
student leadership journal. Students were required to keep a leadership journal during the 
academic year in which they recorded both positive and negative experiences 
encountered during their time at ACSC that affected their learning in the area of 
leadership. At the end of the school year, students used this journal to reflect on what 
they gained from their experience at ACSC and to share their personal leadership 
philosophy with their fellow students. The goal of this initiative was to demonstrate to 
students that leadership cannot be completely taught in the course of a single school 
year. Instead, the art of leadership is a continual journey that requires significant thought 
                                                 
314 History of the Air Command and Staff College, 1 July 1995 – 30 June 1996. 
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and reflection.315 Formally reemphasizing leadership and command concepts was the 
key curricular refinement made during General Brook‘s short stay at ACSC. 
 The curriculum and course flow put in place by Colonel Warden remained stable 
each year from AY 1996 through AY 1999. The curriculum began with an overview of 
big picture objectives, and then moved through theory, strategic analysis, operational 
analysis, campaign planning, and conflict resolution. Students began their year of studies 
exploring the larger conceptual issues of war and conflict and ended the year with a 
practical application exercise. Minor updates and changes to the curriculum continued to 
be instituted over this four-year period, but Warden‘s curriculum largely remained.316  
 One noticeable change was the re-naming of two of Warden‘s courses. AY 
1996‘s Air Campaign Exercise Simulation (ACES) course was renamed Joint Warrior in 
AY 1997. With ACSC scheduled for a Process of Accreditation for Joint Education 
(PAJE) inspection in 1997, this course name change reflected ACSC‘s emphasis on joint 
education. Joint Warrior was held in the Air Force War Gamming Institute near ACSC at 
Air University and remained part of the curriculum every year until AY 1999. Also, the 
Campaign 2025+ course was renamed Force 2025+ for AY 1997 to more accurately 
reflect the fact that future conflicts for the United States would be fought with an 
emphasis on a combined force.317 Most importantly, the post-Warden ACSC curriculum 
remained heavily book and technology-based. Students saw no decrease in their rigorous 
                                                 
315 Ibid. 
316 Air Command and Staff College AY 1997 Curriculum Plan; Air Command and Staff College AY 1998 
Curriculum Plan; Air Command and Staff College AY 1999 Curriculum Plan, in the official files of the 
Office of the Dean of Education and Curriculum, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force 
Base, AL. 
317 Ibid. 
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required reading load or reliance on computer technology in the years after Warden left; 
ACSC did not revert back to its former low level of academic rigor.  
 A new technology-based curriculum initiative created during AY 1997 was a 10-
day combined ACSC and AWC exercise called Tandem Challenge. Implemented in AY 
1998, Tandem Challenge replaced Joint Warrior in the ACSC curriculum and became 
the capstone application exercise for both ACSC and AWC. The intent of Tandem 
Challenge was to afford students of ACSC and AWC the opportunity to work together to 
solve problems associated with a national-level scenario; ACSC students focused on the 
operational level of war while AWC students operated at the strategic level. The course 
description for Tandem Challenge read, 
 Tandem Challenge (TC), the capstone exercise of the AWC and ACSC academic 
 years, provides a framework for the students to apply the concepts and principles 
 taught at AWC and ACSC in a scenario that spans the strategic and operational 
 levels of war. TC emphasizes the themes of leadership, doctrine, strategy, 
 political-military affairs, joint and multinational warfare, aerospace power, and 
 technology. Through role play at the National Command Authorities, Chairman 
 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and war-fighting Commander-In-Chief levels, AWC 
 and ACSC students evaluate the national security process and actively apply 
 various political-military concepts in a complex, wartime simulation.318 
 
 On the surface, implementing Tandem Challenge appeared a good idea. With 
AWC and ACSC housed in buildings separated by only 100 yards, combining both 
student bodies in a joint exercise appeared a good use of available resources, especially 
as technology evolved to enable such a venture. Feedback from the first Tandem 
Challenge exercise was positive. ACSC recorded in its official history report from June 
1998: 
                                                 
318 History of the Air Command and Staff College, 1 July 1997 – 30 June 1998, Volume I, 7, KC239.07C 
v.1, IRIS no. 01128943 in the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
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 The initial effort to combine the capstone war games of AWC and ACSC was a 
 huge success. Although some minor problems are expected in any first-time 
 endeavor, the exercise did an excellent job of accomplishing the learning 
 objectives of both schools. ACSC students served as members of a CINC‘s 
 planning staff under the leadership of a CINC from Air War College. The two 
 near simultaneous major theaters of war impressed upon the students the 
 difficulties of planning and executing operational forces in a situation where you 
 may not get all of the resources necessary to accomplish the mission.319 
 
However, by the second year of implementation, significant problems with Tandem 
Challenge emerged. ACSC‘s history report from June 1999 was not so positive: 
―Tandem Challenge was a continuing curriculum challenge. It was the year‘s lowest 
rated course. Improving this joint exercise is one of the Commandant and the Dean of 
Education‘s priorities.‖320 Efforts to improve the exercise did not succeed. Tandem 
Challenge was last held during AY 2001, and was eliminated from the ACSC and AWC 
curriculum for AY 2002. During his interview, Dr. Kevin Holzimmer, a civilian 
historian who joined the ACSC faculty in 1999, remarked, ―Tandem Challenge died 
from barriers between AWC and ACSC. ACSC students felt that AWC students viewed 
them as free labor while AWC students believed ACSC students got tactical too 
quickly.‖321  
 The barriers referenced by Dr. Holzimmer are both real and perceived. The real 
barriers are the 100-yard geographical separation between AWC and ACSC as well as 
the military rank structure difference; ACSC students are majors while AWC students 
are lieutenant colonels and colonels. The perceived barriers are dependent on an 
individual‘s experience and on which side of the ACSC – AWC fence they are sitting. 
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321 Interview with Dr. Kevin Holzimmer, September 2007.  
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Commonly-heard labels for AWC and ACSC around the academic circle at Air 
University are ―House of Lords‖ for AWC and ―House of Commons‖ for ACSC, a 
reference to the structure of the British Parliament. These labels fuel the perception of 
many ACSC students that AWC students view themselves as above them (not just in 
rank) and the AWC belief that ACSC students are there to serve them. 322 In any case, 
whether real or perceived, problems between the ACSC and AWC students during 
Tandem Challenge execution certainly contributed to the demise of the exercise. No 
official documentation could be found that formally explains why Tandem Challenge 
was cancelled.    
 After remaining virtually unchanged for the previous four years, the ACSC 
curriculum was completely redesigned for AY 2000. The basic idea of curriculum flow 
moving from theory to practice remained a central tenet of the new curriculum. ACSC 
did not decide to change its curriculum because the curriculum was broken; the 
curriculum was redesigned for several reasons. First, ACSC needed to comply with the 
guidance in the Air University CESG. Also, ACSC had 17 civilian Ph.D.s on faculty; the 
largest number of faculty with doctoral degrees ACSC had ever had on staff at one time. 
Thus, the faculty perceived they had enough academic expertise to take the curriculum 
to a higher academic level.323 According to Dr. Muller, ―And to be honest, we had a 
stronger faculty in 1999, so we were able to go even further [with the curriculum].‖324 In 
                                                 
322 From the personal experience of the author during his time as an ACSC student and instructor from 
2002 – 2005. 
323 Interview with Dr. Richard Muller, August 2008. 
324 Interview with Dr. Richard Muller, August 2008. 
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addition, the effort to gain authority to grant master‘s degrees to ACSC graduates was a 
motivating factor (This topic is covered later in this chapter). 
   In conjunction with its curriculum redesign, ACSC published an Educational 
Philosophy for the first time in its AY 2000 Curriculum: 
 At ACSC, we believe that the best way to learn is through an ACTIVE and 
 COLLABORATIVE environment that facilitates knowledge, comprehension, 
 and application of ideas. Our curriculum and learning environment challenges 
 students and faculty to CONSTRUCT MEANING, THINK REFLECTIVELY, 
 and DEVELOP INTERNALLY while experimenting with a wide range of 
 concepts, issues, and possibilities (Emphasis original).325 
 
This philosophy reflected ACSC‘s intent to elevate its curriculum and teaching to higher 
levels of rigor and academic standards. Three new courses were developed for AY 2000: 
National and International Security Studies, Nature of War, and Military Studies. The 
foundation for each course was lessons from the AY 1999 curriculum (Table 6); 
however each course required significant additional development. The AY 2000 
curriculum is shown in Table 7. Course directors for the new courses each possessed a 
Ph.D. and completed an intensive curriculum design in the summer of 1999.326 The 
remainder of the AY2000 curriculum contained elements from AY 1999, but also 
underwent significant revision, particularly in the areas of research and electives.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
325 Air Command and Staff College AY 2000 Curriculum Plan. 
326 History of the Air Command and Staff College, 1 July 1998 – 30 June 1999, Volume I, 7, KC239.07C 
v.1, IRIS no. 01128944 in the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
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Table 6.  ACSC AY 1999 Curriculum Summary 
Course Title Academic Contact Hours 
Orientation Course 33 
Leadership and Command—Phase I 21 
Leadership and Command—Phase II 42 
War & Conflict 18 
War Theory 48.5 
Strategic Environment 41.9 
Operational Forces 78.5 
Conflict Resolution 27 
Joint Operations & Campaign Planning 71.5 
Air and Space Operations 45 
Leadership and Command—Phase III 45 
Tandem Challenge 49 
Force 2025+ 37.9 
Gathering of Eagles 12 
Total Academic Contact Hours 589.3 
 
Source: Air Command and Staff College AY 1999 Curriculum Plan, in the official files 
of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL., 5. 
 
Table 7.  ACSC AY 2000 Curriculum Summary 
Course Title Academic Contact Hours 
Orientation Course 32 
Leadership and Command—Phase I 25 
Leadership and Command—Phase II 46 
National & International Security Studies 45 
Nature of War 45 
Military Studies 45 
Operational Forces 60 
Aerospace Operations 60 
Joint Operations & Campaign Planning 60 
Leadership and Command---Phase III 26 
Tandem Challenge 40 
Future Capabilities and Concepts 30 
Research and Electives 45 
Gathering of Eagles 12 
Total Academic Contact Hours 586 
Total Semester Hours  
 
Source: Air Command and Staff College AY 2000 Curriculum Plan, in the official files 
of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL., 6. 
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This new curriculum was built with the new curricular guidance in the Air 
University Continuum of Education and Strategic Guidance document in mind and 
vetted through the CCRC process. The Nature of War course was built to line up with 
the Profession of Arms CESG area and the Military Studies and National and 
International Security Studies courses were built to mirror the Military Studies and 
National and International Security Studies areas of the CESG. The existing Leadership 
and Command courses at ACSC lined up well with the requirements of both the 
Communications Studies area and the Leadership and Management Studies area of the 
CESG. Forward-thinking faculty members sought to create a new curricular structure 
through which to deliver the new curriculum product.   
Organizational Adjustments 
 ACSC made adjustments to the organizational and curricular structure put in 
place during Colonel Warden‘s tenure in order to more effectively deliver the new 
curriculum. Dr. Muller recalled that the three teaching departments established under 
Colonel Warden each contained three academic courses that ―were not academically or 
operationally connected to each other.‖327 Therefore, he teamed with Lieutenant Colonel 
Jim Forsyth and a few other faculty members in 1998 to consider how to improve the 
teaching department structure left by Warden. The result was a plan to fine-tune the 
teaching departments, realign faculty members based on expertise and move the 
academic year to a two-semester structure. Dr. Muller was well-placed to effect such 
                                                 
327 Interview with Dr. Richard Muller, August 2008. 
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change; he became Vice Dean for Academic Affairs in June 1998 and served as Dean of 
Education from January 2000 – June 2001. 
 The group began with Warden‘s curriculum structure as their starting point. Dr. 
Muller recalled that he and his group took a hard look at the curriculum as a whole and  
 …saw an opportunity to go one step beyond the Warden structure. Under 
 Warden, the three departments ran three courses each, largely determined by the 
 calendar. We thought  it was time to create departments that taught similar 
 subject matter. Under Warden for example, different departments taught 
 International Relations and History, even though the expertise you‘d want to 
 teach these subjects was the same.328 
 
Thus, a new departmental outline was drafted according to subject matter and faculty 
expertise. The new structure still contained three teaching departments, but their names 
were changed to reflect their new areas of emphasis. The new departments were the 
Department of Leadership and Aerospace Power Studies (DEP), the Department of 
International and Military Studies (DEI), and the Department of Joint Warfare Studies 
(DEW). The intent was for each department to teach courses with specific, related 
content and assign faculty with specific expertise to those departments. For example, 
DEI contained the courses with theoretical underpinnings in history and international 
relations. Thus, faculty members with Ph.D.s or other expertise in history, political 
science, and international relations were assigned to DEI. Likewise, faculty members 
with experience and expertise in joint military matters were assigned to DEW and 
faculty with command and key leadership experience were assigned to DEP.329 
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 The organizational structure within the Office of the Dean of Education and 
Curriculum also changed for AY 2000 to reflect the creation of the new teaching 
departments (Figure 5).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.  DE AY 2000 Organization Chart 
Source: Air Command and Staff College AY 00 Curriculum Briefing, slide 5. In the 
official files of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
 
 
For AY 2001, DEP and DER were combined into a single department called the 
Department of Leadership, Command and Communication Studies (DEC) (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6.  DE AY 2001 Organization Chart 
Source:  Air Command and Staff College AY 01 Curriculum Briefing, slide 6. In the 
official files of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
 
 
 With these new departments, the curriculum was then structured around a two-
semester academic year. This two-semester academic year contained the theoretical 
foundations of the curriculum during the fall semester, and the operational aspects of the 
curriculum in the spring semester. The students moved seamlessly from theory to 
practice during the course of the academic year. This new structure was implemented in 
Academic Year 2000 (Figure 4). Dr. Muller recalled that ―it just made good academic 
sense to gather subject matter and expertise together in the same department. Now we 
had disciplinary connectivity in the departments and the curriculum.‖330   
                                                 
330 Interview with Dr. Richard Muller, August 2008. 
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 The curriculum content for AY 2001 was virtually unchanged from AY 2000 
(Figure 7); however the AY 2001 curriculum chart (Figure 8) reflects the departmental 
teaching responsibility changes from AY 2000. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  ACSC AY 2000 Curriculum Structure. 
Source:  Air Command and Staff College AY 00 Curriculum Briefing, slide 9. In the 
official files of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
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Figure 8: ACSC AY 2001 Curriculum Structure. 
Source:  Air Command and Staff College AY 00 Curriculum Briefing, slide 10. In the 
official files of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
  
Feedback on ACSC‘s new curriculum structure was positive. The 1999 Air 
University Board of Visitors reviewed the departmental structure and the curriculum 
content of the new two-semester curriculum structure at ACSC and reported favorably 
on their findings. In their report to the Air University Commander, the BOV noted, 
 The AY 00 Departmental Structure is consistent with continuum of education 
 strategic guidance, which identifies the five core areas of PME study and 
 articulates core objectives at the intermediate (ACSC) level in each area. The 
 BOV believes this structure provides effective organization of human resources 
 to accomplish the proposed curriculum in accord with the CESG. The proposed 
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 curriculum for AY 00 is consistent with COE [continuum of education] strategic 
 guidance and its content is appropriately divided between semesters.331 
 Faculty members put in many hours of hard work to be ready to execute the new 
curriculum design for AY 2000. Some faculty members called the first semester of this 
new academic year structure, taught by faculty members from the Department of 
International Security and Military Studies (DEI), the ―Fall Classic‖ as a light-hearted 
baseball reference. In Major League Baseball, the annual World Series championship is 
played during the fall month of October, and is commonly known as the Fall Classic. 
Today (2008), the first semester is still commonly called the Fall Classic. Dr. Muller 
fondly recalled that some faculty members referred to DEI as ―Murderer‘s Row,‖ a 
reference to the nickname of the famous and powerful New York Yankees baseball team 
that won the 1927 World Series.332  
 Dr. Muller also recalled that there were plenty of skeptics in ACSC who doubted 
that the new two-semester academic structure could be successfully executed. This doubt 
stemmed from the fact that the two-semester structure required a very heavy teaching 
load for DEI in the fall and a very heavy teaching load for DEW in the spring; never 
before had a single teaching department had such a heavy teaching load compressed into 
finite semesters.333 Muller said, ―Many individuals (including my predecessor as Dean) 
believed the Fall Classic and the spring operational semester would be impossible to 
execute—and we did it.‖334 Dr. Muller went on to explain one of his most memorable 
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moments at ACSC. He said, ―One moment I‘ll never forget: December 1999, raising a 
glass with Jim Forsyth at the Christmas party after the completion of DEI‘s first-ever 
Fall Classic, and saying, ‗We did it!‘‖335 
 Dr. Muller, Lt Col Forsyth, and the other faculty members who worked diligently 
on the new structure may have had doubters, but they also had a powerful ally in 
Brigadier General John W. Rosa, Jr., the ACSC Commandant. General Rosa, not a 
professional educator himself, however recognized the ability of those on his faculty, 
such as Dr. Muller and Lt Col Forsyth who were professional educators, to conceptualize 
curriculum and develop a sound organizational structure through which to deliver the 
curriculum. Thus, General Rosa gave Muller and Forsyth the authority to effect such 
change. When asked if any Commandants after Colonel Warden stand out as particularly 
influential in curricular change, Dr. Muller responded, ―I give high marks to Brigadier 
General Rosa—not because he was ―hands-on‖ about curriculum, but because he 
respected his professional educators and let us take care of the academics while he 
provided superb leadership.‖336          
Degree-Granting and Accreditation 
 Air University decided to seek degree-granting authority and accreditation for 
their PME programs. In 1997, Air University schools were the only PME schools in the 
Department of Defense not granting graduate degrees to their officers. Embarrassed by 
this situation, the Air University Commander, Lieutenant General Redden, approved a 
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plan to seek degree-granting authority for its schools.337 If approved, ACSC could award 
a Master of Operational Art and Science degree to graduates of its in-resident program. 
To prepare for the approval process, ACSC completed, in 1998, a self-study for the 
United States Department of Education (DoE). After the DoE review of the self-study, 
ACSC received a three-day visit in September 1998 from the National Advisory 
Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI), the on-site review 
representatives of the DoE.338 
 The NACIQI attended a series of briefings, lectures, and seminars during the 
execution of the War Theory course for AY 1999. ACSC received a favorable response 
from members of the NACIQI, who recommended that the United States Secretary of 
Education approve ACSC‘s request to grant master‘s degrees to its graduates beginning 
with the class of AY 2000.339 The Secretary of Education approved the request and 
forwarded the action to the United States Congress for approval. Approval was granted 
when President Bill Clinton signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law on 5 
October 1999. This act gave the Air University Commander authority to confer the 
Master of Military Operational Art and Science degree to in-resident ACSC graduates as 
well as the Master of Strategic Studies degree to in-resident graduates of AWC 
beginning with the class of AY 2000. However, because authority to grant degrees was 
                                                 
337 History of Air University, 1 January 1999 – 31 January 1999, Volume I. 
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awarded in 1999, Air University was allowed to retroactively confer degrees to class of 
AY 1999 graduates as well.340 
 Degree-granting authority for Air University was a big step in elevating the 
academic credibility of Air University schools and their curriculum since use of the word 
―college‖ in civilian institutions normally denotes a degree-granting institution. Soon 
after degree-granting authority was granted, Air University began the process to apply 
for candidacy status for accreditation through the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Schools (SACS). The BOV commended this move by Air University, stating that 
―Regional accreditation for Air University as an institution through SACS would put the 
‗University‘ back in Air University.‖341 Regional accreditation was awarded to Air 
University in 2004 (Covered later in this study).  
Curricular Influence of World Events 
 World events with military significance continued to be integrated into the ACSC 
curriculum. Events such as the 1996 terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi 
Arabia and Operation Deliberate Force, the NATO-led air campaign in Kosovo, and the 
bombing of the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, were discussed and analyzed 
through the use of case studies, formal lectures, or seminar discussions. During his 
interview, Dr. Matthew Schwonek, a member of the ACSC faculty since 1996, indicated 
that recent world events with military significance usually come into the curriculum via 
individual instructors. He indicated that many times, the exact manner of how an event is 
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covered in seminar is a function of instructor personality and teaching ability, but most 
all faculty members seek to stay abreast of current events. Dr. Schwonek said, ―The 
faculty is always on a quest to update lessons from current events and to illustrate 
lessons with the latest operations.‖342 In addition, classified briefings on recent world 
events were periodically given to United States students; international students are not 
allowed to attend classified briefings.  
Summary 
 The Warden Revolution brought ACSC out of the shadow of the Skelton Report 
and into the forefront of academic rigor and progressive air power thought. By 2001, 
ACSC graduates were receiving a Master‘s Degree in Military Operational Art and 
Science. ACSC processes, curriculum, and structure reached a new level of maturity 
during the five-year period between the end of the Warden Revolution and 2001 through 
methodical, evolutionary improvements that, combined with technological upgrades, 
improvements in the quality of ACSC faculty, and far-reaching initiatives from Air 
University, helped firmly establish ACSC as a leader in Professional Military Education.  
 The pace of change during this time was significantly slower than during the 
Warden years; however, ACSC continually marched forward with significant 
improvements. Curriculum development was now centralized via a Core Curriculum 
Review Committee that maintained visibility over all facets of the curriculum. By de-
conflicting curricular content in each course and facilitating integration of the entire 
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curriculum, ACSC students would no longer be exposed to the same topic in multiple 
courses. The Commandant now had a formal instead of an ad hoc mechanism through 
which to control curriculum development.  
 The newly-established Air University Continuum of Education and Strategic 
Guidance eliminated the lack of continuity in the PME courses Air Force officers 
completed over the course of their career. The CESG established and organized five 
distinct curricular content learning areas that Air University believed were critical for the 
intellectual growth of its officers: Profession of Arms, Military Studies, International 
Security Studies, Communication Studies, and Leadership and Management Studies. Air 
University schools, including ACSC, incorporated the CESG learning area objectives 
into their curriculum. Significantly, the CESG integrated the core curriculum areas 
across PME throughout an officer‘s career, ensuring an officer received the right PME at 
the right time. 
   The ACSC curriculum matured significantly after the Warden Revolution. To 
begin, formal Leadership and Command courses were added back to the curriculum in 
AY 1996 to reverse what some believed was a shortfall in the Warden curriculum. The 
Air Campaign Exercise Simulation and Campaign 2025+ war game courses were 
renamed to Joint Warrior and Force 2025+ to better reflect their curricular content and 
focus. Another technological-based war game course named Tandem Challenge was 
established as a combined AWC – ACSC student effort. Tandem Challenge was held 
annually for four years but was eliminated after 2001 due to apparent problems between 
AWC and ACSC students that could not be overcome. The cancellation of Tandem 
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Challenge demonstrates that although Air University had made significant progress in 
many areas since the Skelton Report, it still had significant problems that needed 
addressing. 
 After the re-institution of Leadership and Command courses in AY 1996, the 
curriculum remained stable until AY 2000 when ACSC redesigned its curriculum and 
academic structure. The impetus for the redesign was the improved quality of the ACSC 
faculty, the new CESG requirements, and the effort to acquire authority to grant master‘s 
degrees to students. Three new courses were built: National and International Security 
Studies, Nature of War, and Military Studies. Parts of the Warden curriculum remained, 
but were spread among the new courses. Other parts of the Warden curriculum remained 
in the rest of the ACSC curriculum.  
 The curriculum content of the new courses was designed at a very high academic 
standard because ACSC had the expertise to do so. The quality of faculty had improved 
greatly over this time. The number of civilians with Ph.D.‘s increased by over 500 
percent since the 1989 Skelton Report and the Faculty Preparation Program instituted by 
Colonel Warden began to bear fruit as the first military officers with Ph.D.s began 
returning to ACSC. ACSC was able to elevate the curriculum to new levels of academic 
rigor in 1999 due to the higher quality of the faculty at that time.  
 The three new courses were built to coincide with the core areas of the CESG, 
and were even named after the core areas. ACSC‘s pre-existing Leadership and 
Command courses lined up well with the other core areas of the CESG and thus required 
little rework. Additionally, Air University‘s effort to gain authority to grant master‘s 
 174 
degrees to graduates spurred curricular redesign in order to meet the academic standards 
required for degree-granting authority. 
 In order to execute and deliver the new curriculum for AY 2000, ACSC 
reworked its organizational and academic structure. A new departmental structure was 
designed according to subject matter and faculty expertise. Each department now taught 
specific, related content and faculty members with Ph.D.s or other expertise in those 
areas were assigned to those departments. ACSC still maintained three teaching 
departments, but DEA, DEB, and DEC became International Security and Military 
Studies (DEI), Leadership, Command, and Communication Studies (DEC), and Joint 
Warfare Studies (DEW). 
 A new two-semester academic year structure was instituted to facilitate delivery 
of the new courses and the new teaching departments. Students still were taken from 
theory to practice over the course of the year. The fall semester contained the theoretical 
foundations of the ACSC curriculum and was known as the Fall Classic. The spring 
semester contained the operational aspects of the curriculum and students finished the 
year with practical application exercises made possible by ACSC‘s use of emerging 
technology during this time.  
 ACSC‘s mission statement was also changed as a reflection of how far ACSC 
had come since the Skelton Report and even the Warden years. The new mission 
statement acknowledged the vastly improved quality of its faculty by adding the words 
―world-class team.‖ In addition, the new mission statement demonstrated the seriousness 
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with which ACSC took its role in conducting joint education to produce officers capable 
to lead joint forces.  
 The vast majority of credit for moving ACSC from the Warden years to the point 
it had a centralized curriculum development process, an academically sound teaching 
department structure and two-semester curricular structure, a highly academically 
rigorous curriculum, and degree-granting authority belongs to Dr. Richard Muller and 
Colonel Jim Forsyth. Both of these men insist that any success ACSC or they personally 
have enjoyed is the result of a team effort, and not due to their individual efforts. 
However, both men are seasoned educators who teamed together and emerged as the 
intellectual leaders of ACSC at a time when intellectual leadership was needed to bring 
ACSC firmly into the forefront of PME leadership. The fact that they succeeded, often in 
the face of detractors and doubters, is a testament to their dedication and fortitude. As 
ACSC prepared for AY 2002, it was clear that processes, structure, and curriculum had 
matured, and mediocrity had been left behind.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 BEYOND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
 
September 11, 2001 is a date that marks another turning point for Professional 
Military Education. On that date, terrorists turned United States commercial airliners 
into missiles and flew them into the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon. Over 
3,000 people were killed that day in the deadliest terrorist attacks on United States soil in 
history. This date is a turning point for military education; not for immediate effects but 
rather for the long-term implications the attacks had on PME curriculum. 
 ACSC was beginning to find its curricular rhythm in the fall of 2001. On 
September 11, 2001, AY 2002 had been in motion for little more than a month and 
represented the third consecutive year that ACSC had executed its 2-semester academic 
structure. The Core Curriculum Review Committee process was institutionalized and 
ACSC‘s core curriculum had been aligned under the Air University‘s Continuum of 
Education and Strategic Guidance since 1999. The core courses taught in the three main 
teaching departments underwent annual modifications, but contained essentially the 
same subject content. None of this changed on September 12, 2001. However, as time 
passed and the United States began military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
elsewhere across the globe in support of a Global War on Terror (GWOT), curriculum 
changes began to be pushed to ACSC from external sources. 
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Immediate Impact of September 11, 2001 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 stunned the entire United States. 
People spent days, weeks, even months trying to come to terms with what had just 
happened. At Air University, faculty and students were just as shocked as the rest of the 
world. On September 12, 2001, Air University Commander Lieutenant General Donald 
A. Lamontagne ordered a halt to the normal curriculum so faculty and students could 
talk about the event. Emotions ran high and opinions became very pointed at times, 
especially with international officers. According to Dr. Jim Forsyth, the day was not a 
success. Forsyth recalled, ―When 9-11 happened, we did that special day on September 
the 12th, which was an utter disaster. That was directly from the AU Commander. We 
had a special day. We were going to stop the curriculum and talk about the event, which, 
I guess, was appropriate looking back, but it didn‘t go well.‖343 ACSC resumed its 
normal operating curriculum the next day. 
 The ACSC curriculum did not change overnight because of the September 11th 
attacks. However, there were those who felt the attacks had voided the entire curriculum. 
During his interview, Dr. Rich Muller remembered, ―The immediate impact of 9-11 was 
that the faculty had to stamp down calls to redo the entire curriculum.‖344 Calls to 
radically change curriculum in the wake of an event on the scale of the September 11, 
2001 attacks is nothing new. Stakeholders in school curriculum typically call for change 
in the wake of a crisis or significant event. For example, stakeholders in United States 
public school education called for significant change to public school curriculum 
                                                 
343 Interview with Dr. Jim Forsyth, September 2007. 
344 Interview with Dr. Rich Muller, September 2007. 
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nationwide in the aftermath of Russia‘s 1957 launch of a satellite they called Sputnik. 
Calls for emphasis on mathematics, engineering, and science to keep from falling far 
behind Communist Russia were soon heard around the nation. Similarly, stakeholders in 
PME were soon calling for renewed focus on subjects such as terrorism.  
 The curriculum in place during the fall of 2001 was the AY 2002 curriculum 
(Figure 9), which closely mirrored the AY 2001 curriculum, although some courses did 
change. The last course in the Fall Classis was renamed from Military Studies to 
Airpower Studies due to its concentration on the air arm of the military.  A National 
Planning Systems course was added to the second semester, which covered national-
level decision making and planning processes, and the joint Air War College-ACSC war 
game called Tandem Challenge was replaced by a new Aerospace Exercise.  
As curriculum planning for AY 2003 got underway, it was clear that lessons related to 
the September 11, 2001 attacks would be incorporated into the curriculum. However, the 
scope of the changes was manageable. The core areas of the Air University Continuum 
of Education and Strategic Guidance did not change, and the core curriculum for ACSC 
remained virtually the same for AY 2003 (Figure 10). Changes related to the 9-11 
attacks originated from the faculty through new lessons within a core course. For 
example, in the National and International Security Studies course, the security issues of 
terrorism, failed states, and globalization were taught and each included discussions on 
the 9-11 attacks. In the Nature of War course, radical Islamism was a lesson in the topic 
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area of Wars of Religion. Additionally, an elective course was added called Islam and 
Islamism: Radical Political Religion, Ideology, and the State.345 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  ACSC AY 2002 Curriculum. 
Source:  PowerPoint Briefing, ―Program Review Board 2002,‖ January 18, 2002, slide 4 
in the personal files of Dr. Jim Forsyth, Department Chair for Department of Leadership, 
Command, and Communication Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL.  
 
 
  
                                                 
345 PowerPoint Briefing, ―Program Review Board 2002,‖ January 18, 2002, in the personal files of Dr. Jim 
Forsyth, Department Chair for Department of Leadership, Command, and Communication Studies, Air 
Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL., Slides 6-22.  
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Figure 10.  ACSC AY 2003 Curriculum. 
Source:  PowerPoint Briefing, ―Air Command and Staff College AETC/IG Visit,‖ April 
22, 2003, in the personal files of Dr. Jim Forsyth, Slide 4. 
 
  
 
No significant curriculum changes were forced on ACSC in the aftermath of the 
9-11 attacks, despite calls for changes. Changes that were incorporated for AY 2003 
came from the ACSC faculty, who are astute enough to know when such curricular 
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was Dean that terrorism was something important after 9-11, but I got a lot of people 
telling me this, as if this was something I couldn‘t figure out on my own.‖346 What 
Colonel Forsyth and the rest of ACSC did not know as AY 2003 began, was that 
significant changes to the ACSC curriculum were being planned by Air Force leadership 
that ACSC would not be able to resist. By time curriculum planning for AY 2004 got 
underway, a new Air Force initiative called Force Development would dictate significant 
curriculum changes to ACSC.   
Force Development Education 
 
 In November 2002, Air Force senior leadership announced it was overhauling 
how it develops its officers, news that had significant impact on Air Force PME. In an 
interview with the Air Force Times newspaper, Brigadier General Richard S. Hassan, 
director of the Air Force Senior Leadership Office (AFSLMO), stated the new force 
development initiative had two goals: ―To produce generals and colonels with broader 
operational and strategic perspectives than current personnel policies may allow; and to 
better meet the expectations of officers, who often feel the personnel system operates at 
odds with their career aspirations.‖347 To accomplish these goals, the Air Force decided 
to make changes to the existing officer promotion system and the officer assignment 
system. Regarding the promotion system, ―information on education and training will be 
reported to promotion boards in new ways, reflecting the new focus on development,‖ 
                                                 
346 Interview with Dr. Jim Forsyth, September 2007. 
347 Gordon Trowbridge, ―Shooting for the stars or not: A new program aims to overhaul the Air Force 
leadership culture, letting officers choose their own destiny,‖ November 11, 2002. 
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and the assignment system would be rebuilt ―to give individuals more input and to stress 
career development as the top priority.‖348   
 Assignments would be now be geared toward broadening the experience of 
officers who aspire to obtain senior command positions, and to give officers who do not 
aspire to senior level rank the opportunity to avoid the broadening assignments that 
would remove them from their functional specialty. This new assignment emphasis was 
in line with Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper and Secretary of the Air Force 
James G. Roche‘s goal of eliminating career-building as an exercise in ―box-checking,‖ 
or officers taking assignments they believe they must in order to compete for promotion, 
even if those assignments do not build better officers. In short, Secretary Roche and 
General Jumper wanted to change the Air Force culture.349 
 If the new force development initiative succeeded in changing the Air Force 
culture, the new officer culture would ―develop colonels and generals with a broader 
understanding of operations and strategy by systematically exposing them to aspects of 
the force outside their specialty. At the same time, the Air Force would place greater 
value on officers who choose to remain in their specialty—pilots who want to fly for 
example—who often suffer in the military‘s up-or-out system.‖350 Thus, officers could 
now expect to greater opportunities to broaden outside their functional specialty while 
who choose to remain in their functional specialty would be viewed as important assets 
to the Air Force rather than as officers to simply be phased out of the service. 
                                                 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. 
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 Force Development sought to tie military education and training closer to an 
officer‘s career development than in the past. According to Brigadier General Hassan,  
 For example, to become competent as a pilot, there is a standard set of functional 
 experiences the pilot must go through. We understand that pretty well. I call that 
 ‗occupational competence.‘ The other piece of the equation is what education 
 and training opportunities we offer. Our terminology is that they are the 
 ‗enduring competencies.‘ So the key is how to tie all of that together in a way 
 that makes sense.351  
  
Force Development entailed a redirection of the Air Force‘s approach to Professional 
Military Education. General Jumper signaled in the Chief of Staff‘s November 2002 
Sight Picture that change was coming. The Sight Picture stated the Air Force had 
transitioned from a Cold War structure to an Air Expeditionary Force structure, and 
therefore would transform ―the way we train, educate, promote, and assign‖ Air Force 
personnel.352  
 General Jumper focused on ACSC to begin this transformation in PME. He 
focused the initial efforts of Force Development at the intermediate level of PME since 
officers at this level have become functional area experts but still have time to broaden 
their expertise before reaching general officer rank. General Jumper decided to 
restructure the ACSC academic year into three distinct academic modules. In a 
December 2002 policy letter, General Jumper stated,  
 Many officers, upon leaving Air Command and Staff College, have been thrust 
 into assignments for which they have no training. They arrive at their new 
 assignments uncomfortable because they are unable to fully contribute to their 
 new teams. To remedy this, the Air Force will add a module of training in the 
 ACSC curriculum tailored to the assignment each individual will be receiving. It 
                                                 
351 Bruce D. Callender, ―Curtain Up on Force Development,‖ Air Force Magazine, Vol. 86, No. 2, 
February 2003. 
352 General John Jumper, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, ―Chief‘s Sight Picture‖, November 6, 2002, 2. 
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 will give these officers the familiarization needed for their follow-on 
 assignments.‖353 
 
Brigadier General Hassan explained the new modular structure as follows: 
 Module 1 will be called Leadership and Joint Development and focus on things 
 we hold dear such as doctrine, strategy, and leadership principles. Everybody 
 would take part so they‘re all grounded in the same thing. 
 
 Module 2 will focus on the operational art of war. ACSC is the intermediate level 
 of PME and its there that individuals should shift their focus from the tactical to 
 the operational and staff issues. It helps the individual transition beyond the wing 
 level.  
 
 Module 3 is the really unique part of the new approach. The training will be 
 related to what I call a satellite group of occupational skills. For example, a 
 fighter pilot generally will concentrate on one of five occupational areas: 
 acquisition, plans and programs, politico-military, space, and a sort of super-
 operations area. Whichever skill the pilot chooses will be the deciding factor in 
 the pilot‘s next duty assignment. In the past, the Air Force simply would project 
 a post-ACSC assignment based on whatever job might be open. Module 3, in 
 effect, will help prepare an individual for his or her next duty assignment.354 
 
 Restructuring ACSC as a modular institution benefited the Air Expeditionary 
culture the Air Force was creating. The world events of the late 1990s and early 2000s 
such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
and the Global War on Terror, was the impetus for the Air Force transitioning to an 
expeditionary culture. As the U.S. military drew down its force structure and reduced its 
overseas footprint, Air Force personnel were grouped together to form certain skill sets 
and placed into deployment rotation ―buckets‖ which would then deploy at established 
time intervals in support of U.S. operations. Modular military education complemented 
the expeditionary culture because courses would be grouped in distinct, flexible 
                                                 
353 Air Force Policy Letter, Air Force Policy Letter Digest, December 2002, 2. 
354 Callender, ―Curtain Up on Force Development,‖  
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packages of learning. In his article about Force Development, Colonel Jon A. Kimminau 
wrote that these modular learning packages would ―free the system of either sequential 
or haphazard requirements for delivering PME to those who need it. The additional 
benefits of modularity are that learning can then be given in any order, and possibly in 
any combination, to include focused modules intended only for smaller groups of 
officers.‖355 Moreover, the timing of attendance at ACSC could be more flexible in a 
modular structure since students could enter the program at the start of any module of 
learning.    
 General Jumper‘s restructuring plan sent shockwaves through ACSC and 
reopened the debate regarding the proper place for education versus training. 
Professional educators at Air University questioned whether ACSC was the proper place 
for the Module 3 functional-area training courses. Many felt that ACSC, a degree-
granting educational institution in the midst of seeking regional accreditation for its 
academic program, was no place for training courses. Rather, training courses should be 
conducted outside of educational institutions such as ACSC in a true training 
environment.356 Nevertheless, General Jumper went ahead with his restructuring plan, 
therefore ACSC began planning for the modular implementation in late November 2002. 
 ACSC was directed to plan for execution of the new modular curriculum in AY 
2004, scheduled to begin in August 2003 (Figure 11). This gave ACSC only 9 months to 
create the Module 3 courses from the ground up. However, ACSC was not alone in this 
                                                 
355 Jon A. Kimminau, Colonel, USAF, ―One Challenge of Force Development: Developmental Education 
and PME,‖ Air & Space Power Journal, August 2004. 
356 Interview with Dr. Jim Forsyth, September 2007; Interview with Dr. Charles Costanzo, September 
2007; Interview with Dr. Glen Spivey, September 2007. 
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ambitious endeavor. The Air Force Senior Leaders Management Office was intimately 
involved in establishing the new Module 3 courses alongside ACSC planners. In fact, it 
was AFSLMO who determined the 8 functional-area courses that comprised the Module 
3 curriculum; it was ACSC‘s responsibility to then build and execute the course 
content.357       
 
 
Figure 11.  ACSC AY 2004 Curriculum. 
Source:  PowerPoint Briefing, ―Air Command and Staff College AETC/IG Visit,‖ April 
22, 2003, in the personal files of Dr. Jim Forsyth, Slide 5. 
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ACSC revised more than 50 percent of its annual program to accommodate the 
new modular structure. During his interview, Colonel Forsyth explained that no part of 
the existing core curriculum was eliminated to make room for Specialized Studies. He 
recalled, ―Essentially, we just shifted everything to the left and got through it quicker to 
allow for two weeks of Command Course and three weeks of Specialized Studies at the 
end of the year. It was really tough on the students because it was five days a week. But 
we didn‘t drop anything.‖358 The faculty worked extremely hard to incorporate the new 
curriculum on time. In fact, faculty members building an entirely new curriculum for the 
following academic year while still executing the current curriculum is reminiscent of 
the early days of the Warden Revolution. According to Brigadier General Ronald 
Ladnier, ACSC Commandant at the time, ―Our faculty did a Herculean job of pulling 
this together between last November and this past August, especially while still fully 
executing the previous curriculum.‖359 Additionally, because the modules were 
independent of each other, ACSC instituted a modular school calendar which allowed 
officers to enter the program in either August or January and graduate in either June or 
December. This new calendar flexibility was designed to better accommodate the 
deployment rotations of air and space expeditionary forces.360 
 Module 3 courses were called Specialized Studies as a reflection of the 
specialized functional area of each course. Eight courses were designed as functional 
                                                 
358 Interview with Dr. Jim Forsyth, September 2007. 
359 Mike Paoli, Major, USAF, ―ACSC Launches Force Development Curriculum,‖ 1, Air Education and 
Training Command News Service, November 25, 2003. 
360 Ibid. 
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area courses, and a ninth course was added called Tailored Specialized Studies, a course 
for international students. U.S. students were assigned to functional courses.   
The Specialized Studies course description for its inaugural year of AY 2004 read, 
The Specialized Studies Program provides students with career broadening 
education tailored to meet the US Air Force‘s force development goals. This 
educational opportunity covers a broad spectrum of functional areas and 
operational disciplines. Students are assigned to study areas based on the 
developmental pattern established for them by either their service, agency, or by 
an appropriate US Air Force development team. The following is a list of AY04 
specialized study areas: 
 
    Air and Space Power Employment 
    Acquisition Management 
    Space Operations 
    Political-Military Strategist 
    Agile Combat Support 
    Mobility Operations 
    Information Operations 
    Plans and Programs 
    Tailored Specialized Studies361 
 
Additional funding and faculty members were needed to execute the Module 3 
courses. Instructors for the functional area courses needed to be functional area experts; 
therefore ACSC received additional funding as well as authorization for an additional 24 
faculty members, each which was an expert in one of the functional areas, to report to 
ACSC in the summer of 2003.362 To build course content, the course directors for each 
of the 8 Specialized Studies courses coordinated closely with their functional area 
counterparts out in the greater Air Force. Course directors wanted to make sure that their 
                                                 
361 Air University Catalog, Academic Year 2003-2004, 58. 
362 PowerPoint briefing, ―Dean‘s Guidance AY 04,‖ January 9, 2003, in the personal files of Dr. Jim 
Forsyth, Slide 9. 
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course content accurately reflected current thinking and initiatives in the areas students 
would encounter in their next assignments.  
 Field trips were an integral part of each Specialized Studies course. Students in 
each Specialized Studies course took a 1-2 week field trip for a first-hand orientation in 
elements of their study area. For example, students in the Space Operations course 
toured space vehicle launch facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and 
Headquarters United States Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 
International students in the Tailored Specialized Studies course toured famous sites in 
the United States, such as New York City, to receive a fuller glimpse of American 
society.363  
 Students were vectored into one of the eight Specialized Studies courses by their 
individual assignment development teams at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), not 
by ACSC. Each course contained between 60 and 70 students, who had little to no say in 
which course they were assigned. A student‘s career field assignment team decided 
which Specialized Studies course matched the most likely career broadening assignment 
for the students in that career field, and then directed the student to that course through 
the ACSC staff.  AFPC then tracked which Specialized Studies course an officer took to 
aid in determining the officer‘s future assignments.364 Sister-service students in the 
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were assigned to a Specialized Studies course by their 
respective service representatives.  
                                                 
363 ―ACSC Launches Force Development Curriculum,‖ 3. 
364 Ibid. 
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 The inaugural Specialized Studies execution was successful, but not without 
problems. Most of the negative feedback from students pertained to the course of 
assignment process and location of field trips. Course content feedback was generally 
positive, but some students felt course content mirrored some lessons in the core 
curriculum too closely.365 The same Specialized Studies courses were again executed for 
AY 2005 and AY 2006 with minor updates to course content and field trip dynamics, but 
essentially Specialized Studies did not change. The only notable change was the 
renaming of the course Political-Military Strategist to Political-Military Affairs for AY 
2005 and renaming Specialized Studies to Developmental Studies for AY 2006 to more 
accurately reflect the intent of Force Development. 
 Developmental Studies did not survive past AY 2006. During AY 2007 
curriculum planning, Developmental Studies was eliminated from the ACSC curriculum 
due to a lack of funding. During his interview, Dr. Glen Spivey indicated that General 
Michael T. Moseley, the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force who replaced General 
Jumper in 2005, did not place as high a priority on Developmental Studies as did his 
predecessor. Thus, as the war in Iraq continued to grow more expensive and the Air 
Force budget continued to be constrained, Developmental Studies was eliminated, along 
with the authorization for additional faculty.366  
                                                 
365 PowerPoint briefing, ―AY 04 Specialized Studies End-of-Course Briefing,‖ June 14, 2004, Slide 54, in 
the personal files of Dr. Jim Forsyth. 
366 Interview with Dr. Glen Spivey, September 2007. 
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Other Curriculum Initiatives 
 In addition to ordering the inclusion of Specialized Studies into the AY 2004 
ACSC curriculum, General Jumper mandated that ACSC include a course on strategy 
and a course on air expeditionary force operations in its core curriculum. In his 
interview, Dr. Holzimmer recalled that the inclusion of the Strategy and Air 
Expeditionary Force courses taught as part of Module 1 during the AY 2004 curriculum 
was due to the wishes of General Jumper. The concept of strategy is nothing new to 
ACSC; many courses throughout the years have addressed strategy in varying contexts 
and degrees. However, General Jumper wanted an entire course devoted to the topic 
because he felt strategy was not fully understood among the officer corps. In addition, 
with the Air Force transitioning to an expeditionary culture, General Jumper wanted a 
course on Air Expeditionary Operations. Thus, ACSC rewrote 75 percent of the AY 
2003 Nature of War course to create the Strategy course and rewrote 50 percent of the 
AY 2003 Air and Space Operations course to create the Air Expeditionary Force course 
for AY 2004.367 
Regional Accreditation 
 Air University was granted authority by Congress in 1999 to confer master‘s 
degrees on graduates of ACSC and AWC. Beginning with graduates of AY 2000, ACSC 
graduates earned a Master of Military Operational Art and Science degree. Air 
University immediately began the process to seek regional accreditation of its degree-
granting authority from the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), 
                                                 
367 Interview with Dr. Kevin Holzimmer, September 2007. 
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which began a 5-year accreditation study of ACSC. The SACS accreditation team visited 
Air University and ACSC on several occasions during this time and ACSC completed a 
comprehensive self-study in 2003 as part of the accreditation effort. In June 2004, Air 
University was officially accredited by the Commission on Colleges of the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools to award associate and master‘s degrees effective at 
the beginning of the 2004 calendar year.368 Thus, ACSC graduates, beginning with the 
class of AY 2004, now received regionally accredited Master of Military Operational Art 
and Science degrees. Likewise, Air War College graduates received accredited Master of 
Strategic Studies degrees.  
The Fullhart Era 
 Brigadier General Randall W. Fullhart served as Commandant of ACSC from 
October 2004 to June 2006. General Fullhart brought with him to ACSC a firm belief in 
critical thinking, leadership and management principles and a strong desire to make 
these principles a central part of the ACSC curriculum. In addition, Fullhart strongly 
believed in the professional development of the faculty and sought opportunities to 
immerse faculty members in various training and development programs. Because he 
arrived in October 2004, Brigadier General Fullhart inherited the AY 2005 curriculum 
already in progress (Figure 12). Thus, he was not able to institute his own curricular 
ideas until the start of AY 2006. However, Fullhart immediately began to inject his ideas 
                                                 
368 Air University Catalog: Academic Year 2004-2005. 
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into the curriculum planning effort for AY 2006 as well as institute his own faculty 
development and training ideas after he arrived.369 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  ACSC AY 2005 Curriculum. 
Source:  PowerPoint Briefing, ―AY 05 Curriculum,‖ July 12, 2004, slide 4 in the 
personal files of Dr. Jim Forsyth, Department Chair for Department of Leadership, 
Command, and Communication Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL.  
 
 
                                                 
369 Personal experience and observations of the author as a member of the ACSC faculty during the first 9 
months of Brigadier General Fullhart‘s tenure as Commandant. 
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One of Brigadier General Fullhart‘s first acts as Commandant was to change the 
ACSC mission statement. When he arrived, the mission statement read, 
 A world-class team educating mid-career officers to lead in developing, 
 employing, commanding, and supporting air and space power across the 
 spectrum of service, joint, and combined operations.370 
 
Fullhart believed ACSC should articulate not only its mission, but also its vision for the 
future. Subsequently, he created an official ACSC vision statement to accompany its 
mission statement. Fullhart also believed ACSC had a mission to its students and a 
separate mission to its faculty. Therefore, he split the ACSC mission statement into an 
area addressing students and an area addressing faculty, and incorporated a vision 
statement, both of which clearly reflect Fullhart‘s emphasis on leadership and 
developing critical thinking skills: 
 ACSC Mission: 
 To our Students… 
 Inspire critically thinking Airmen to lead Air & Space forces in Joint/Combined 
 operations. 
 To our faculty and staff… 
 Provide an intellectually stimulating environment that attracts, develops, and 
 rewards the finest team of educator-leaders possible. 
 
 ACSC Vision: 
 
 To forge relationships with mid-career officers and civilians that promote… 
 …life-long learning, 
 …sustained military education, 
 …and continuing professional development.371 
 
                                                 
370 Air University Catalog: Academic Year 2004-2005, 51, in the Muir S. Fairchild Research Information 
Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 
371 Air Command and Staff College Curriculum Plan for the Academic Year 2005-2006, 6, in the official 
files of the Office of the Dean of Education and Curriculum, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell 
Air Force Base, AL. 
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 Fullhart injected formal Commandant Guidance into the ACSC Curriculum Plan 
for AY 2006 in which he articulated the emphasis areas and issues he wanted addressed 
during AY 2006 (Figure 13). He established the theme for his tenure as ―Developing 
Instructor-Leaders and Thinkers.‖372 To thus guide ACSC, Fullhart established three 
Areas of Emphasis: Critical Thinking, Leadership, and Expanded Educational 
Opportunities, and four Issues: Forging Relationships to Maintain Currency and 
Relevance, Promoting an Expeditionary Mindset, Faculty Manning and Development, 
and Facility Modernization and Expansion.373 
In addition to his own ideas, Brigadier General Fullhart was careful to include 
external guidance laid out in the Continuum of Education and Strategic Guidance. For 
AY 2006, the CESG had new guidance in several areas from senior leaders to support 
the core CESG learning areas. The new guidance included emphasizing cultural 
awareness of coalition allies and enemies, understanding the evolving role of special 
 
 
 
                                                 
372 Ibid, 9. 
373 Ibid, 10. 
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Figure 13.  ACSC AY 2006 Curriculum. 
Source:  PowerPoint Briefing, ―ACSC Program Review,‖ April 2005, Slide 15, in the 
official files of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.  
 
  
operations forces, understanding of the role of space in the future of national 
security, and stressing the areas graduates will be working in during the next five years 
of their careers.374 Each of these areas was covered by lessons interspersed throughout 
the curriculum.   
 Brigadier General Fullhart‘s own curricular ideas were primarily thrust into the 
formal Leadership courses, the Practice of Command course, and Research courses. 
However, Fullhart emphasized several unifying themes across all the teaching 
departments and courses: Leading Airmen, Thinking Critically; The Importance of 
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Context; Operational Art; Joint and Service Doctrine; Transformation and the Future; 
and Lifelong Professional Development.375 The Art of Military Leadership I focused on 
leader development and leader-follower interaction; The Art of Military Leadership II 
focused on how that leader-follower interaction ensures mission accomplishment. The 
Practice of Command course was designed to further enhance a student‘s understanding 
of leadership principles by stressing the importance of developing the mindset of a 
commander appropriate for an expeditionary force. Critical research and analysis was 
stressed in the Research courses. Students were required to enroll in one of a number of 
research seminars that complemented the ACSC core curriculum. Each student was 
required to produce a scholarly research paper under the direction of a subject matter 
expert.376 Fullhart believed that leadership, command, and critical thinking were the glue 
that held the entire curriculum together, as depicted in a graphic he personally built 
(Figure 14) to represent his vision. 
 
 
                                                 
375 Air University Catalog: Academic Year 2005-2006.  
376 Ibid. 
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Figure 14.  Brigadier General Fullhart‘s Curriculum Vision 
Source:  PowerPoint Briefing, ―ACSC Program Review,‖ April 2005, Slide 6, in the 
official files of the Office of the Dean of Education and Curriculum, Air Command and 
Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.  
 
 
Additional curricular initiatives during Brigadier General Fullhart‘s tenure 
included a new Homeland Defense Exercise called Silent Fury and a joint exercise with 
students from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Silent Fury 
contained multiple scenarios that involved coordination with regional mayors and 
various state emergency management offices. The joint exercise with the Army 
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a Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) with senior mentor 
involvement from the Air Force and Army.377   
 Brigadier General Fullhart took a special interest in exposing faculty members to 
formal leadership and management lessons. One example is during the Christmas 2004 
season; Fullhart assembled the entire faculty body in the ACSC auditorium and showed 
the 1946 movie It’s a Wonderful Life. At the end of the movie, he played a video of 
Frances Hesselbein, former CEO of The Girl Scouts of the USA and Founding President 
of the Drucker Foundation, discussing the leadership traits of the movie‘s main 
character, George Bailey, played by Jimmy Stewart. Brigadier General Fullhart then 
provided closing comments before dismissing the faculty. Days later, Fullhart personally 
delivered to each faculty member a copy of the book, Hesselbein on Leadership, by 
Frances Hesselbein. In the front of the book, Fullhart had written, ―Small book…Big 
ideas!‖378 Fullhart had only been Commandant for approximately 6 weeks, and his 
actions were a clear signal of what the faculty could expect. 
 Brigadier General Fullhart utilized several initiatives to develop the faculty into 
Instructor-Leaders. One of the most significant efforts Fullhart introduced to develop 
Instructor-Leaders was sending faculty members to civilian leadership training 
programs. Within the first eight months of Fullhart‘s tenure, he had sent 12 faculty 
members to the Goldratt Institute for training in critical thinking, where they learned 
―core problem identification, conflict resolution, and solution generation and 
                                                 
377 Ibid, Slides 10-11.   
378 Personal experience and observation of the author. 
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implementation.‖379 Fullhart‘s intent was for the faculty to return to ACSC and 
incorporate such training into seminar instruction. Fullhart also approved 7 civilian 
faculty members up to 90-days of research leave each in order to begin or complete 
personal research projects in their field of specialization. In addition, Brigadier General 
Fullhart encouraged and often funded faculty members to attend and or present papers at 
professional conferences in their area of specialization.380 Fullhart believed so strongly 
in the formal principles of leadership that he selected a military member of the faculty in 
2005 to pursue a Ph.D. in Leadership as part of ACSC‘s Advanced Academic Degree 
Program. This is significant because out of a total of 40 military faculty members 
selected for the program since its 1995 inception, this was the first and only time that 
Leadership has been chosen as the academic discipline for a Ph.D. candidate.381 
 Brigadier General Fullhart was a controversial Commandant. Few faculty 
members fully embraced his leadership-centric curriculum or faculty development 
initiatives. In fact, Fullhart had a tenuous relationship with many members of the faculty 
for much of his tenure. Some seasoned civilian faculty members even left ACSC out of 
frustration with Fullhart‘s initiatives.382 One faculty member, who wished to remain 
anonymous, made some scathing comments in reference to what Brigadier General 
Fullhart was doing at ACSC and are worth quoting at length. Although these are the 
comments of a single faculty member, they illustrate the tension that characterized 
Fullhart‘s relationship with the faculty: 
                                                 
379 ―ACSC Program Review,‖ Slide 36. 
380 Ibid, Slide 37. 
381 ―ACSC Program Review,‖ Slide 35. 
382 Personal experience and observation of the author. 
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 In the past year, the ideas about leadership presented at ACSC have taken the 
 form of inspirational talks more suited to the pulpit than to the lectern and at a 
 level of discourse more appropriate to senior airmen than to officers and civilian 
 academics. These ideas are juvenile simplisms offered up as irrefutable truths 
 which may be discussed and examined but which are also, by definition, dogmas 
 and therefore not subject to rational disproof. Under such conditions, is it really 
 leadership that we are talking about? Or is it that the study of leadership, more 
 than any other subject, simply lends itself to the pretensions of guruship? 
 The growth we should be interested in at ACSC is intellectual. It is not an issue 
 which required additional leadership programs based on pseudo-scientific 
 methodological or theoretical assumptions. Any subject of study in our 
 curriculum, if properly designed and  taught well by qualified academics, can 
 ‗grow‘ people by providing them, within the limits of their individual intellectual 
 capacity, and opportunity to think critically, to define problems, to bring these 
 problems to resolution, to convince others of the value of analysis and to 
 encourage them to follow a specified course of action. That is a worthy target to 
 aim for. And we have already worked out its vector. There is nothing, other than 
 the speciousness of what our superiors deign to call leadership studies, which 
 should keep us from executing this mission.383 
 
During his interview, Mr. Budd Jones was asked if any Commandants stand out as being 
as radical as John Warden, to which he replied,  
 Perhaps the one that tried to make the biggest change was the one that just left 
 [Brigadier General Fullhart], who to be honest with you, put a great deal of 
 management theory into the curriculum, over by the way, the objections of some 
 of the faculty who felt that was too much. Indeed, it needed to be scaled back a 
 bit. Now, General Fullhart was also a big believer in engaging ACSC with the 
 larger Air Force population. He started the squadron commander‘s on-line page 
 that they can go to. He was a big supporter of accrediting non-resident master‘s 
 degrees and stuff like that. From a perspective, he was probably the second-most 
 active Commandant in that arena behind Warden. Many of the other 
 Commandants were more of a ‗keep an even keel‘ person.384 
 
 Brigadier General Jay H. Lindell replaced Brigadier General Fullhart as 
Commandant in June 2006 and began to scale back the leadership and management 
                                                 
383 Comments from a faculty member who wished to remain anonymous, 2008. 
384 Interview with Mr. Budd Jones, September 2007. 
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emphasis Fullhart instituted. Dr. Forsyth recalled, ―We are in the process of trying to 
stay true to that [Fullhart‘s leadership emphasis], but at the same time, change the 
curriculum back to make it a little bit more executable.‖385 One of the changes made to 
scale back Fullhart‘s emphasis was to the ACSC mission statement, which did not 
survive after Fullhart‘s departure. The new ACSC mission statement read, ―Prepare 
field-grade officers to develop, employ, and command air, space and cyberspace power 
in joint, combined and multinational operations.‖386 The growing importance to the U.S. 
military of the potential of cyberspace as a virtual battlefield and operating alongside 
partners from other nations, as shown in the experience of the U.S. military during the 
Global War on Terror, is reflected in this new mission statement for ACSC.  
 Brigadier General Fullhart‘s curricular and faculty development initiatives did 
not survive after he departed. ACSC‘s curricular emphasis on leadership and critical 
thinking soon went back to levels seen in the years prior to Fullhart‘s arrival, and the 
emphasis on leadership training for the faculty was greatly reduced or eliminated. The 
tenure of Brigadier General Fullhart as ACSC Commandant vividly illustrates not only 
the enormous power to influence curriculum that lies with the office of the 
Commandant, but also how fleeting a Commandant‘s curricular emphasis can be when a 
new Commandant assumes command of ACSC.     
                                                 
385 Interview with Dr. Jim Forsyth, September 2007. 
386 ACSC Home Page, accessed on August 1, 2008. 
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Summary 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the outlook for a lot of 
Americans and people around the world. The date marks the deadliest terrorist attacks on 
U.S. soil in history; the date also marks a turning point in Professional Military 
Education. After September 11, 2001, the curriculum at ACSC did not immediately or 
significantly change. Rather, the curriculum has evolved in the years since 9-11-01 as 
the Global War on Terror has progressed and as Air Force leadership has changed.  
 In the early days after 9-11-01, the curriculum modifications originated with the 
faculty who recognized the need to inject discussions about terrorism and radical Islam 
into appropriate lessons. As time progressed, Air Force leadership forced top-down 
curricular changes to the ACSC program. The Force Development initiative forced 
ACSC to transition to a modular curriculum structure and include a block of instruction 
called Specialized Studies, which took an extraordinary effort from the faculty to be 
ready for AY 2004, but was successfully accomplished. Specialized Studies ran for three 
years, was renamed Developmental Studies, and then was cancelled due to lack of 
funding. In reality, Developmental Studies was cancelled because the initiative was not 
the same priority for the new Air Force Chief of Staff as it had been for the previous 
Chief of Staff. Developmental Studies is a good example of how curricular influence 
from top Air Force leadership comes and goes as the leadership changes. 
 Another significant era of change at ACSC after 9-11-01 was during the tenure of 
Brigadier General Randall Fullhart. Brigadier General Fullhart‘s legacy at ACSC is 
mixed. On one hand, Fullhart was a Conscientious Commandant who took his role as the 
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leader of ACSC very seriously and worked hard to instill in the students the skills and 
knowledge he believed were critical for officers to possess. In addition, Fullhart 
instituted aggressive faculty development programs he felt would keep faculty members 
relevant in the classroom, abreast of current military operations and intellectually 
stimulated and growing. It was becoming increasingly important for faculty members to 
have recent operational experience in light of the fact a growing number of students 
attending ACSC had recent experience in Afghanistan or Iraq. Faculty with recent 
operational experience, especially in either Afghanistan or Iraq had more credibility in 
the eyes of the students than faculty who did not.  
 Moreover, Fullhart engaged ACSC with the wider Air Force and civilian 
institutions, and made significant improvements and upgrades to ACSC facilities and 
technological infrastructure. On the other hand, Fullhart was a controversial 
Commandant. He forced unpopular curricular changes and implemented even more 
unpopular faculty training, quite often against the pointed feedback of seasoned faculty 
members. Before Fullhart left ACSC, several seasoned civilian faculty members simply 
left ACSC out of frustration. Therefore, in a sense, Fullhart could be compared with 
John Warden in that both Commandants came to ACSC and made their presence felt 
immediately through significant changes. However, it is telling that many of Warden‘s 
initiatives survived beyond his tenure, while those of Fullhart‘s did not.    
 Secretary Wynne and General Moseley‘s rationale behind including language 
and cultural studies at ACSC was for PME to maintain relevance to the realities of the 
evolving Global War on Terror. Language skills and a keener cultural understanding of 
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geographical areas such as the Middle East are considered essential war fighting skills 
for future U.S. military operations. Thus, as the U.S. continues to engage in operations to 
defeat terrorism, PME continues to be an area of emphasis and refinement for senior 
leaders seeking ways to provide officers with the necessary skills to fight and win the 
nation‘s wars. 
 In the first 5 years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, ACSC witnessed some 
radical changes to its curriculum and structure. Changes in Air Force and ACSC 
leadership resulted in significant changes; but as leadership changed, so did the changes 
they had instituted. However, ACSC has survived as a regionally-accredited degree-
granting institution with a rigorous curriculum and inherent flexibility that is able to 
respond to internal or external guidance.       
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CHAPTER VIII 
 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary 
 This study explored the evolution of the Air Command and Staff College 
curriculum from 1990 to 2006. Specifically, this study answered a central question and 
three supporting research questions: how the ACSC curriculum evolved since 1990; 
what influences drove curricular changes; how were influences manifested in the 
curriculum; and what factors enhanced or impeded the changes were explored. 
Following a brief synopsis of the role of technology in the time period under study, this 
chapter will discuss how each of the study‘s research questions was answered.  
 This study was designed as a historical research study utilizing qualitative 
research methods to gather data. Datum was gathered through personal interviews with 
past and present members of Air Command and Staff College who served in or is 
currently serving in key positions and review of historical documents related to ACSC 
and its curriculum. Three key findings were produced from this study‘s research: The 
ACSC curriculum was continually in flux; both internal and external influences drove 
curricular change, but the most significant curriculum changes originated with 
individuals in positions of authority; and few curricular changes lasted. These findings 
led to the following conclusion: Air Command and Staff College will not have curricular 
stability as long as its dominant curricular influence remains senior officers who serve 
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only one or two years as leaders of Professional Military Education and are free to make 
unilateral curricular decision as they see fit.  
   During the time period under study, the ACSC curriculum changed continually. 
At no time in the sixteen year study period did the curriculum remain exactly the same 
from one academic year to the next. The ACSC curriculum for each academic year is 
built in line with the influences that act upon the curriculum. The study revealed that 
ACSC‘s curriculum is subject to both internal and external influences. The most 
significant curriculum changes were instituted by Air Force leaders, primarily the Air 
Force Chief of Staff and the ACSC Commandant, who came into their positions with 
strong ideas on what ACSC should teach its students.  
Although at times it appeared the curriculum had briefly stabilized because the 
courses offered did not change, in name, from one year to the next, a closer examination 
of the curriculum revealed that changes still occurred. Usually these changes were 
through an increase or decrease in contact hours for a particular course, which indicated 
an emphasis or de-emphasis of that course in the overall curriculum from the previous 
year. Or, such changes as the injection of new lessons such as case studies on recent 
world events to illustrate course content were made. Furthermore, many curricular 
changes at ACSC did not last long after their implementation. Often, new leadership 
arrived and scrapped large parts of the curriculum they inherited in favor of instilling 
their own curricular ideas.   
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Research Question 1 
 The first research question in this study is, ―What were the external and internal 
influences on the curriculum?‖ This study revealed that internal influences were those 
that fell within the confines of the ACSC organization itself, primarily the curricular 
influence of the Commandant and faculty. External influences included the Skelton 
Report, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force Chief of 
Staff, the Air University Commander and world events.  
 The Skelton Report was a significant curricular influence. As a result of this 
report, joint education requirements were dictated to each military education school 
within the Department of Defense by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Every 
five years, each PME institution undergoes an inspection by the Joint Staff of its joint 
education curriculum to ensure it adheres to the joint education requirements established 
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This inspection is called the Process of 
Accreditation for Joint Education (PAJE). If ACSC passes its PAJE inspection every 
five years, ACSC is then accredited by the Joint Staff to award Phase I joint education 
certification to its graduates. Phase II joint education is then accomplished at the Joint 
Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Once an officer has Phase I and Phase II joint 
education accomplished, that officer can apply for Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) status. 
The Skelton Report recommended that the Department of Defense establish Joint 
Specialty Officers, those officers trained and educated to excel in leading U.S. forces in 
joint operations, to serve in high-level military positions. 
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 In addition to joint education requirements, the Skelton Report was the genesis of 
ACSC‘s effort to increase the number of civilian faculty with doctoral degrees and 
increase the rigor of its academic program. ACSC was sharply criticized by the Skelton 
Report for its lack of academic rigor and the quality of its faculty. ACSC responded with 
new efforts to enhance its status by complying with the Report‘s recommendations. 
Overall, the Skelton Report made 31 recommendations applicable to ACSC, 30 of which 
were complied with. The lone recommendation of the Skelton Report not implemented 
by ACSC dealt with issuing officer efficiency reports to students upon graduation; 
ACSC issues training reports to its graduates and determined that issuing officer 
efficiency reports would not add any value. Therefore, that recommendation was not 
implemented. 
 The Department of Defense and Joint Chief of Staff were also external curricular 
influences. The study revealed that the Department of Defense generally left 
Professional Military Education to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who 
codified PME policy in its publication, Officer Professional Military Education Policy 
(OPMEP). The OPMEP establishes the criteria for joint education accreditation. Beyond 
joint education, the OPMEP leaves curriculum up to the individual schools to determine. 
However, the Department of Defense did directly influence curriculum at ACSC after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The DoD dictated that ACSC offer language 
training and regional cultural instruction, beginning with AY 2007, based on lessons 
learned from U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Otherwise, the Department of 
Defense was not a significant, direct curricular influence.  
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     The Air Force Chief of Staff position was a significant external curricular 
influence for ACSC. General John Jumper became Air Force Chief of Staff in 2002 and 
instituted the largest change in curricular content at ACSC since the arrival of Colonel 
John Warden as ACSC Commandant in 1992. General Jumper instituted a Force 
Development initiative in which he revamped the way the Air Force assigns and 
manages career development of its officers. As part of Force Development, General 
Jumper ordered ACSC to include new functional training courses called Specialized 
Studies in its curriculum beginning in AY 2004. Specialized studies consisted of 9 
courses designed to familiarize officers with specific career field functional areas and 
became 50% of the ACSC curriculum in AY 2004.  
 Specialized Studies was executed in Academic Years 2004-2006, but was 
eliminated from the ACSC curriculum after AY 2006. General Michael Moseley, the Air 
Force Chief of Staff who replaced General Jumper, eliminated Specialized Studies in its 
entirety because of budgetary constraints and the fact he did not view Specialized 
Studies with the same priority as General Jumper had. The case of Specialized Studies 
represents a clear example of how the ACSC curriculum is in continual flux as it 
responds to the dictates of individual leaders. General Jumper dictated Specialized 
Studies be added; General Moseley dictated Specialized Studies be eliminated.    
 The Air University Commander, as the direct supervisor of the ACSC 
Commandant, is in a direct position to influence curriculum at ACSC. No evidence was 
found that the officers who served as Air University Commander during the study‘s time 
period micro-managed the curriculum of Air University schools. Air University 
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Commanders monitored the ACSC curriculum for compliance with directives from the 
Chief of Staff or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but otherwise allowed the ACSC 
Commandants to manage their own curriculum. The only instance of direct curricular 
influence originating with the Air University Commander was the creation of the Air 
University Continuum of Education and Strategic Guidance in 1999.  
 Lieutenant General Joseph Redden, Air University Commander in 1999, directed 
the creation of the Air University Continuum of Education and Strategic Guidance to 
integrate curriculum implementation across all Air University schools and to ensure an 
officer received the appropriate military education at the appropriate stage of his or her 
career. All Air University schools were required to include 5 core subject areas in their 
curriculum: Profession of Arms, Military Studies, International Security Studies, 
Communications Studies, and Leadership and Management Studies. The ACSC 
Commandant briefed the Air University Commander each spring on the ACSC 
curriculum content and rationale for the coming academic year which gave the Air 
University Commander the opportunity to ensure the Continuum of Education 
requirements were included. 
 World events were also an external influence on the ACSC curriculum. 
Throughout the post-Cold War period covered by this study, U.S. military forces were 
involved in various operations around the world, including operations in Iraq (1991 and 
again beginning in 2003), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Kosovo (1998), and 
Afghanistan (beginning in 2001). In addition, terrorist attacks such as the bombings of 
the U.S. military barracks at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia (1996), the bombings of the 
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U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), the attack on the USS Cole Navy ship in 
Yemen (2000), the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, and military action in Afghanistan beginning in October, 2001 were significant 
world events for the U.S.  
 Most world events typically became part of the ACSC curriculum in the form of 
individual lessons incorporated in various parts of the core existing core curriculum, and 
did not typically become part of the curriculum immediately after their occurrence. 
Faculty did discuss these events as they occurred in seminar with students because they 
were current events with military significance. However, formal curricular lessons that 
explored these world events for their military significance and lessons learned were not 
included as individual case studies, lectures, or seminar discussions in core curriculum 
courses until the academic year or years following the occurrence of the event. The 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, however, had a deeper and more far-reaching 
curricular impact than other world events.  
 The September 11, 2001 attacks were the catalyst for significant change to the 
ACSC curriculum. National security issues such as terrorism, failed states, globalization, 
radical Islamism, wars of religion and ideology were incorporated and each included 
discussions on the 9-11 attacks. In addition, as experiences and lessons learned from 
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were published, ACSC faculty used this 
knowledge to create new lessons within core curriculum courses to illustrate ideas and 
concepts. Finally, language and cultural studies were directed to be taught at ACSC 
beginning in AY 2007 based on the experience of U.S. forces in the Global War on 
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Terror which began after September 11, 2001. At the time this study ended, ACSC 
faculty were still focused on keeping the curriculum relevant to the post-September 11, 
2001 international security environment.  
 Internal curricular influences were the ACSC Commandant and the faculty. 
ACSC Commandants during this study period can be classified as reformers or 
managers. Reformers are those Commandants who significantly altered the curricular 
content or structure of ACSC, while managers are those Commandants that may have 
initiated smaller-scale changes, but mostly kept the curriculum intact during their tenure 
as Commandant. Two Commandants stand out as reformers: Colonel John A. Warden III 
and Brigadier General Randall W. Fullhart. The rest of the Commandants from this 
period were managers.      
 Colonel John A. Warden became Commandant in 1992 and held the position for 
3 years, the longest tenure of any Commandant during this time period. Warden‘s 
changes were so far-reaching his tenure is known as the ―Warden Revolution‖.  
Warden‘s changes went beyond simple curricular content; he altered the organizational 
structure of ACSC and how curriculum was delivered. Although he arrived at ACSC 
with an unofficial mandate to change ACSC, the changes Warden made were his own 
ideas. Warden recognized the changing international security context of the post-Cold 
War era, and brought the ACSC curriculum in line with his vision of the new security 
environment. 
 Warden‘s curricular content changes included building the core curriculum 
around an Air Campaign Course which incorporated the problem-solving methodology 
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of an operational-level theater campaign. His organizational change included combining 
separate curriculum development and classroom instruction entities into a single 
directorate, because Warden believed those who delivered curriculum should have a 
hand in its development. Warden‘s instructional change included moving the curriculum 
from heavily lecture-based to heavily seminar-based, restructuring the student academic 
day to allow time for reading, study and reflection, incorporating a rigorous required 
reading program for students, and accelerating the hiring of civilian faculty with doctoral 
degrees. Most of these changes were accomplished in the first year of his tenure, a pace 
of change not equaled by any other Commandant during this period. Warden spent the 
last two years of his tenure refining his initiatives.      
 Brigadier General Randall W. Fullhart served as Commandant for only 18 
months, between October 2004 and April 2006, and like Warden, made significant 
changes to the ACSC curriculum. Fullhart‘s changes were not made in the background 
of a changed security context as were Warden‘s changes. Fullhart could have sharply 
focused the curriculum toward the lessons that were beginning to come out of the Iraq 
and Afghanistan campaigns during his tenure, but he did not. Instead, Fullhart believed 
the curriculum needed a more managerial focus. 
 Fullhart was a staunch believer in formal leadership and management principles 
and critical thinking skills. Thus, he insisted these concepts be the central focus of the 
ACSC curriculum, against the advice of a lot of his faculty. Fullhart completely re-wrote 
the ACSC mission statement to reflect his emphasis on leadership, management, and 
critical thinking, and developed an in-depth faculty training program he designed to 
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create ―Instructor-Leaders and Thinkers.‖ Fullhart‘s curriculum still addressed the 
required areas of the Air University Continuum of Education and joint education 
requirements; however, Leadership courses and Research practices were more heavily 
emphasized than in previous years. Brigadier General Fullhart‘s curricular focus did not 
survive his tenure. Within one year of his departure, the heavy emphasis on formal 
leadership and management was eliminated. Fullhart‘s successors did not share his 
curricular vision and thus, eliminated it.  
The significant curricular changes instituted by Warden and Fullhart did not last. 
Warden‘s curriculum remained longer than Fullhart‘s did, most likely due to the focus of 
Warden‘s curriculum resembling the traditional ACSC focus of employing airpower at 
the operational level of war more closely than Fullhart‘s curriculum focused on Servant 
Leadership. Both Warden and Fullhart were firm believers that the ACSC curriculum 
they inherited was not sufficient, and so they changed it to fit their personal curricular 
vision, as was their prerogative as Commandant. Commandants should retain the 
authority to make changes to the ACSC curriculum, just as any military commander 
should retain the authority to change and lead their organization as they see fit within 
guidelines set by the chain of command. However, this authority, combined with short 
tenure as Commandant, opens the door for significant curricular instability. The 
examples of Warden and Fullhart illustrate how the ACSC curriculum is at the mercy of 
those in positions of authority over ACSC.  
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Research Question 2 
 The second research question for this study is, ―How were external and internal 
influences manifested in the curriculum?‖ This study revealed that external and internal 
influences were manifested in the ACSC curriculum via small or larger-scale changes. 
Small scale changes included adding new or eliminating existing lectures and individual 
lessons within a core curriculum course, individual seminar discussions, or adding or 
deleting special readings. Larger scale changes included incorporating entire new 
courses within the core curriculum, changing the core content of an existing course, or 
adding a new elective course on a particular subject or area of emphasis.  
 Before external and internal curricular input is formally manifested in the ACSC 
curriculum, proposed changes are first vetted through ACSC‘s Educational Program 
Committee (EPC). The EPC is the governing body within ACSC with responsibility for 
the curriculum content. It is the EPC that takes the curriculum changes driven by 
external and internal influences and ensures the curriculum reflects the necessary small 
or large-scale changes for the next available academic year. The EPC recommends 
curriculum content to the Commandant, who makes the final decision on what is taught 
at ACSC, unless of course, the Commandant is directed by higher authority to include 
particular curriculum content.  
The aforementioned process is illustrated through ACSC‘s formal feedback 
system. ACSC students can comment on the curriculum they receive and faculty can 
comment on the curriculum they are required to deliver. Students and faculty can 
comment upon each individual lesson within a course, each course, and their overall 
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experience at ACSC during the academic year. Upon completion of each individual 
lesson, students are afforded the opportunity to electronically submit feedback on the 
particular lesson they just received, and faculty can comment on how well the lesson 
went from their perspective. All lectures and seminar lessons are cyber-linked to a form 
where students and faculty submit formal feedback. Likewise, at the completion of each 
course, students and faculty are asked to electronically provide End-of-Course (EOC) 
feedback.  
The formal feedback system is built with metrics. Students are asked to rate 
various areas of individual lessons and courses on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 is strongly 
disagree and 6 is strongly agree. Students and faculty can also comment on how well 
they believe the individual lessons and overall course achieved their stated educational 
objectives, and offer any suggested improvements. Finally, at the end of the academic 
year, all students and faculty are asked to provide feedback encompassing their entire 
ACSC experience during the academic year.  
Most often, formal student feedback comments center on their perceptions of 
how well the curriculum was delivered as opposed to curricular content. For example, 
suggestions for updating lesson support readings, bringing in different guest speakers, or 
shortening/extending the length of a particular lecture or seminar are typical of student 
feedback.  
   Beyond the formal feedback process, ACSC students are encouraged to 
informally talk with faculty members about aspects of the curriculum they feel should be 
changed. Students can also seek conversations with faculty to provide constructive 
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criticism of the curriculum or simply have a deeper conversation about a particular 
curricular subject area. Regardless of motivation, students have the opportunity to talk 
about the curriculum face-to-face with faculty as well as provide formal feedback. 
 Student and faculty feedback is collected and becomes part of ACSC‘s formal 
EOC-Curriculum Development-EPC process. After each course is delivered, an EOC 
meeting is held where the current course team briefs the Dean of Academic Affairs and 
the course team for the following academic year on various aspects of the just-completed 
course, including faculty observations and student feedback. The new course team then 
develops course curriculum for the next academic year and briefs their proposed course 
to the ACSC EPC, who approves the course as proposed or suggests changes. The 
course team briefs the EPC members on how student and faculty feedback briefed at the 
EOC meeting will be incorporated in the course or how the feedback is not valid or 
applicable to the course.  
Research Question 3 
 The final research question for this study is, ―What factors facilitate or impede 
curricular change relative to external and internal influences?‖ This study revealed that 
the ACSC curriculum is responsive to both external and internal influences. Curricular 
change was facilitated by the ACSC faculty and the fact ACSC is a military 
organization. Significant curricular changes, particularly during the Warden and Fullhart 
years, were resisted by some of the ACSC faculty, but the changes were instituted 
nonetheless. The fact that ACSC is a military organization, and therefore, is subject to 
orders from the ACSC Commandant and higher ranking personnel outside ACSC in its 
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chain-of-command, is the primary reason the ACSC curriculum experienced so much 
change.  
Although Professional Military Education curriculum can be, and often is, 
dictated by direct order, the ACSC faculty can also facilitate or impede curricular 
change. The ACSC faculty is on the front line of curriculum delivery. If the faculty 
agrees with new curriculum changes, the faculty can make the transition to the new 
curriculum smooth. However, if the faculty disagrees with the new changes, the faculty 
can make incorporating the new changes problematic. The ACSC faculty cannot refuse 
an order to deliver a particular curriculum; however, once the seminar door closes, 
faculty is alone with the students, and can present the curriculum in whatever context 
they choose. Thus, faculty can present the curriculum in a light favorable or unfavorable 
to leadership, depending on how the faculty views the changes.   
Technological Influence 
 Although not covered in the chapters, emerging technology enabled new and 
innovative curriculum delivery methods, but had no significant impact on curriculum 
content. Colonel John Warden, ACSC Commandant from 1992 to 1995, is the first 
commandant to make incorporating emerging technology across all facets of ACSC a 
top priority. Under Warden‘s leadership, ACSC faculty utilized emerging, state-of-the-
art computer technology to create robust war games and exercises, and to create lesson 
presentation aids. ACSC students had participated in war games and exercises prior to 
the availability of computer technology; however, computer technology enabled ACSC 
to create more challenging and life-like scenarios for students to resolve. Computers 
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were programmed to allow students to formulate and execute a plan of action, inject 
realistic problems into the action, simulate enemy actions, and compute success and 
failure scores. In addition, faculty used computers to create lesson aids such as maps, 
graphs, and video which were then used in class to demonstrate points and generally 
enhance delivery of curriculum content. Curriculum content did not change as a result of 
bringing new technology on board at ACSC; technology simply enhanced the delivery of 
ACSC curriculum.      
 Technology, however, does have a role in ACSC curriculum content. Rapid 
technological advancements in modern weaponry, communications, and information 
technology after the end of the Cold War contributed significantly to the changing nature 
of the international security environment. As the U.S. began facing adversaries very 
adept at utilizing existing technology in unconventional ways, new ways of thinking 
about the conduct of military operations became necessary. Professional Military 
Education necessarily incorporates elements of this new thinking into its curriculum to 
remain relevant. In this way, technology does, in fact, influence curriculum at ACSC.  
Theoretical Influence 
During the period of this study, no formal curriculum theory or adult learning 
theory was consciously injected into the formulation of the ACSC curriculum. Nor does 
ACSC consciously attempt to keep up with trends in curriculum or adult learning theory 
development. The curriculum that was developed, approved, and taught each academic 
year was developed in the absence of a conscious effort to use or adhere to a particular 
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theory of curriculum or adult learning. However, the ACSC curriculum most resembles 
core curriculum theory and Andragogy.  
 Core curriculum theory presupposes that there is a single, uniform body of 
knowledge that all students should know and this curriculum will produce graduates well 
positioned to serve their community. In core curriculum, a mandated, pre-defined 
curriculum is designed outside the classroom and students all learn a common set of 
knowledge and skills. Instruction in this curriculum theory revolves around imparting 
this pre-determined body of knowledge to the students. Although instruction in a core 
curriculum can tend toward teaching a single ―correct‖ answer, critical thinking, problem 
solving, and team learning are not precluded. In fact, ACSC goes to great lengths to 
inject academic rigor, or the promoting of student ability to critically evaluate and 
synthesize the content under study, into its core curriculum and teach its faculty to 
stimulate mental inquiry amongst the students rather than passively transmit the required 
course content.  
 The ACSC curriculum is built as a core curriculum. Subject material that is 
deemed necessary for field grade military officers attending ACSC to know in order to 
become the future military leaders of the United States is codified as the ACSC 
curriculum for a given academic year. This subject material can, and usually does, 
change quite often at ACSC. Although ACSC‘s Educational Program Committee molds 
and shapes the individual courses and lessons that make up the annual ACSC 
curriculum, the subjects and knowledge areas that will be taught are downward directed 
to ACSC‘s Educational Program Committee from the ACSC Commandant or from areas 
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outside of ACSC.  In theory, every graduate of ACSC is poised for success as a military 
leader in the defense community because each ACSC student received the same 
education.  
 In addition, ACSC designs its educational program around adult learning theory. 
This seems intuitive, given the fact that the students attending ACSC are military 
officers with 12-14 years of service and are in their mid to late 30s in age. Although its 
students are all adults, ACSC does not consciously subscribe to a particular adult 
learning theory or make efforts to keep up with trends in adult education. However, the 
ACSC curriculum mirrors behaviorist learning theory, an integrated framework of adult 
learning. Behaviorist learning theory emphasizes observable behavior as well as 
identification of the skills needed to perform in an occupation, teaching those skills, and 
requiring a certain standard of performance in the practice of those skills. The ACSC 
curriculum is based on the skills that mid-career officers need to have in order to fight 
and win the nation‘s wars. ACSC instructors teach those skills and officers are held 
accountable for their performance when practicing the skills they learn at ACSC. 
Furthermore, the ACSC curriculum mirrors the foundation for adult learning 
Eduard Lindeman first laid out in the 1920s and Malcolm Knowles‘s Andragogy 
assumptions. Lindeman stated that the setting for adult education was: 
Small groups of aspiring adults who desire to keep their minds fresh and  
vigorous, who begin to learn by confronting pertinent situations, who dig down 
into the reservoirs of their experience before resorting to texts and secondary 
facts, who are led in the discussion by teachers who are also searchers after 
wisdom and not oracles: this constitutes the setting for adult education.387 
 
                                                 
387 Lindeman, 1926, 10-11. 
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Lindeman wrote that in adult education, student experience counts just as much as 
teacher knowledge and that the role of the teacher is to ―engage in a process of mutual 
inquiry with them [students] rather than to transmit his or her knowledge to them and 
then evaluate their conformity to it.‖388 Knowles expounded on Lindeman‘s thoughts by 
writing that the richest resource in adult learning is the learner himself. Thus, the 
―emphasis in adult education is on experiential techniques—techniques that tap into the 
experience of the learners, such as group discussion, simulation exercises, problem-
solving activities, case method, and laboratory methods instead of transmittal 
techniques.‖389 
 The adult education described by Lindeman and Knowles can be found at ACSC. 
The ACSC student body of nearly 600 students is organized into seminars of 12 to 14 
students who are assigned a course instructor, whose purpose in seminar is to lead a 
group discussion on a particular curricular topic. A course instructor may teach two 
seminars, but will not be assigned to teach a seminar larger than 12 to 14 students at any 
one time. Furthermore, each seminar lesson is structured using the instructional 
methodologies mentioned by Knowles; group discussions, simulation exercises, 
problem-solving activities, case method investigation, and laboratory methods. Course 
instructors are taught how to employ these instructional methodologies through the 
ACSC Faculty Development program, and individual lessons are designed with one of 
these instructional methodologies in mind.  
                                                 
388 Ibid, 166. 
389 Knowles, 1980, 66. 
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Conclusions 
 The ACSC curriculum is unstable. During the period of this study, no broad, 
lasting consensus about what the ACSC curricula should contain was evident. The 
ACSC curriculum in 2006 did not resemble the 1990 curriculum. At any point in the 
period of this study, the ACSC curriculum resembled the priorities and ideas of the 
person in charge at that time. Curricular changes that do not necessarily enhance the 
ACSC curriculum are often made at the whims of leaders who happen to be in a position 
of authority and can effect these changes. Curricular changes instituted by these leaders 
are often their own personal ideas and priorities and are not necessarily made on the 
basis of sound educational criteria. Curriculum changes instituted by one leader are 
easily scrapped by a succeeding leader who does not share the same ideas or priorities 
and his or her predecessor, and then he or she institutes his or her own ideas. Thus, the 
cycle of curricular change continually spins with each cycle of leadership change, which 
averages about every two years.  
This cycle of curricular change at ACSC causes unnecessary turmoil in the 
curriculum development process, frustrates the ACSC faculty members, and is 
detrimental to effective recruitment and retention of professional faculty, particularly 
civilians with doctoral degrees. Moreover, the major curriculum shifts as well as the 
smaller-scale curricular changes did not appear to be connected to each other in any 
coherent way. Rather, these changes appeared to be the result of the current whims of 
those in charge as opposed to changes based upon sound educational reasoning.  
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 Professional Military Education curriculum should, in fact, be responsive to the 
evolving nature of warfare and the international security environment. As new 
developments in weapons technology, transportation, communications and information 
technology are introduced into the international security environment, PME curriculum 
does need to incorporate the impact of these developments on current and future U.S. 
military operations in order to remain relevant and on the forefront of developing 
officers capable of operating in such a rapidly changing environment.  
Recommendations 
  Curricular changes that need to be made, such as those that keep the ACSC 
curriculum relevant and updated should be made using sound educational decision 
making criteria and not on personal preference alone. Professional educators on the 
ACSC faculty and assigned to Air University should be consulted and their input 
seriously considered. In addition, the professional civilian educators assigned to the Air 
University Board of Visitors should be consulted for their expert advice on curricular 
changes that will have significant impact on the content and direction of the ACSC 
curriculum before change is instituted. Implementing curricular changes for reasons of 
personal preference or simply for the sake of making creative changes so a personal 
legacy can be left behind could be avoided if significant curriculum changes desired by 
Commandants were first required to be approved by the AU Commander.    
 A conscious effort for curriculum and adult education theory should be part of 
the curriculum development process within ACSC. Taking time out from ―doing‖ adult 
education in order to seriously think about why ACSC does what it does is not always 
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easy. However, relevant and current scholarship in the fields of curriculum theory and 
adult education should be reviewed by the ACSC Chief Academic Officer for 
incorporation into the curriculum design and implementation process at ACSC. This 
would ensure that the educational practitioners at ACSC are directed toward a more 
organized source of knowledge about curriculum and the teaching of adults as they plan, 
use, and evaluate the curricula at ACSC.  
 The Air Force should consider changing their practice of selecting personnel for 
the positions of ACSC Commandant and Air University Commander. Traditionally, the 
Air Force has assigned only senior active duty Air Force officers to these positions. 
These officers have traditionally been pilots with significant operational experience, but 
who do not hold doctoral degrees. The Air Force should consider placing professional 
educators in these positions, particularly experienced military officers or civilian 
educators with doctoral degrees. Hiring a civilian to either of these positions could 
reduce or eliminate the rapid change of leadership in the top PME positions and help 
stabilize the ACSC curriculum. Civilians do not change assignments nearly as frequently 
as their military counterparts do, and a civilian ACSC Commandant would most likely 
stay in the position for many years, helping stabilize the curriculum. Military officers 
from any career field who have a doctoral degree and educational experience, such as 
faculty at a PME institution, should also be considered for the position of Commandant. 
Significance 
 This study gives curriculum planners at ACSC a solid understanding of 
curriculum evolution in the post-Cold War era. Curriculum planners can use this study to 
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look for similarities in today‘s ACSC curriculum with the curriculum of the past, which 
will help them avoid the counterproductive activities of the past.  A historical awareness 
of the forces that have influenced ACSC curriculum and the rationale behind curricular 
changes will inform development of current and future curricula at ACSC. 
 This historical curricular awareness is important for ACSC because of the vested 
interest the American public has in how well its military officers are prepared to lead 
U.S. forces. Far-reaching consequences could result from a cadre of senior military 
leaders unprepared to successfully cope with today‘s volatile international security 
environment. Thus, this study makes a significant contribution to the existing knowledge 
of curriculum history at ACSC, provides understanding of its past, and allows 
curriculum developers at ACSC to avoid the mistakes of the past. Also, the civilian 
leadership of the United States periodically reviews the effectiveness of Professional 
Military Education curriculum in preparing its military leaders to succeed; this study will 
serve as a guide for review of past ACSC effectiveness.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
 During the course of conducting research for this study, several areas that 
warrant further research were noted. First, in what ways did the Skelton Report affect the 
future curriculum of the Professional Military Education schools (other than ACSC) in 
the Department of Defense? We know that Joint Education requirements were dictated 
to all PME schools through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, outside 
of this requirement, how was the core curriculum at the schools affected? A comparison 
study of the Skelton Report‘s impact between ACSC and its sister schools in the Army 
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and Navy, the Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Naval 
Command and Staff respectively, would illuminate how each service component viewed 
Professional Military Education within their respective service and whether any 
opportunities for cross-sharing of curricular ideas between schools were missed. 
 In addition, a study on the legacy and continuing impact of the Skelton Report 
for Professional Military Education in the United States is appropriate. The year 2009 
marks the 20th anniversary of the publication of the Skelton Report. Such a milestone for 
this very important report naturally begs the questions, ―What is the legacy of the 
Skelton Report, twenty years after it was published,‖ and ―In what ways is the Skelton 
Report influencing PME today?‖ Thus, a study examining not only the impact of the 
Skelton Report at the time of its publication in 1989, but also the continuing impact the 
Report is having on PME in the United States is timely.  
 A final area of suggested research is an exploration of the Air Force‘s practice of 
assigning senior officers as Commandants of ACSC or Commanders of Air University. 
These senior officers have traditionally not been trained as professional educators and 
therefore know little or nothing about formal adult learning or curriculum theory and 
models. These officers bring a wealth of operational and leadership experiences to their 
positions, have at least a Master‘s degree, and are graduates of senior-level PME 
schools. However, most of these officers cannot draw on adult learning and curriculum 
models to guide their decisions impacting PME curriculum or student learning. Although 
professional educators are assigned to ACSC and Air University, their input is often 
ignored if the officer in charge is bent on implementing his or her own ideas.  
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 Senior officers or civilians with doctoral degrees have not been assigned to lead 
Air Force PME. A study exploring the reasons why the Air Force has never hired a 
professional educator to lead its top military education schools could potentially lead to a 
change in the Air Force assignment culture; especially if the study included other service 
PME schools and revealed those schools have hired professional educators to lead them. 
Epilogue 
This study ends with the state of the ACSC curriculum in June 2006 at the end of 
Academic Year 2006. However, the curriculum story at ACSC that began with the 
events of September 11, 2001 continues. For example, a foreign language requirement 
and cultural studies were added to the ACSC curriculum for AY 2007.  
 This language and cultural studies initiative was the result of the Department of 
Defense recognizing the need for its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to have a 
better understanding of Middle Eastern culture and language as a result of its 
experiences during years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. Air Force Chief of Staff 
General Moseley first announced the forthcoming change for ACSC and the rationale 
behind the new curricular initiative during the Air Force Association‘s Air Warfare 
Symposium in February 2006. General Moseley stated, 
Starting next year, the students down at Maxwell are going to see a more robust 
education that is going to prepare them to be leaders in this global war on terror, 
and that included language education. It is going to be mandatory that they take 
one of four languages: Arabic, French, Spanish and Chinese. This will enable 
them to go to other countries, not only in the Middle East, but in the sub-Sahara, 
and be able to better work in those regions.390 
                                                 
390 Julie Weckerlein, Staff Sergeant, USAF, ―BMT Extended, NCOs and Officers to learn new languages,‖ 
Air Force Print News, February 3, 2006.  
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In a letter to all Air Force personnel in April, 2006, Secretary of the Air Force Michael 
W. Wynne reiterated the forthcoming change and expanded the rationale put forth by 
General Moseley. Secretary Wynne stated, 
As an expeditionary force, we find ourselves deployed to foreign countries with 
increased responsibilities in new mission areas. To ensure success, we need to go 
beyond our typical Air Force and Joint Force war fighting skills. Therefore, I am 
spearheading refined initial and developmental education for all ranks. Officers 
will see changes such as cultural and language classes added to their curriculums. 
Understanding different languages and different cultures is especially important 
in the Global War on Terror, where we work with many coalition partners in 
distant lands.391 
 
 Students of ACSC AY 2007 were the first to receive language and cultural 
studies. Students were required to take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) 
exam prior to arrival at ACSC. Based on their DLAB scores, students were allowed to 
select which language to study. Language training was not integrated into the core 
curriculum however. Instead, students were issued commercial language familiarization 
training software and were expected to complete the training outlined in the software as 
part of their normal study time. At the end of the academic year, students were required 
to pass a language familiarization exam in order to graduate.392 
 Cultural studies was not made into a stand-alone course, but was rather integrated 
into the existing core ACSC curriculum. ACSC faculty completed a comprehensive 
assessment and revision of course content in order to comply with the order from 
General Moseley and Secretary Wynne to incorporate language and cultural studies into 
                                                 
391 Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force, ―Letter to Airmen: Education and the Airman,‖ April 
13, 2006. 
392 Interview with Dr. Glen Spivey, September 2007. 
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the curriculum. ACSC published the results of this assessment and curricular revision on 
its website for AY 2007: 
The revision effectively balanced our study of military history, leadership and 
joint war fighting with a focused examination of the regions of Africa; East Asia 
and the Pacific area; Europe; ―Eurasia‖; the Near East; and South and Central 
America. With this mandate, ACSC has created a fresh approach to teaching 
mid-career officers. Not only will ACSC provide language familiarization in 
Mandarin Chinese, Arabic, French, and Spanish, the Department of International 
Security and Military Studies will address how political, cultural, strategic 
military and regional contexts impact military operations.393 
 
Language and cultural studies remain part of the ACSC curriculum as of AY 2008. 
  
                                                 
393 ACSC Home Page, accessed on August 1, 2008. 
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      APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Describe your association with ACSC, including positions held and responsibilities. 
 
Describe the curriculum development process at ACSC during your tenure. 
 
Describe the role you played in the curriculum development process during your tenure. 
 
During your tenure, what were the major curricular changes at ACSC? 
 
Identify the influences that drove curricular changes at ACSC during your tenure. 
 
Describe how those influences were manifested in the curriculum. 
 
What curricular influence stands out as having the most impact on the curriculum during 
your tenure and why? 
 
Indentify and describe factors that facilitated or impeded curricular change at ACSC. 
 
How would you characterize ACSC curriculum during the Cold War? 
 
How would you characterize ACSC curriculum during the post-Cold War era? 
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